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Preface 
The present study on Tanzania’s preparations for negotiating an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with 
the EU was carried out by a research team of the German Development Institute (GDI) within the framework of 
the GDI’s 2002/2003 postgraduate training course. The report's aim is to contribute to the preparations of EPA 
negotiations in ACP countries by providing information and structured guidance on the main dimensions of 
EPAs, on their potential impact, and on the negotiation opportunities that arise. Comprehensive fieldwork was 
carried out in Tanzania between February and April 2003. The research team closely co-operated with the Tan-
zanian Office of the President, the Commission on Planning and Privatisation (POPP), and the Economic and 
Social Research Foundation (ESRF) based in Dar es Salaam.  
When the field research was being conducted, the geographic configuration of EPAs at the regional level was not 
yet clear. In November 2003, member countries of the various regional organisations in Eastern and Southern 
Africa formally announced the configuration under which they were going to negotiate a regional EPA. In the 
case of Tanzania, which is a member of both the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African De-
velopment Community (SADC), a decision was made in favour of SADC. Some of the analysis of the present 
study concerning the regional level was done on the assumption that Tanzania would negotiate as part of EAC. 
The considerations and recommendations presented by this report, however, still apply, as the case of EAC 
served to exemplify the more general difficulties and the complexities that arise from negotiating as a regional 
entity. We therefore think that the main findings are useful all the same, for Tanzania as well as for other coun-
tries, particularly LDCs, in the region. 
We would like to express our gratitude to all our interview partners in the United Republic of Tanzania, in Ger-
many, Brussels, and Maastricht for their interest, time and patience, as well as for sharing with us their valuable 
information, knowledge and experience. Special thanks go to the participants of two workshops held in Dar es 
Salaam in April 2003, where our preliminary findings were discussed with representatives from ministries, par-
liament, civil society organisations, the private sector, donor agencies, the research community and non-
governmental organisations. We are mostly indebted, however, to our counterparts, Ms. Diana Makule from 
POPP, and Dr. Josaphat Kweka of ESRF for their competent advice and their support. Special thanks also go to 
Dr. Michael Stahl from GTZ and the staff of the East African Community’s Secretariat in Arusha for their coop-
eration. The views expressed in the present report, as well as any shortcomings that may remain, are of course 
entirely our responsibility. 
Asante sana! 
 
Bonn and Gaborone, November 2003 
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Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements with the EU I 
Summary of Findings and Recommenda-
tions 
Background and Rationale of the Study  
In September 2002, negotiations on Economic Part-
nership Agreements (EPAs) formally started be-
tween the European Union (EU) and the group of 
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. 
EPAs are an integral part of the Cotonou Agree-
ment, which was concluded between the parties in 
2000 and is the successor of the Lomé Conventions. 
The Cotonou agreement aims at defining a new 
development partnership between the EU and the 
ACP countries, including a comprehensive overhaul 
of the current trade arrangement, which has been 
characterised by unilateral trade preferences ex-
tended to the ACP countries by the EU.  
The aim of EPAs is to introduce, for the first time in 
the history of the special relations between the EU 
and the ACP countries, reciprocal free trade, pref-
erably as Free Trade Areas between the EU and 
ACP sub-regions. The underlying motives are on 
the one hand the need to make ACP-EU trade rela-
tions compatible with the World Trade Organisa-
tion’s (WTO) rules and regulations; on the other 
hand, the underlying assumption of the EPA con-
cept is that trade liberalisation and regional trade 
integration will enhance the ACP countries’ com-
petitiveness and accelerate their integration into 
global markets. EPAs are to be negotiated over a 
period of four years, or by the end of 2007, when 
the current WTO waiver expires and the new 
agreement needs to come into force.  
The present study analyses the risks and opportuni-
ties entailed by the planned Economic Partnership 
Agreements. With special reference to the United 
Republic of Tanzania, this report identifies the po-
tential fiscal, economic and social effects of EPAs 
and analyses the institutional set-up for EPA nego-
tiations at the all-ACP, regional and national level. 
It assesses the capacity for strategic trade policy 
formulation and the degree of preparedness for EPA 
negotiations at both the national and the regional 
level. Finally, the study gives a number of recom-
mendations regarding the eventual scope and con-
tent of EPAs, and identifies necessary steps for the 
preparation of the negotiations.  
It is obvious that EPA negotiations are both a great 
challenge and an opportunity for ACP countries, in 
particular for the large number of Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) among them, of which Tanzania 
is one. The aim of this report is to point out these 
challenges. In spite of some quantification carried 
out on the fiscal impact of EPAs, the present study 
is deliberately non-technical and focuses on the 
major risks and opportunities, including those relat-
ing to negotiation skills and institutional mecha-
nisms that must be created at the national, regional 
and multilateral level. More detailed impact studies 
and economic analyses at the sectoral level and on 
some technical issues will have to be carried out 
during the course of the negotiations.  
EPAs in the Context of other Preferential 
Trade Arrangements and the WTO 
The EPA negotiations will introduce a number of 
important changes to the traditional trade relation-
ship between the EU and the ACP countries. While 
the declared aim is to ensure that the achievements 
of the Lomé Conventions – the so-called Lomé ac-
quis – are maintained, it is also clear that the new 
trade arrangement needs to change considerably to 
become WTO-compatible. The current trade regime 
is based on unilateral preferences given by the EU 
to the ACP and could as such be challenged as un-
fair by other developing countries. The regime is 
only functional because of a waiver which was ex-
tended by the WTO but which expires at the end of 
2007. Hence the time pressure for a new agreement.  
The alternative offered by the EPA concept lies in 
reciprocal free trade agreements (FTAs) between 
the EU and regional sub-groupings of the ACP, 
where the ACP would gradually liberalise trade vis-
à-vis the EU. This would enable the EU to maintain 
the current preferential market access for the ACP, 
which is better than the preferences given to other 
developing countries under the EU’s General Sys-
tem of Preferences (GSP). Matters are complicated 
further, however, by the fact that the LDCs in the 
group already enjoy non-reciprocal duty and quota-
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free access to the EU under the Everything-But-
Arms Initiative (EBA). As this regime defines pref-
erential access for all LDCs regardless of geography 
or history, it is considered compatible with WTO 
principles.  
One of the main problems that arise with EPA nego-
tiations is therefore that the interests of the ACP 
countries vary according to their status as LDCs and 
non-LDCs. If mixed groups are to negotiate a single 
agreement, as is already foreseeable, these interests 
have to be harmonised. For both country groups the 
basic negotiation strategy is to keep their current 
preferences and achieve non-tariff improvements of 
market access in return for concessions on recipro-
cal trade liberalisation. The second major difficulty 
is due to the fact that the actual value of preferences 
and the scope of concessions required for WTO 
compatibility are not yet clear and will be influ-
enced by the outcome of negotiations under the 
WTO’s Doha Development Agenda expected to be 
finalised only by 2006. 
Fiscal, Economic and Social Impact of an 
EPA 
The present analysis points out that the fiscal impact 
of an EPA, resulting from a combined effect of the 
tariff reduction on revenue and changes in the trade 
pattern, is substantial but less dramatic than has 
been argued in previous studies in the case of Tan-
zania. What appears more problematic is the fact 
that whatever the revenue loss, Tanzania has little 
scope to compensate for it by increasing its already 
high VAT rate any further. On the contrary, because 
of the pressure arising for Tanzanian producers from 
increasing competition from within the region and 
abroad, there is even an ongoing discussion on low-
ering the VAT rate. Unavoidable tariff losses will 
then have to be compensated for through other 
revenue increases or expenditure cuts, but this may 
likewise run up against political resistance.  
According to our findings, trade liberalisation will 
have a negative impact on a number of private busi-
nesses that produce final goods and currently enjoy 
high levels of protection. Some will be able to make 
use of the envisaged transition periods for the nec-
essary adjustments in quality and productivity, par-
ticularly in those industries benefiting from com-
parative advantages such as the agro-processing 
industries. However, the benefits from cheaper im-
ported inputs will not be substantial, as the EU is 
not the lowest cost producer for most Tanzanian 
inputs. Within the manufacturing sector, textiles and 
clothing, and to a lesser extent auto parts, are shown 
by our findings to be among the most sensitive in-
dustries in the case of opening up for duty free trade 
with the EU. 
Of special concern for Tanzania, as for the majority 
of ACP countries, is the potential impact of EPAs 
on the agricultural sector. This sector contributes a 
large share to GDP and employs most of the poor. 
Our analysis shows on the one hand that the agricul-
tural sector appears to be in a better position with 
respect to increasing EU competition than manufac-
turing. Tariff elimination, according to our findings, 
will not lead to a sudden surge in agricultural im-
ports from the EU. This result is, however, subject 
to some qualifications. If prices of EU exports rap-
idly decrease (due to Eastern European enlargement 
for instance), or if the level of domestic or export 
subsidies further increases for certain products (e.g. 
because of a reshuffling under the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy), the picture may change sub-
stantially. Precautions should be taken to avoid any 
further unfair competition for the agricultural sector 
under EPAs. 
On the export side, concluding an EPA will not 
result in additional export opportunities for produc-
ers in Tanzania or elsewhere in the ACP countries, 
unless they are accompanied by substantial reforms 
of the EU's price-distorting agricultural policies, and 
by targeted measures in the ACP countries to help 
them comply with the EU’s sanitary and phytosani-
tary requirements. In Tanzania the agricultural sec-
tor faces a number of internal deficiencies that heav-
ily constrain its ability to benefit from new export 
opportunities particularly in non-traditional agricul-
tural goods. As long as the agricultural sector is not 
in a position to benefit from trade, the overall de-
velopment-related impact of EPAs will be minimal.  
More generally speaking, our analysis shows that if 
the objective of poverty reduction is to be achieved 
Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements with the EU III 
within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement, it 
will be essential to define complementary measures 
and flanking policies to trade in a way that more 
directly benefits the poor. The EPA concept itself 
says nothing on this point, and the European Com-
mission has thus far been reluctant to establish any 
closer link between the EPAs' trade component and 
their development dimension. The EC has also re-
jected the idea of “additional funds” for EPAs be-
yond the resources earmarked for capacity building 
activities. The present analysis shows, however, that 
there will be extra-needs associated with adjustment 
costs and revenue losses that should at least in part 
be addressed by the resource allocation processes 
under the EU’s National Indicative Plans (NIPs), 
while the Regional Indicative Plans (RIPs) may help 
to cater to unequally distributed costs and benefits 
of EPAs in the sub-regions.  
State of Preparedness and Institutional 
Arrangements at the National and Multi-
lateral Level 
The possibility to negotiate an EPA is an important 
opportunity in itself, as it gives the ACP countries 
the chance to influence the eventual outcome, 
thereby maximising their benefits and mitigating 
their risks. The prerequisite is, however, that the 
ACP countries are in fact in a position to negotiate 
strategically, i.e. to analyse, formulate and pro-
actively pursue their positions during the negotia-
tions. The analytical and institutional capacity 
needed for this is very limited in most ACP coun-
tries. Trade policy formulation is a challenging task 
as it affects a number of areas of an economy. Con-
sequently, this will involve inputs from various 
stakeholders, including several ministries as well as 
the private sector and intermediate institutions and 
organisations. For EPA negotiations, a national 
trade policy needs to be coordinated at the regional 
level and with delegations in Brussels and, poten-
tially, Geneva. 
Our findings indicate that in the case of Tanzania 
the preparation process for EPAs has not advanced 
very far and has been characterized by a fragmenta-
tion of responsibilities and mandates. The Ministry 
of Industry and Trade has only very recently been 
named to lead the process, but the resources it has to 
comply with that responsibility are severely limited. 
This is partly due to the fact that traditionally trade 
issues have not been high on the agenda of policy 
makers and of most other stakeholders, including 
the donor community in Tanzania. The fact that 
Tanzania’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) of 
2000 does not mention trade as one of the focal 
areas for strategic action is revealing.  
The uncertainty about the specific parameters of 
EPAs, and a widespread perception that EPAs will 
mainly serve the interests of the EU, have added to 
the passive or even reluctant attitude found at all 
levels in Tanzania concerning the preparation of 
EPA negotiations. As a result, the Government’s 
capacity, but also its political resolve, to prepare for 
EPA negotiations have been limited, and the prepa-
ration process is still in an early stage. This is par-
ticularly worrisome in view of the immediate need 
to enter into phase II of the negotiations that are set 
to be conducted at the regional level, which, how-
ever, will necessarily have to be based on national 
preparations.  
Involvement of Non-State Actors  
Involvement of non-state actors (NSAs) in EPA 
negotiations is one objective of the Cotonou 
Agreement, of which the EPA concept is part. Most 
ACP governments have difficulties putting this ob-
jective into practice for lack of experience, capacity, 
funding and political will, or a combination of all 
these factors. Evidence from the Tanzanian case 
shows that the Government's capacity to deal with 
EPA negotiations is very limited and that no initia-
tives have been taken so far to inform NSAs about 
the EPA process or to define how they are to be 
involved in the preparations. The most systematic 
effort in terms of awareness raising on Cotonou and 
EPAs made so far has been undertaken by the Ger-
man Friedrich Ebert Foundation, but even this has 
not met with keen interest from governments in 
most countries, including Tanzania.  
From the side of the European Commission there 
has been little guidance on how to involve NSAs. 
Moreover, neither incentives nor sanctions are pro-
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vided for in the case of (non-)involvement of NSAs. 
While there have been sporadic efforts in the con-
text of designing National Indicative Programmes 
since 2000, the outcome has been limited in both 
coverage and scope, and it has not resulted in a sys-
tematic NSA involvement in defining EU-ACP 
cooperation policies at the national level. Given the 
complexity of trade negotiations, more targeted 
action will be needed to identify, capacitate and 
involve the relevant NSA representatives in the EPA 
preparations. 
Regional Dimension of EPA Preparations 
Regional integration initiatives (RIs) are to be the 
building blocks of EPAs, and ongoing integration 
processes will be further enhanced by EPAs. How-
ever, at the time of writing, the geographic configu-
ration for phase II EPA negotiations was still un-
clear. Overlapping memberships between the exist-
ing regional initiatives add to the difficulty of clari-
fying configuration and mandate. The regional sec-
retariats, one potential structure to co-ordinate EPA 
negotiations, currently lack both the mandate and 
the capacity required. The overlap problem is not 
the fault of EPAs – in fact, EPAs will increase the 
pressure in favour of a rationalization of member-
ships and regional commitments of countries. But 
one should take into account that EPAs create un-
necessary time pressure for the existing RIs and that 
they introduce different objectives into the regional 
integration agenda. This may well run counter to a 
deepening of integration processes.  
Even once the question of configuration is resolved, 
the assignment of responsibilities between the re-
gional and the national level will not prove easy to 
clarify. The process of deeper regional integration 
involving institution building and transfer of sover-
eignty to the regional level has only just begun in 
the ACP regions, and EAC and SADC are no excep-
tions in this respect. The EPA concept does not take 
into account the reality of regional integration proc-
esses and the capacity of the existing RIs in most of 
the ACP sub-regions. As a minimum, the regional 
groupings will have to create regional EPA task 
forces or negotiation teams appointed by member 
states to coordinate the negotiations at the regional, 
i.e. the supra-national level. 
Recommendations 
The Cotonou Agreement puts forward the idea of a 
partnership on an equal footing, and engaging in 
EPA negotiations will be a real test for the new 
quality of this partnership. On the one hand, this 
requires that the ACP side urgently address the ca-
pacity constraints relating to trade policy issues at 
the national and regional level. On the other hand, 
the EU will have to demonstrate that with EPAs it is 
pursuing genuinely development-related rather than 
purely strategic or commercial interests.  
One of the greatest opportunities – i.e. that the out-
come of EPAs is at least to a certain extent negotia-
ble and not unilaterally determined – is therefore at 
the same time the greatest risk. The unequal bar-
gaining power of the negotiating parties is more 
than obvious, with the European Commission and 
its clear mandate and negotiation experience on the 
one side and the ACP group, soon to be sub-divided 
into yet unclear regional groupings, on the other. 
The present analysis confirms moreover that the 
bargaining power of the ACP countries will be re-
stricted because of a lack of analytical and negotia-
tion capacity, but also by the lack of political re-
solve to prepare for and formulate strategic posi-
tions for the negotiations.  
EPAs will be negotiated and it is therefore essential 
for all ACP countries to clearly identify the risks 
and opportunities involved and to weigh the costs 
against the benefits throughout the negotiations. The 
need to define and co-ordinate negotiation positions 
at the regional level has to be tackled urgently. Al-
though this poses a major challenge to the RIs cur-
rently involved in the deepening of regional integra-
tion processes as described above, it will also force 
the sub-regions to bundle their resources and to 
assume an active part in multilateral trade nego-
tiations for the first time.  
The recommendations can be summarized as fol-
lows.  
Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements with the EU V 
At the national level, Tanzania and most other ACP 
countries need 
— to commission thorough impact studies to re-
duce uncertainty concerning the potential bene-
fits and losses of an EPA; 
— to set up a national task force to co-ordinate 
EPA preparations of negotiations to overcome 
the fragmentation of responsibilities in the field 
of trade policy formulation and to establish a 
focal point for all relevant stakeholders, such as 
the private sector and civil society. 
At the regional level, countries will have  
— to urgently decide on the geographical configu-
ration of EPAs and to define roles and mandates 
for the preparation of the negotiations between 
national and regional authorities; 
— to actively tackle the problems arising from 
overlapping memberships, including setting up 
mechanisms to harmonise negotiation positions 
between those RIs that overlap; 
— to harmonise negotiation positions and strategic 
interests within the groupings and particularly 
between LDCs and non-LDCs in each group. 
At the multilateral level, Tanzania together with its 
regional partners should negotiate for:  
— an outcome as close as possible to the EBA 
scheme in terms of a total abolition of all tariffs 
and quotas on ACP exports; 
— the elimination of NTBs and targeted supply 
side assistance to reduce export constraints;  
— the definition of appropriate safeguards, es-
pecially in the agricultural sector; 
— special and differential treatment for LDCs, 
especially if they negotiate a joint EPA with 
non-LDCs; 
— compensatory measures in return for conces-
sions made in the area of reciprocal trade liber-
alisation to take into account adjustment costs 
and revenue losses.  
In addition to these negotiable positions, it needs to 
be clear that the ACP themselves have to undertake 
a number of steps towards necessary domestic re-
forms if EPAs are to be beneficial for them. More 
than anything, national governments will have to 
ensure that trade policy is better aligned with the 
relevant national policies, in particular fiscal re-
forms and agricultural policy, and that it is embed-
ded in a poverty reduction strategy, as this is a pre-
condition to make efficient use of trade and permit it 
to contribute to pro-poor growth. 
Another very relevant step to ensure a beneficial 
outcome of EPAs is without doubt the reform of the 
EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). While 
this reform is negotiated in other forums – within 
the EU and at the level of the WTO – during EPA 
negotiations, any opening up of agricultural sectors 
on the side of the ACP countries could be made 
conditional on substantial changes regarding the use 
of subsidies in the EU.  
Finally, over and above the eventual agreements 
themselves, ample assistance from the donor com-
munity should be made available to build trade ca-
pacity and to enable the ACP countries to be equal 
partners in global trade. Naturally, as the negotiating 
partner, the EU cannot directly assist the ACP coun-
tries in determining their negotiating positions. 
Nevertheless, the EU, and in particular the EU 
country delegations, can help raise awareness by 
disseminating information, especially about avail-
able funds and programmes for trade capacity build-
ing. Programmes of other international cooperation 
partners who have expertise to offer will have to 
complement these efforts in the area of trade and 
private sector promotion, such as UNCTAD, the 
WTO and some bilaterals like DFID, DANIDA or 
GTZ. 
In order to make EPAs an effective instrument for 
the integration of ACP countries into the world 
economy and at the same time to make them consis-
tent with the overarching objectives of poverty re-
duction and sustainable development, we suggest 
that the European Commission should  
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— show flexibility regarding timeframes and give 
regional groupings time to pursue and deepen 
ongoing regional integration processes; 
— cater to the needs of the LDCs through special 
and differential treatment regardless of configu-
ration; 
— offer improved market access in terms of a dis-
mantling of NTBs in return for trade liberalisa-
tion of the ACP; 
— ensure that applications for funding and trade 
capacity building are processed in an efficient 
and timely way; 
— make the EU country delegations explicitly 
responsible for dissemination of information 
about EPAs as well as for awareness raising 
among the various stakeholders about potential 
implications of EPAs; 
— foster and insist on the involvement of NSAs in 
trade policy formulation, as this was seen as one 
of the fundamental principles when the Cotonou 
Agreement was signed. 
Further, we suggest that the donor community, es-
pecially the EU member states, should  
— assist in trade capacity building, particularly in 
countries like Tanzania, where trade issues have 
not been high on the agenda; 
— closely co-ordinate trade capacity building ef-
forts to avoid fragmentation of various projects 
and programmes by different donors and to in-
crease effectiveness;  
— make EPA capacity building an element of al-
ready existing trade capacity building structures 
instead of establishing new ones; 
— ensure that trade capacity building programmes 
take into account overarching national strategies 
and poverty reduction programmes and closely 
align trade and other sectoral policies with 
them. 
The challenges ahead are numerous. To tackle them 
will demand political commitment and additional 
resources on the side of the ACP countries and their 
international co-operation partners, particularly the 
EU. Without a clear conviction on all sides that 
EPAs will be a success and benefit farmers, indus-
tries and society at large, there will be little support 
by ACP policy makers when it comes to implemen-
tation of the agreement.  
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1 Introduction 
In June 2000 the EU and the group of African, Car-
ibbean and Pacific states (ACP) signed the Cotonou 
Agreement in the capital of Benin. The Agreement 
replaced the Lomé Conventions that had shaped the 
special relations between the EU and its former 
colonies since 1975. With respect to trade and eco-
nomic co-operation, the Cotonou Agreement pro-
vides for separate negotiations of Economic Part-
nership Agreements (EPAs) between the signato-
ries. According to the Cotonou Agreement, the pri-
mary objective of EPAs is to foster the "smooth and 
gradual integration of the ACP States into the world 
economy" (Article 34.1). In pursuance of this goal, 
EPAs are to provide for reciprocal free trade areas 
between the EU and the ACP that conform to the 
rules and regulations of the international trade 
framework, i.e. that are WTO-compatible. In coher-
ence with the overall objectives and principles of 
the Cotonou Agreement, EPAs are moreover in-
tended to contribute to poverty reduction and sus-
tainable development in the ACP states. Finally, 
EPAs are envisaged to build on existing regional 
integration initiatives among the ACP and thereby 
foster regional trade integration processes.  
In September 2002 negotiations on the future EPAs 
formally started in Brussels at an all-ACP level. The 
two parties agreed that from September 2003 on a 
second phase of negotiations would be entered into, 
when the details of EPAs would be negotiated with 
regional groupings of ACP countries. The new 
agreement is set to be concluded by the end of 2007 
at the latest, and in 2008 implementation will com-
mence. The transition period to the full implementa-
tion of free trade areas is planned to be completed 
by 2020.  
Background and Rationale for EPAs  
Following from the Cotonou Agreement, EPAs will 
eventually replace the Lomé Conventions and rede-
fine trade relations between the EU and the ACP. 
The EC has stressed in various communications 
that, in contrast to Lomé, it is willing to negotiate 
and implement EPAs at a regional rather than at an 
all-ACP level. For the first time the element of re-
ciprocity will be introduced to trade relations be-
tween the signatories. The ACP side has in principle 
accepted that changes to the old regime have be-
come unavoidable and that the benefits of current 
unilateral preferences have been of limited value for 
the majority of ACP countries. With a view to recip-
rocity the group has stressed, however, the need to 
take into due account their lower stage of develop-
ment and to provide maximum flexibility in EPA 
negotiations to accommodate to their particular 
needs. The ACP have moreover emphasised their 
interest in maintaining ACP unity and solidarity 
throughout negotiations. According to the Cotonou 
Agreement, the eventual geographical configuration 
of EPAs is up to the decision of the ACP, including 
the choice to negotiate individual EPAs at the coun-
try level. 
For the EC one important motivation to negotiate 
EPAs can be found in the more general objective to 
restructure and rationalise its trade agreements with 
its main groups of trading partners. While WTO 
conformity is one element of the approach, regional-
ism and the negotiation of preferential bilateral 
agreements with a number of strategically important 
trade partners have become additional important 
pillars of the strategy. From a political economy 
point of view, the EU’s readiness to assist the ACP 
in their accession to world markets is clearly linked 
to the objective of maintaining and further strength-
ening traditional spheres of influence in the devel-
oping world. According to communications by the 
European Commission (EC), it is ready, however, to 
offer assistance within the EPA framework to ACP 
countries in all trade-related areas, and to promote 
regional integration initiatives among them. So far, 
however, the EC has not proposed any concrete 
improvements over the current arrangements, par-
ticularly concerning markets access. The ACP have 
for instance requested further reductions of tariff 
escalation in EU markets, the dismantling of non-
tariff barriers to trade and a substantial lowering of 
trade-distorting subsidies in agriculture in return for 
preference erosion.  
For the ACP group, it is not easy to strike a balance 
between the potential costs and benefits of the new 
agreement. While nobody would deny the numerous 
deficits of the Lomé regime, some ACP countries 
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have clearly benefited from its preferences, in par-
ticular from those that granted market access at 
above-market prices via the various commodity 
protocols. Another important concern of ACP coun-
tries is the potential impact of reciprocal free trade 
on their revenue from tariffs. Moreover, reciprocity 
will affect domestic markets through increased 
competition from EU producers. Depending on the 
coverage and sequencing of trade liberalisation, 
trade dynamics, the availability of alternative 
sources of fiscal revenue, and above all the respon-
siveness of the private sector and its ability to over-
come current supply-side constraints, ACP econo-
mies will therefore incur higher or lower adjustment 
costs – or reap additional benefits from the new 
arrangement.  
One key concern that arises with a view to the up-
coming negotiations is whether ACP countries will 
be able to make use of the new partnership approach 
as it is envisaged in the Cotonou Agreement. The 
intention to institute dialogue and negotiations to 
achieve a mutually binding agreement between 
trade partners – rather than continue with unilateral 
preferences granted by the EU, as under the Lomé 
Conventions or the Everything-But-Arms Initiative 
(EBA) – has been well received. However, the 
eventual outcome of EPAs will depend on the ca-
pacity of ACP countries to identify, formulate and 
effectively negotiate their strategic interests vis-à-
vis the EU. It is quite clear that the signatories to the 
Cotonou Agreement differ widely in their economic 
weight and their trade negotiation capacity, and 
consequently they have very different levels of bar-
gaining power. Hence, trade capacity building will 
be one of the most urgent issues to deal with along-
side negotiations. 
With a view to phase II of the negotiations, the op-
portunities and risks embodied in the EPA concept 
require detailed analysis. ACP countries and re-
gional organisations need to be fully aware of their 
negotiation options, and of the potential risks and 
opportunities involved. Prior to ratification of EPAs, 
ACP countries will need to be informed of all obli-
gations arising from the agreements, as well as of 
their respective social, economic and political im-
plications. This refers to both the country and the 
regional level.  
According to the EPA concept, the agreements 
should strengthen regional integrations processes. 
But existing regional organisations in Africa so far 
lack the mandate of their member states and also the 
capacity to take the lead in trade negotiations with 
third countries. Overlapping memberships, varying 
speeds of integration processes and the heterogene-
ity of member states in terms of level of develop-
ment and economic structure are bound to render 
the negotiation of EPAs at the regional level an 
extremely complex process, and there is an inherent 
risk of overstretching the capacities of the regional 
organisations both technically and politically. As 
EPAs are explicitly to support ongoing regional 
integration processes, and existing regional group-
ings are seen as building blocks of the new trade 
arrangement, there appears to be an urgent need to 
strengthen negotiation and implementation capacity 
at the regional level and to factor in these ‘new 
players’ during the negotiations.  
Finally, it is important to note that the eventual out-
come of a number of other ongoing negotiation 
processes may directly affect EU-ACP trade rela-
tions and the shape of EPAs. Among the most im-
portant issues are those arising from the Doha round 
of multilateral trade negotiations and the WTO 
framework in general, in particular any changes 
pertaining to Article XXIV of the GATT on free 
trade arrangements between developing and devel-
oped countries and provisions for special and differ-
ential treatment of the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs). Moreover, the process of EU enlargement 
and potential reforms to the EC’s Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP) are of special concern for EPA 
negotiations.  
Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of the present report is to con-
tribute to the preparations of phase II negotiations in 
Tanzania and to provide key stakeholders in Tanza-
nia with substantiated information on the potential 
risks, opportunities and negotiation options involved 
with EPAs.  
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More specifically, the present report seeks:  
— To inform stakeholders on the provisions as 
stated in the Cotonou Agreement regarding the 
EPA concept, the changes envisaged as com-
pared to the Lomé framework, on related trade 
regimes currently in place such as the EBA ini-
tiative of the EU, and on the general trade regu-
lations given by the WTO framework, as these 
are perceived to be the main reference points for 
EPA negotiations; 
— to identify against this background the opportu-
nities and risks entailed in the EPA concept for 
the case of Tanzania, generalising these findings 
where possible to a more comprehensive ACP 
perspective; 
— to analyse at the country level the ongoing 
preparations for EPA negotiations with a par-
ticular view to the institutional set-up and the 
involvement of non-state actors, including the 
private sector, in the preparations for negotia-
tions;  
— to assess the state of regional integration for the 
case of the EAC as one potential configuration 
for an EPA, and to identify the risks and oppor-
tunities involved in EPAs for the regional inte-
gration process; and finally 
— to formulate recommendations regarding the 
process of strategy formulation as well as on 
measures to be taken to strengthen trade capac-
ity at the national and regional levels, including 
the potential role of donor support. 
When the present report was finalised, the potential 
implications of an EPA had not yet been assessed 
systematically from the country perspective. While 
the EU commissioned a number of regional impact 
studies in the late 1990s, including a study on the 
EAC , their findings offered merely a starting point 
for the discussion, and they are now outdated in 
several respects. More recently, a regional impact 
study was produced for SADC on behalf of the ACP 
and SADC Secretariat (Trades Centre 2003). Based 
on partial equilibrium analysis using the SMART 
methodology developed by UNCTAD, the authors 
find that EPAs will result in substantial revenue 
losses, entail significant adjustment costs and poten-
tially undermine regional integration processes. The 
authors recommend tying the phasing in of trade 
liberalisation to certain thresholds of development 
indicators.  
By the end of 2002, terms of reference for country 
studies had been issued by the ACP Secretariat, but 
a number of countries were late in commissioning 
these studies. As for the case of Tanzania, the Gov-
ernment submitted its terms of reference and applied 
for the respective funds in Brussels in April 2003, 
and the drafting process was still underway at the 
time of writing.  
In addition to being delayed, an important deficit of 
the current preparations may evolve from the fact 
that the discussions so far have concentrated on the 
economic implications whereas problems relating to 
the overall development impact of EPAs, their po-
litical dimension and the institutional structure of 
negotiations have not yet been addressed. Questions 
relating to the role of the existing regional bodies 
have not been tackled, and none of the negotiation 
parties has suggested yet how non-state actors 
should be involved in the preparation of negotia-
tions. Finally, while there is broad consensus on the 
fact that ACP countries generally lack trade negotia-
tion capacity, so far very few concrete measures 
have been undertaken to actually build up this ca-
pacity.  
It should be noted that the present report does not 
seek to substitute for the national Tanzanian process 
of preparation for negotiations, nor does it aim to 
render obsolete other impact studies carried out at 
the national or regional level. Rather, the present 
study seeks to complement such analyses by shed-
ding light on the political economy of EPA negotia-
tions. The strategy building processes at the national 
and regional levels are entirely up to the local stake-
holders. Hence, our main contribution lies in the 
stimulation of discussions among these stake-
holders. 
The present report is structured as follows. Chapter 
2 discusses the methodological approach and time-
table of the study. Chapter 3 outlines the principles 
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and objectives of the Cotonou Agreement and as-
sesses the main changes introduced by the EPA 
concept compared with the former Lomé Conven-
tions. We also explain the major elements of the 
EPA concept and discuss alternative options for 
EPA negotiations against the background of rele-
vant multilateral trade regulations. Chapter 4 out-
lines the fiscal and economic impact of EPAs by 
means of a comparative static analysis and deline-
ates the potential social implications for Tanzania. 
Chapter 5 gives an outline of the current state of 
EPA negotiations in Tanzania and identifies the 
main shortcomings of national trade policy formula-
tion. Furthermore, the chapter puts special emphasis 
on the role of NSAs in the EPA preparation process. 
Chapter 6 analyses the potential opportunities and 
risks for regional initiatives in the context of EPAs, 
paying particular attention to the state of EPA 
preparations in the EAC. The final chapter provides 
a summary of the main findings and a general as-
sessment of the EPA concept. The report concludes 
with recommendations for the negotiation parties 
and the donor community on how to make EPAs an 
effective instrument for the development of ACP 
countries.  
2 Methodological Approach 
The present study was carried out in two phases. 
During the first phase, from November 2002 to mid-
February 2003, the research team conducted a desk 
study. The team reviewed the relevant literature and 
official documents on the Cotonou Agreement, 
critically analysed the EPA concept and the state of 
negotiations, and assessed the socio-economic situa-
tion of Tanzania and the country's state of integra-
tion into world and regional markets.  
The second phase was comprised of a field study in 
Tanzania and was carried out between mid-February 
and the end of April 2003. During this phase, the 
research team collected trade and revenue data and 
carried out interviews with key stakeholders from 
the public and private sectors as well as with civil 
society. Throughout the field phase the research 
team assessed information gaps and disseminated 
missing information on the Cotonou Agreement and 
EPAs to stakeholders. The research team analysed 
the data collected and presented preliminary find-
ings at two workshops held in Dar es Salaam. The 
results of the workshop discussions were integrated 
in the present final report. 
Collection of empirical data: In order to assess 
risks and opportunities of EPAs and to identify the 
main negotiation options, we chose a combined 
approach consisting of qualitative and quantitative 
data collection and analysis. The qualitative ap-
proach was used to gather data on the current state 
of the regional integration process and to assess the 
role of trade policy and the past and present in-
volvement of the various stakeholders in its formu-
lation. The relevant stakeholders include govern-
ment representatives from Tanzanian ministries 
from both mainland and Zanzibar, staff of the East 
African Community Secretariat, various para-statal 
and academic institutions, business representatives, 
as well as a number of NGOs (see Annex A and 
Table 1, below). The majority of interviews were 
conducted in Dar es Salaam, where most of our 
interview partners from the public and private sector 
and most civil society organisations are based. The 
data was supplemented by interviews conducted in 
Arusha region, where the EAC Secretariat is based 
but which is also one of the country's major com-
mercial and agricultural regions. The team con-
ducted interviews with entrepreneurs of the manu-
facturing and agricultural sectors in the Dar es Sa-
laam and the Arusha/ Kilimanjaro region. To take 
into account the special situation of Zanzibar within 
the United Republic of Tanzania, the researchers 
also interviewed officials of the Zanzibarian Gov-
ernment.  
The interviews sought to explore the interviewees' 
perceptions and positions towards EPAs, aiming to 
identify, from different angles, the risks and oppor-
tunities for Tanzania associated with the creation of 
EPAs. All interviews were based on semi-structured 
questionnaires (see Annex B). The questionnaires 
took into account the heterogeneity and varying 
levels of information of the stakeholders inter-
viewed and were slightly adapted where necessary. 
Interviews were in most cases conducted by two 
researchers. Further official and internal documents 
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gathered from interview partners were used to com-
plement the qualitative data collected. 
In addition, the team worked with quantitative data 
from various sources such as the Bank of Tanzania 
and the Tanzania Revenue Authority, mainly on 
trade and revenue collection. The data served to 
compute the implications of trade liberalisation on 
revenue collection, trade performance and main 
economic sectors.2 
Capacity building: A second aim of the project’s 
field phase was capacity building, i.e. provision of 
stakeholders with information on EPAs, the current 
state of negotiations, and, more generally, on nego-
tiation options. In accordance with the main inten-
tion of the present project – that is, to contribute to 
the preparation of EPA negotiations, to stimulate 
discussions and build capacity in this respect – the 
methodological approach differed somewhat from 
purely research-led studies.  
These objectives were pursued by three means: 
First, by distributing information on EPAs, discuss-
ing sensitive issues and thereby raising awareness 
on the topic among stakeholders. Second, the team 
compiled an EPA information package and distrib-
uted it to stakeholders.3 Third, the research team 
                                                     
1  These include business development services, chambers, 
trade unions associations, investment centres, etc.  
2  Details on the methodology used in this part are contained 
in Annex D. 
3  The package consisted of relevant information suitable to 
get acquainted with the subject as well as with the oppor-
tunities and risks of EPAs and the ways in which various 
stakeholders are involved. Apart from documents on EPAs 
and the Cotonou Agreement and the Agreement itself, we 
included parts of the Cotonou Infokit compiled by 
ECDPM.  
conducted two workshops with the main stake-
holders involved, thereby complementing and en-
hancing ongoing research and capacity building 
processes on the implications of the Cotonou 
Agreement, of trade liberalisation and of regional 
integration efforts on Tanzania.4 The workshops 
also addressed the role of the donor community and 
its potential contribution to trade capacity building 
and preparations for EPA negotiations in Tanzania.  
Although the present study was conducted on 
schedule and is quite comprehensive in scope, it 
suffers from a number of limitations. First, and per-
haps most importantly, it should be noted that 
throughout the interview phase the study team had 
to cope with the fact that for most stakeholders 
EPAs still appear to be a largely hypothetical sce-
nario that is not a priority on their agenda. Often, 
the concept of EPAs even meets with open disap-
proval and is seen as something negative imposed 
from the outside. This is obviously a limitation in-
volved in the stakeholder approach chosen by the 
research team, one which was particularly virulent 
in the interviews conducted with representatives 
from civil society organisations.  
Secondly, a full assessment of the economic impli-
cations of EPAs on individual economic sectors 
would have required a deeper analysis of the current 
situation at the industry and enterprise level than 
was possible within the scope of the present multi-
disciplinary study. The empirical data collected are 
therefore rather a snapshot, though one highlighting 
the main risks and opportunities involved in EPAs 
for the most relevant sectors.  
                                                     
4  The workshops were carried out in close cooperation with 
the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and ESRF, which are 
among the institutions most actively engaged in research 
and capacity building in the respective fields. 
Table 1: Distribution of Interview Partners 
 Associa-
tions etc.1 
Donor 
Com-
munity 
EAC Se-
cretariat 
Govern-
ment 
NGOs Private 
Sector 
Research 
Com-
munity 
Total 
Number of 
Interviews 
12 9 7 18 5 19 10 80 
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Thirdly, at the time of writing the geographic con-
figuration for EPAs was still unclear. The present 
report analyses the East African Community (EAC), 
of which Tanzania is a member, in more detail so as 
to highlight some of the implications of the EPA 
negotiations at the regional level. An in-depth im-
pact study on the fiscal and economic implications 
of an EPA with a certain configuration can, how-
ever, only be conducted when the configuration has 
been decided on. Moreover, the present report does 
not provide any recommendations regarding which 
geographical configuration would be most appropri-
ate for Tanzania. This would have required a com-
parative analysis of the other options available, 
which is beyond the scope of the present study. 
Finally, it should be noted that one limitation of the 
present report is inherent in its scope. As a country 
case study, most of the findings are specific to the 
Tanzanian situation, and are thus not necessarily 
transferable to other countries. While the East Afri-
can region was covered to some extent by the data 
and interviews carried out in Arusha, additional 
analyses of the other two member countries of the 
EAC would have been necessary to provide a com-
plete assessment of the integration process and po-
tential implications of an EPA on the latter.  
3 The Concept of Economic Partnership 
Agreements: Objectives, Regulatory 
Framework and Political Economy of 
Negotiations 
3.1 Co-operation between the EU and 
ACP Countries: Background 
In June 2000 the EU and the ACP countries signed 
the Cotonou Agreement in Benin’s capital, after 
which it was named. The Agreement replaced the 
Lomé Conventions, which, having been adapted 
several times, had been in place for 25 years. 
Among the aims of the new Agreement are to make 
the economic co-operation between the EU and the 
ACP countries compatible with WTO standards and 
to increase its effectiveness. The elements of an 
enhanced partnership for development and of politi-
cal dialogue between the partners are emphasised in 
the Cotonou Agreement. The two major pillars of 
the Lomé Conventions retain their place under 
Cotonou: trade and aid.  
The Lomé Conventions: The main objective of the 
first Lomé Convention was to enhance the economic 
and social development of ACP countries by inte-
grating them into the world economy. The EU 
granted the ACP countries trade preferences and 
opened its markets to all products originating from 
these countries apart from agricultural products and 
textiles.5 Because the arrangement was not compati-
ble with WTO rules, it required special approval 
through waivers. The most important achievement, 
especially of the last Lomé Convention, was to per-
ceive the ACP countries as equal partners instead of 
as mere recipients of development aid. A result of 
this new approach can be found in the National In-
dicative Programmes (NIP) financed from the Euro-
pean Development Fund (EDF). Yet past EU-ACP 
development co-operation was unable to prevent 
ACP economies from being increasingly marginal-
ized in global trade, and it failed to break the cycle 
of commodity export dependency. Moreover, the 
idea of partnership in development co-operation was 
not substantiated in any meaningful way.  
The Cotonou Agreement: Despite displaying simi-
larities with its predecessors concerning aid aspects, 
the Cotonou Agreement differs from Lomé essen-
tially with respect to trade. The main objectives 
stated in the Cotonou Agreement are to reduce pov-
erty in the associated countries, to contribute to 
sustainable development, and to integrate the ACP 
countries successfully into the world economy (Ar-
ticle 1). The latter objective is to be fostered not 
only by strengthening EU-ACP trade relations, as in 
the past, but also by enhancing trade relations 
among the ACP countries. To achieve this, the EU 
is encouraging ACP countries to engage in regional 
integration initiatives and to open up these initia-
tives towards the EU market. Economic Partnership 
Agreements are to become the main instrument to 
                                                     
5  Exceptions were made for sugar, rice, bananas, and beef. 
The so-called commodity protocols still regulate the import 
of certain amounts of these products to the EU, allowing 
ACP exporters to benefit from higher prices within the EU. 
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pursue these objectives; they will be discussed in 
more detail below. Further attention was given to 
participation, structural reforms, and capacity build-
ing as well as to fighting corruption. The four main 
principles of the Cotonou Agreement are (Article 2):  
1. Equality of the partners and ownership of the 
partner country  
2. Participation of all stakeholders – state and non-
state actors – of the partner country in defining 
objectives of economic and development co-
operation 
3. Political dialogue and mutual obligations, in-
cluding respect of human rights, and  
4. Differentiation in accordance with the varying 
needs and levels of development of the ACP 
countries, taking into account regional integra-
tion processes.  
The ACP countries are expected to take on a more 
active role in shaping trade and development co-
operation. The idea of a partnership on an equal 
footing engaging in economic and social co-
operation became the main concept of the Agree-
ment. The major innovations of the Cotonou 
Agreement as compared to the Lomé Conventions 
are thus its stress on political dialogue, perform-
ance-based aid, and the integration of new actors 
into development co-operation. 
3.2 Reforming Economic and Trade 
Relations between the EU and the 
ACP Countries 
The Cotonou Agreement is the general framework 
defining overall ACP-EU co-operation on economic 
and social development. Articles 34 to 54 of the 
Agreement then define more specifically the scope 
and content of future EPAs. Briefly spoken, EPAs 
are to define new trading arrangements that comply 
with WTO regulations (Article 36.1). EPAs are to 
be consistent with the overall development objec-
tives agreed between the ACP countries and the EU. 
High importance is accorded to trade development 
within national and regional development strategies. 
The Cotonou Agreement stipulates that EPAs are to 
be negotiated between the signatories starting in 
September 2002, and come into force on 1 January 
2008.  
The EPA concept encompasses three major princi-
ples:  
1. EPAs are to include implementation of WTO-
compatible free trade areas (FTAs) between the 
EU and the ACP countries, which essentially 
means that trade liberalisation will be reciprocal 
rather than unilateral.  
2. To safeguard the interests of the ACP vis-à-vis 
an economically much stronger partner, special 
and differential treatment (SDT) will be ac-
corded to them, which means that their lower 
level of development will be given due consid-
eration. 
3. EPAs will build on and enhance regional inte-
gration processes on the side of the ACP coun-
tries; consequently, they should be concluded 
with groups of ACP countries already engaged 
in regional integration initiatives rather than 
with individual countries. 
The following subsections discuss the three main 
elements of future EPAs against the background of 
the respective WTO regulations, and highlight the 
potential implications for the ACP countries. 
WTO compatibility: The EU Commission intends 
to establish WTO-compatible FTAs with the ACP 
countries. Trade liberalisation will thus, in accord-
ance with Article XXIV of the GATT of 1994, 
cover “substantially all … trade.” 
Article XXIV leaves room for interpretation, as it 
merely states that: 
— the eventual free trade agreement must be estab-
lished within “a reasonable length of time”; 
— and that trade barriers have to be eliminated on 
“substantially all the trade between the con-
stituent territories.” 
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The WTO defines the “reasonable length of time” 
as full liberalisation in FTAs which “should exceed 
ten years only in exceptional cases”. FTAs between 
industrialised countries and developing countries 
and even more so LDCs constitute exactly the  
“exceptional case.” Hence, the exact length of the 
transition phase is subject to discussion.6 
“Substantially all … trade” is at present defined as 
90 % + of all trade, without stipulating the absolute 
reference figure on which the percentage is to be 
calculated. Either trade volume prior to the liberali-
sation process between the partners or the number 
of product lines according to the common trade 
classification systems such as the Harmonised Sys-
tem (HS) may be taken as the base reference.7 Both 
approaches only consider the variety of products 
being traded, not the potential financial value of free 
trade. They may therefore not be the most concise 
indicators for defining “substantially all … trade”. 
The rather vague definition of Article XXIV poten-
tially gives some leeway to ACP countries negotiat-
ing an EPA regarding the coverage of products and 
longer implementation periods for the liberalisation 
process vis-à-vis the EU (also see special and dif-
ferential treatment, below). Asymmetric liberalisa-
tion would reduce adjustment costs in two ways: 
first, by lowering the amount of revenue forgone via 
trade levies, and second by protecting sensitive sec-
tors and infant industries. Longer implementation 
periods would give ACP economies more time to 
adapt to the new trade regime.  
Special and differential treatment: WTO trade 
regulations provide for special and differential 
                                                     
6  In the case of the EU’s FTA with South Africa, and in the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) for Mexico, 
transitional liberalisation periods of 12 and 15 years have 
been granted respectively (McQueen, 2002). The WTO has 
been notified of both agreements have been notified, but 
they are still under review. 
7  Using  the trade classification catalogues as a base refer-
ence will usually allow for more extensive liberalisation 
than historical trade volume, since  actual trade is subject 
to protective policies and tariffs. The EU, for instance, pro-
tects selected agricultural goods, processed foods and or-
ganic chemicals to such an extent that trade liberalisation 
for whole HS chapters is at a standstill.  
treatment for developing countries and LDCs to 
reduce negative effects of trade liberalisation.8 First, 
asymmetrical liberalisation allows developing coun-
tries and LDCs to liberalise less tariff lines by lower 
percentages of tariff reduction at a slower speed 
than industrial countries. Second, developing coun-
tries and LDCs may implement policies otherwise 
considered to be trade-distorting, such as the provi-
sion of domestic support for their agricultural sec-
tors. Third, industrial countries may grant develop-
ing countries unilateral trade preferences by apply-
ing lower tariffs than the Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) tariffs. 9  
The EU has used asymmetrical liberalisation in its 
FTA with South Africa; therefore it may be ex-
pected that it will also do so in EPAs with the ACP 
countries. As for the second option, the majority of 
developing countries and LDCs lack sufficient fund-
ing to implement policies for the support of certain 
sectors; but the Cotonou Agreement acknowledges 
“supply and demand side constraints” and “trade 
development measures as means of enhancing ACP 
states' competitiveness” (Article 35). Finally, one of 
the principle aims of EPAs is to end non-reciprocal 
preferential trade between the ACP countries and 
the EU, thus ruling out the third option, to provide 
special and differential treatment.  
Where WTO Article XXIV provides a leeway due 
to unspecified regulation, SDT clearly allows for 
more flexibility on the side of developing countries 
and LDCs in any trade agreement or liberalisation 
commitment. On the other hand, as the EU wants to 
conclude EPAs with regions rather than with single 
countries, it would have to provide SDT for groups 
                                                     
8  Special and differential treatment (SDT) has its origin in 
the Enabling Clause agreed upon in the WTO’s Tokyo 
Round in 1979. 
9  A country granting trade preferences under the provisions 
of SDT must outline such preferences in the General Sys-
tem of Tariff Preferences (GSP) and report these to the 
WTO secretariat. The General System of Tariff Prefer-
ences is the instrument at the heart of the “Enabling 
Clause” of 1971. It has been equipped with a waiver of the 
MFN principle for an indefinite period since 1979. The EU 
was the first to implement its own GSP Scheme in 1971, 
and since then it has granted developing countries tariff 
preferences.  
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of countries. It remains to be seen how each coun-
try’s specific needs and developing interests in such 
groups can be catered for. Furthermore, among 
themselves ACP countries are likely to have con-
flicting interests in the SDT granted to them by the 
EU. 
Regionalization: The EPA concept envisages 
strengthening regional integration on the side of the 
ACP countries. Thus the EU would wish for the 
ACP countries to enter EPAs as regional groups. 
The WTO agreement rules that FTAs will have to 
engage in reciprocal free trade rather than continue 
with (market-distorting) preferential trade of the 
kind granted under the Lomé Convention and cur-
rently still in effect until the conclusion of EPA 
negotiations. ACP countries, especially the least 
developed ones among them, will have to choose 
between two options: Either they may decide to 
establish economic unions with their regions (FTAs, 
customs unions) to conclude an EPA with the EU; 
this would mean reciprocal free trade with the EU. 
Alternatively, they may opt out of EPA negotiations 
– thereby also risking hampering integration efforts 
in their region – to avoid increased competition 
from both regional and European producers.  
Article 37 of the Cotonou Agreement states that 
EPAs will be negotiated “with ACP countries which 
consider themselves in a position to do so, at the 
level they consider appropriate.” That is, theoreti-
cally, ACP countries may negotiate an EPA indi-
vidually, but this alternative does not seem realistic 
for two reasons. First, neither from a political nor 
from an economic point of view does it seem feasi-
ble for ACP countries to step out of ongoing re-
gional integration processes in order to retain cur-
rent unilateral preferences in EU markets. Second, 
the Commission has made it quite clear that it fa-
vours the negotiation of regional agreements.  
At the time of writing, some of the ACP countries 
had not yet taken a formal decision on the regional  
grouping with which they wanted to continue EPA 
negotiations. Tanzania can negotiate an EPA as a 
member of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) or of the EAC, while Kenya 
and Uganda could negotiate under the umbrella of 
the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA). Overlapping memberships clearly re-
main an unresolved issue in Eastern and Southern 
Africa that will not only complicate EPA negotia-
tions but also hamper regional integration pro-
cesses.10 Economically sound and technically feasi-
ble solutions still need to be found.  
The planned schedule for EPA negotiations is as 
follows: The first phase of EPA negotiations started 
between all ACP countries (represented by the ACP 
secretariat) and the EU Commission (represented by 
the DG Trade) in September 2002. In September 
2003, phase II of the negotiations formally started at 
a regional level, but it was agreed at the same time 
between the signatories that phase I negotiations of 
the all-ACP group would continue in parallel. ESA 
and SADC announced in November that EPA nego-
tiations at the regional level would be launched in 
February and March 2004, respectively. As the 
waiver currently granted by the WTO will phase out 
in 2007, the new agreement will need to come into 
force by 2008. The free trade area is set to be fully 
functional by 2020, i.e. after a transitional phase of 
12 years. 
3.3 Status of European Preferential 
Trade Arrangements – Implications 
for EPAs 
As has been shown above, the Cotonou Agreement 
and subsequent EC documents have so far only 
vaguely defined the eventual shape of EPAs. In fact, 
some of the provisions appear to contradict other 
trade arrangements currently in place such as the 
EBA initiative covering the LDCs. In addition, it is 
not yet clear what concessions the EU is ready to 
make on the market access side in return for recip-
rocity or the expected phasing out of the commodity 
protocols. In order to identify the potential scope of 
EPAs more clearly, we analyse other trade regimes 
currently in place in the EU that may serve as a 
                                                     
10  Tanzania withdrew from COMESA in 2001. Both EAC 
and COMESA announced their intention to establish a 
Customs Union by 2004. If the overlap remains in place, 
common external tariffs will have to be identical in both 
regional organisations. 
10 Regine Qualmann et al. 
benchmark for negotiation options. For an over-
view, see Annex C.11  
The EU’s General System of Preferences (GSP) on 
the one hand and the Everything-But-Arms Initia-
tive (EBA) on the other are the nearest benchmarks 
for EPAs. ACP countries will have to gain in market 
access over and above the current GSP if they are 
not to be “worse off” than under Lomé. The “supe-
rior tranche general system of preferences” (Super 
GSP), better known as the Everything-But-Arms 
Initiative, for which currently only LDCs are eligi-
ble, offers duty- and quota-free market access on a 
unilateral basis. The GSP is thus the “bottom line” 
benchmark for EPAs, with EBA serving as the op-
timum in terms of market access regarding tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions. Both regimes and their 
pros and cons are analysed in more detail below. 
Apart from the Cotonou Agreement, the EU is cur-
rently engaged in a number of bilateral free trade 
agreements with various developing countries. The 
WTO has been notified of these agreements, but the 
notification process is still under way. Of these 
agreements, the Trade and Development Coopera-
tion Agreement (TDCA) concluded between the EU 
and South Africa in 1999 is one of the most relevant 
benchmarks for EPAs. It will also be considered in 
more detail below. 
The European General System of Prefer-
ences  
The European GSP grants developing countries and 
LDCs preferential market access provisions better 
than those under MFN tariffs but less liberal than 
EU free trade agreements. This leads Stevens and 
Kennan (2001) to argue that: 
                                                     
11  We deliberately exclude the African Growth and Opportu-
nity Act (AGOA) from this comparison. AGOA is not as 
comprehensive in terms of product lines as the EU trade 
regimes we look at. However, the promotion and imple-
mentation of the program appears to be more hands-on and 
quite effective in a number of the eligible countries, 
thereby in some respects providing a useful lesson to the 
European schemes in place.  
“The EU’s effective trade policy has turned WTO 
terminology on its head. In practice, the EU’s most-
favoured regime is that provided under the Cotonou 
Agreement, the set of bilateral agreements that the 
EU has negotiated with its Southern and Eastern 
neighbours plus South Africa, and the Super GSP.” 
The EU’s GSP currently regulates preferential mar-
ket access for 179 countries. These include all 76 
signatories to the Cotonou Agreement;12 nine other 
developing countries engaged in trade and co-
operation agreements with the EU;13 an additional 
nine non-ACP LDCs which benefit at the same time 
from the EBA-initiative; and six developing coun-
tries that are currently conducting negotiations on 
free trade and co-operation agreements with the 
EU.14 
In general, the GSP sets percentage reductions for 
MFN tariffs for exporters from beneficiary coun-
tries. Fine-tuning in the composition and extent of 
preferences is defined by the scheme of the GSP, 
which provides individual regulations for different 
countries or groups of countries, e.g. the ACP 
group. More than half of the 179 GSP beneficiaries 
are granted additional preferences above the stand-
ard GSP.  
Implementation of any preferential regime necessar-
ily calls for rules of origin to regulate who is to 
benefit from the preferences and who is not. The 
point of rules of origin is to ensure that only the 
beneficiary country can take advantage of the GSP. 
They apply when a product of a beneficiary country 
is not fully “obtained” in that country, since inputs 
from third countries are used in it. As a rule of 
                                                     
12  This includes all ACP countries with the exception of 
Cuba, which did not sign the Cotonou Agreement. South 
Africa is an ACP member, but with a qualified member-
ship. As stated above, the country has concluded a separate 
free trade agreement with the EU and enjoys observer 
status at EPA negotiations. 
13  Currently in force are free trade agreements with Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, the Palestinian Authority, Mexico, 
South Africa, Lebanon; in ratification: Egypt, Jordan. 
14  Negotiations with MERCOSUR and Chile have been in 
progress since 2000; Syria has been negotiating on acces-
sion to the Euro-Med since 1998. 
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thumb, a minimum of 60 % of value added should 
be created domestically if a processed product is to 
qualify as originating in the exporting country. In 
some cases, the EU grants a “cumulation of origin,” 
which means that products containing inputs from 
specified countries are considered eligible for pref-
erences as if they were obtained wholly in the bene-
ficiary country.  
The cumulation of origin for ACP countries is more 
generous than the regime imposed on standard GSP 
beneficiaries, providing for full cumulation among 
all ACP countries and EU member states. Still, there 
has been much criticism  concerning the detrimental 
impacts of the current regime of rules of origin on 
ACP exports to the EU. Both the minimum trans-
formation required – a two-stage transformation, for 
instance, applies for textiles and clothing – and the 
administrative procedures necessary for the certifi-
cation of origin appear to be beyond the capacities 
of many ACP countries. Moreover, with preference 
margins constantly eroding, the rules of origin have 
become a more decisive factor for exporters than the 
actual tariffs – one of the potential factors held re-
sponsible for the low utilisation rate of trade prefer-
ences granted to developing countries and LDCs.  
The EC has recently taken up this criticism and is 
undertaking a comprehensive review of its rules of 
origin regimes and their overall effectiveness.15 For 
the ACP side, the eventual specification of the ap-
plicable rules of origin, i.e. the type of transforma-
tion required, certification procedures and the scope 
of cumulation may become one of the most critical 
issues during EPA negotiations. 
Of roughly 7000 dutiable products included in the 
GSP, the EU has classified 3300 as non-sensitive to 
its domestic market and thus eligible to be exported 
duty-free. For the remaining 3700 sensitive prod-
ucts, GSP beneficiaries are granted tariffs lower 
than the respective MFN tariffs. Where certain con-
tingency thresholds exceed levels that may threaten 
European producer competitiveness, sectors may 
either be graduated to 'sensitive' or be completely 
                                                     
15  See Green Paper on the Application of Rules of Origin, 
European Commission, 2003.  
“graduated out” of the GSP. If a beneficiary country 
exports “the lion's share” of one commodity to the 
EU, this country would also be graduated out of the 
scheme to assure fair distribution of preferences 
among the beneficiaries.16 As the GSP applies for 
almost every developing country, ACP countries 
would benefit if strong developing countries and 
their respective sectors were graduated (Davenport 
2002:35). An EPA is therefore expected to provide 
preferential market access for ACP countries well 
above the level of the standard GSP. It appears that 
it will not be an option to risk a loss of preferences 
or accept stricter rules of origin by “falling back” on 
the standard GSP-status. 
Super GSP – the Everything-But-Arms 
Initiative  
Regarding market access, LDCs currently enjoy the 
most favourable trade arrangement with the EU. At 
present 40 ACP and 9 non-ACP LDCs enjoy duty- 
and quota-free export status with the EU, except for 
arms and ammunition.17 The remaining quantitative 
restrictions for three sensitive agricultural products 
are subject to a staged phasing out: Restrictions for 
bananas will end in January 2006; for sugar in July 
2009; and for rice in September 2009. For those 
ACP countries that are currently benefiting from the 
commodity protocols, the EBA regime is less fa-
vourable, since it does not provide for fixed country 
quotas. This will raise competition among exporters 
and eventually lower prices received for protocol 
products on the EU market.  
Without doubt, the EBA regime is the most favour-
able trade regime currently in place. However, with 
a view to EPA negotiations a number of questions 
need to be raised in terms of applicability and con-
sistency of trade preferences given to the ACP 
                                                     
16  Davenport (2002: 38) identifies only 5 HS chapters of 
interest as potential markets for increased competition be-
tween ACP countries and non-ACP GSP-beneficiaries, 
namely fish (03), fruit, nuts (08) fats and oils (15), bever-
ages (22), and aluminium (76). 
17  The nine non-ACP LDCs currently eligible for EBA are 
mainly Asian countries and include, among others, grow-
ingly competitive countries like Bangladesh and Vietnam.  
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countries. First and foremost, the EBA initiative 
bears the risk of driving a wedge between ACP de-
veloping countries and ACP LDCs, especially 
where they constitute mixed memberships in re-
gional initiatives. Would the LDCs have to give up 
their current preferences? Or would the EU grant 
the same unrestricted market access to all members 
of an EPA, regardless of whether they are LDCs or 
non-LDCs? This would essentially mean extending 
the EBA preferences to all ACP countries, a posi-
tion that some EU member states have favoured but 
which may not find enough supporters within the 
EU.  
Second, it is as yet unclear how the commodity 
protocols will be treated under EPAs. If they are 
phased out as under EBA, a number of current bene-
ficiaries may face severe income losses in the re-
spective sectors. At any rate, these countries would 
be ‘worse off’ than under Lomé. The European 
Commission still has to present a consistent solution 
for the planned revision of the commodity protocols 
under EPAs.  
Third, if ACP countries are eligible for EPA rather 
than EBA conditions, they want to ensure that they 
remain on a similar footing with other beneficiaries 
of the EU’s preferential trade regimes. ACP coun-
tries clearly face an erosion of their traditional pref-
erences, because more and more other developing 
countries are becoming beneficiaries of similar pref-
erences. But they may face even tougher times if a 
group of countries like the 9 competitive non-ACP 
LDCs get even more favourable market access to 
the EU than the ACP under EPAs.  
The EBA regulations stipulate that the special ar-
rangement for LDCs should be maintained for an 
unlimited period of time, thus exceeding the validity 
of the GSP scheme. On the other hand, the EU can 
withdraw the unilateral preferences at any time; 
change the criteria of eligibility, etc. As discussed 
above, it remains unclear whether and how the EU 
will guarantee LDCs their current preferences when, 
in the near future, they become members of regional 
EPAs.18 
At first glance, no LDC would appear to be well 
advised to enter EPA negotiations. Considering the 
unclear definitions on “substantially all trade” in the 
EU’s current trade agreements, one risk of EPAs 
seems obvious. The liberalisation of only 90 % of 
traded tariff lines by the EU (as opposed to “every-
thing”), and with the remaining 10 % being mainly 
of agricultural origin, ACP LDCs will be worse off 
with a WTO-compatible EPA than with EBA. 
While for developing countries the objective is to 
improve market access above the standard GSP, for 
LDCs the goal is clearly to secure the EBA status. 
Hence, for the ACP countries it is advisable to ne-
gotiate for unrestricted EBA market access for all 
EPA countries. However, recalling the protracted 
negotiations between South Africa and the EU, 
there is reason to be sceptical as to whether the agri-
cultural lobbies in the EU member states will not 
put up heavy resistance to this option (see Box 1). 
The EU-South Africa Trade, Development 
and Co-operation Agreement 
After negotiating for over three years, South Africa 
and the EU concluded the so-called Trade, Devel-
opment and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) in 
1999. The TDCA provides for a free trade area be-
tween the signatories and covers a number of trade-
related areas. It is moreover development-oriented 
and includes provisions for technical and financial 
assistance. The TDCA therefore comes close to the 
EPA concept, but with the important difference that 
South Africa is a more advanced and industrialised 
country than the ACP countries. Hence the assump-
tion that EPAs should be more flexible than the 
TDCA in terms of its interpretation of how substan-
tial all trade is as well as in its application of the 
principle of special and differential treatment.  
                                                     
18  It should be noted that all regional groupings in Africa 
(including for instance EAC, ECOWAS, COMESA, and 
SADC) are mixed groups of least developed countries and 
developing countries. 
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19  Note that from 2004 the EU will be comprised of 25 coun-
tries, and there are 77 ACP signatories to the Cotonou 
Agreement. Together they account for well over half of all 
independent nations. EPAs will thus be trade agreements 
on a global scale. 
20  Negotiations between the EU and South Africa took more 
than three years, and although South African negotiators 
proved tougher than had been expected by most observers, 
the outcome was disappointing, particularly for producers 
and exporters in the agricultural and agro-processing in-
dustries. 
21  This could in turn undermine the strategic solidarity of EU 
ACP co-operation, though. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                  
22  SACU is a potential exception, but there positions on trade 
policy are ‘harmonised’ among member states, mainly be-
cause South Africa takes the lead. EAC member states 
have decided to negotiate separately for EPAs, even after 
their heads of state had declared, in November 2002, that 
the group would henceforth “negotiate as a block.” These 
issues are discussed in more detail in Ch. 5 and 6 below. 
Box 1: The Political Economy of Economic Partnership Agreements 
The European Commission (EC) is certainly following a political rationale with its trade policy, over and above the objec-
tives and eventual economic content of EPAs, as described above. The EC, for instance, intends to increase its influence in 
the WTO by strengthening its partnership with the ACP countries.19 There is hence a case for the EU to make EPAs a 
success: If they fail to result in substantial benefits for ACP countries, there would  not only be a risk that conflicts might 
arise between the EU and the ACP countries, but also that these might continue on WTO grounds. Moreover, the EU 
hopes to expand its network of bilateral trade arrangements, and thus to enlarge its foreign trade in advance of and beyond 
the commitments made in ongoing WTO negotiations. Even though the ACP group is not an economic heavyweight, it is 
relevant enough as a potential destination for European investors, especially in view of its large and in many instances yet 
untapped reserves of natural resources. 
From the outset, the initiative for EPAs was on the side of the EU; the ACP countries are now “forced to react.” The 
Cotonou Agreement raises the claim to improve ownership and true partnership on the side of the ACP countries. How-
ever, EPAs are far more complex than the Lomé Conventions and capacity for trade negotiations on the side of the ACP 
countries is limited. Experience with other bilateral trade agreements recently concluded by the EU show that negotiations 
can be long and protracted, and that negotiation skills and power are decisive factors for the eventual outcome.20 If they 
followed an economic rationale, the ACP countries would mainly bargain for the EU to reduce its strong domestic support 
in the agricultural sector. This would not only increase their international competitiveness in agriculture but also relieve 
their own agricultural sectors. From a political point of view, ACP countries must, however, be aware of the strong oppo-
sition from the European agricultural lobbies and of the pressure that eastern enlargement means for the EU. Other inter-
national fora are more appropriate to negotiate on the highly sensitive issue of European agricultural subsidies.21  
The question is therefore whether EPAs realistically have the potential to open up new opportunities for ACP countries. 
ACP negotiators are obviously the far weaker partners in the negotiations. EPA negotiations will draw heavily on scarce 
resources, both financial and human. Even if ACP countries joined forces in regional groups and establish negotiation 
teams, this would call for additional coordination and harmonisation efforts on their side. None of the groupings currently 
in place has a mandate or the experience needed to negotiate as a group.22 On the ACP side, EPAs will in all likelihood be 
agreements based on and signed by individual states – not regional blocks. Currently, the decisions of ACP states in East-
ern and Southern Africa for the configuration under which they wish to negotiate an EPA even run counter to the interests 
of regional organisations such as EAC and SADC. Thus, instead of strengthening regional processes, EPAs also have the 
potential to undermine them – even if the intention of the European Commission was not to “divide and conquer” as some 
may suspect. 
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The TDCA also takes into account the different 
levels of development of the two parties and allows 
for differentiation both in sectoral coverage as well 
as in the phasing in of trade liberalisation. By 2010, 
95 % of all South African exports will enter the EU 
free of duty, i.e. after a transition period of 10 years. 
The bulk of liberalisation on the EU side is to be 
effected within the first four years. South Africa for 
its part will liberalise 86 % of EU imports within a 
transition period of 12 years. Most industrial prod-
ucts will be liberalised only towards the end of this 
period. The TDCA also aims for WTO compatibil-
ity, which means among other things that no impor-
tant sector could be excluded completely from liber-
alisation. The process of notification is unfortu-
nately still ongoing. Consequently, no firm conclu-
sion can be drawn yet whether coverage of merely 
86 % of product lines and a transition period of 12 
years will be acceptable to the WTO. 
Potential problems may also arise from the fact that 
both parties have exempted large parts of their agri-
cultural sectors from liberalisation. The high overall 
percentage shares of duty-free trade are at least in 
part due to tricky arithmetic. On the EU side, only 
60 % of all agricultural product lines imported in the 
base year 1995 will be liberalised under the TDCA. 
In addition, the EU has made a number of products 
like wine and spirits subject to a separate accord and 
insisted, among other things, on the renaming of 
products such as Grappa, Ouzo, Chardonnay or Feta 
Cheese when they originate in South Africa. Other 
sensitive products exempted from free trade by the 
EU include beef, sugar, dairy products, fresh and 
prepared fruit, maize and cut flowers, which repre-
sent some 3.5 % of total imports from South Africa, 
based on 1995 trade volumes. Even during pro-
longed negotiations, the South African negotiators 
were unable to achieve a more favourable outcome 
in these important sectors.  
Another important drawback were the rules of ori-
gin that the parties agreed on but which are detri-
mental to the interests of South African producers. 
The rules are product-specific and very complex in 
nature, as various measures are combined to assess 
the amount of value added originating in South Af-
rica or the EU. The rules of origin are difficult to 
comply with as they usually require double trans-
formation and, moreover, compliance is costly to 
assess. As a result, the rules of origin applicable 
under the TDCA cannot serve as a model for EPAs.  
The TDCA is still an important benchmark for EPA 
negotiations in two respects: 
1. On a more positive note, it has provided a new 
and more flexible interpretation of the ‘substan-
tially all … trade’ clause in terms of the length 
of the transition period and product coverage.  
2. On the negative side, negotiations on the TDCA 
have again highlighted the EU’s apparently in-
surmountable stakes in the agricultural sector, 
and its lack of flexibility in terms of addressing 
non-tariff barriers to trade in a meaningful way. 
Nevertheless, negotiators from South Africa have 
made some very important experience in negotiating 
a trade agreement with a powerful partner such as 
the EU. This experience and the capacity that has 
been built on the South African side during the 
process (and during ongoing discussions at the 
WTO level) can be of direct relevance for EPA ne-
gotiations. This applies in particular to SADC, of 
which South Africa is a member, but also more 
generally at the all-ACP level, where South Africa 
is also represented due to its qualified membership. 
Implications for EPA Negotiations 
The EU Commission envisages reciprocal free trade 
under EPAs. For the non-LDCs of the ACP group, 
falling back on GSP preferences would imply that 
they were to be worse off than under Lomé. For 
them, negotiating an EPA offers a better opportunity 
under two conditions. First, market access to EU 
markets must improve, e.g. through a combined 
further dismantling of remaining tariffs in the sensi-
tive sectors and a simplification of rules of origin. 
Second, a reciprocal opening up of ACP markets to 
EU imports needs to take into account the develop-
ment levels of ACP countries in terms of transition 
periods and product coverage and at the same time 
to provide for measures to help their economies 
adjust.  
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For LDCs, the implications are slightly different. 
Since 2000 the EU has granted these countries free 
market access through EBA. On the EU side, agri-
cultural subsidies, standards and rules of origin are 
among the factors that play a role. One important 
reason for the current under-utilisation of prefer-
ences, however, seems to lie in supply side con-
straints, which result, among other things, in high 
transaction costs. Adopting reciprocity entails a 
particularly high risk for those LDCs whose budgets 
depend on revenue from tariffs. By definition, LDCs 
are highly vulnerable to trade fluctuations and are 
constantly faced with the risk of balance of pay-
ments problems.  
EPAs may moreover entail particular risks for the 
agricultural sector of all ACP countries. The EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) still provides 
for market-distorting domestic support and export 
subsidies. Further opening up the agricultural sector 
of their own economies is therefore a problem for 
all ACP countries and particularly LDCs, which are 
largely reliant on agricultural production and ex-
ports. Unfortunately, EPA negotiations are not the 
right forum to reform the CAP. However, ACP 
countries should take every opportunity, including 
EPA negotiations, to urge the EU to liberalise its 
still highly protected agricultural markets, as this 
would allow the ACP countries to make appropriate 
use of their comparative advantages. 
Summing up, the following issues are priorities for 
the negotiation agenda: 
1. The ACP countries will want to improve their 
market access to the EU during EPA negotia-
tions. In terms of further tariff reductions, the 
ACP countries want to jointly negotiate for 
nothing less than duty- and quota-free access, as 
currently provided to the LDCs by the EBA ini-
tiative.  
2. ACP countries should aim to eliminate unneces-
sary non-tariff barriers to trade and to simplify  
rules of origin on the side of the EU. Cumula-
tion of origin should be extended to other de-
veloping countries. 
3. Targeted measures should be used to support 
ACP countries’ own efforts to comply with and 
monitor standards. 
4. EPAs need to provide for generous transition 
periods and exemptions to take into account the 
different level of development and special needs 
of the ACP countries. Special and differential 
treatment should be applied wherever possible.  
5. Special safeguards should be used to ensure that 
ACP countries do not suffer from sudden import 
surges or market distortions caused by the CAP 
or other European policies. 
6. Regional integration processes should be given 
priority over EPAs wherever there is a clash of 
objectives, resource allocation or sequencing of 
activities.  
7. In order to ensure a successful outcome of ne-
gotiations it will be essential for ACP countries 
to build trade negotiation capacity at the na-
tional and regional levels. This should include 
systematic knowledge sharing with a more ad-
vanced and experienced partner such as South 
Africa. 
4 Fiscal, Economic, and Social Impact of 
EPAs  
Finding the best negotiation strategy for Tanzania is 
a difficult task. Because EPAs are not yet clearly 
defined, their eventual impact on ACP economies 
cannot be predicted precisely. Moreover, impacts 
will differ between countries depending on the ac-
tual share of trade affected, on trade and fiscal poli-
cies in place at the time of implementation, and on 
the responsiveness of each economy to the changes 
introduced by EPAs. The Tanzanian authorities had 
not yet commissioned a national impact study at the 
time of writing. However, a comprehensive assess-
ment of the potential economic, fiscal and social 
implications of an EPA with the EU is essential for 
formulating a coherent and economically sound 
negotiation strategy. In other words, Tanzanian 
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decision makers need to know more clearly what is 
economically and socially at stake during EPA ne-
gotiations.  
The present chapter provides a first assessment of 
the potential risks and opportunities arising from an 
EPA. After a brief description of the status of Tan-
zania’s trade policy, three intertwined aspects of a 
new reciprocal trade agreement with the EU are 
discussed: 
— the fiscal impact and associated welfare effects; 
— the economic impact on various sectors; and 
— the social implications involved. 
We would like to stress at this point that while the 
present report highlights the main implications of 
EPAs, there is a need for a more thorough and com-
prehensive impact analysis at industry level. In par-
ticular, one would want to look in more detail at the 
effects on the main economic sectors such as agri-
culture and agro-processing, and at the respective 
social implications, especially the impact on in-
comes and employment. This was beyond the scope 
of the present study. 
4.1 The Current Trade Regime 
4.1.1 Trade Policy 
Tanzania’s trade policy is spelled out in a recent 
document drafted by the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade (MIT 2003). While containing a clear vision 
and mission, and an activities and implementation 
schedule, Tanzania’s trade strategy seems to be too 
generic and not linked well enough with the actual 
situation of the economic sectors. Moreover, though 
new, the trade strategy document does not reflect on 
the role of trade policy as a part of the Tanzanian 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). Vice versa, the 
Tanzanian PRS makes no mention of trade policy as 
one of the relevant policy tools. Whatever changes 
may be introduced to Tanzania’s trade regime in the 
near future, it is a severe omission that so little has 
been done to embed trade policy in the broader fab-
ric of national economic and development strategies 
and policies. 
Tanzania’s trade policy has undergone great 
changes over the last decade. Until the mid-1980s it 
was largely dominated by regulatory measures such 
as price controls, trade restrictions, single marketing 
channels and confinement policies. However, be-
ginning in the late 1980s, successive governments 
have undertaken substantial steps towards opening 
up the economy, gradually liberalising the external 
sector by eliminating most export restrictions and 
foreign exchange controls, followed by an opening 
up for imports of foreign goods and services. In 
1995, Tanzania was a founding member of the 
WTO.  
Tanzania is moreover engaged in two regional inte-
gration processes, namely in SADC and the EAC, 
both of which put an explicit emphasis on economic 
integration by means of regional trade liberalisation. 
EAC is currently preparing for a Customs Union, 
with a common external tariff to be implemented 
starting in 2004. In SADC, the implementation of 
the SADC Trade Protocol is under way and the 
SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) is set to be com-
pleted by 2008. SADC envisages implementation of 
a Customs Union by 2010. Both regional integration 
schemes contribute to trade liberalisation in the 
region and limit the level of discretionary policy 
interventions. Whether they will foster Tanzania’s 
trade integration with third countries is less clear, 
though, as several countries in the region currently 
apply higher tariffs than Tanzania. Establishment of 
a common external tariff (CET) within EAC or a 
harmonisation of external tariffs within SADC may 
therefore slow down rather than accelerate further 
trade liberalisation for Tanzania.  
Alongside trade liberalisation, the Tanzanian gov-
ernment is committed to actively encouraging and 
facilitating foreign direct investment (FDI) through 
the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), an invest-
ment promotion agency, as well as by establishing 
export processing zones (see Box 2). 
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The Current Tariff Regime 
Tanzania’s tariff regime underwent various reforms 
since the late 1980s, resulting in a reduction of im-
port duty bands from 18 different tariff categories in 
place in 1988 to a four-tier structure in 2001/02 (see 
Table 2). The four tariff rates of 0 %, 10 %, 15 %, 
and 25 % apply to product categories according to 
their respective degree of processing (Lyakurwa et 
al. 2001: 34). The 0 % rate applies for all imports of 
raw materials, replacements, and parts. Semi-
processed inputs, spare parts (except for motor ve-
hicles) and most capital goods are subject to duty of 
10 %, while fully processed inputs and motor vehi-
cle spare parts are charged at a rate of 15 %. The 
highest rate, 25 %, applies for finished consumer 
goods.  
 
                                                     
23  For a comprehensive discussion of EPZ policy in Tanza-
nia, see Madani (1998).  
Starting in 2004, the CET for EAC is expected to 
replace the current tariff rates. The three-tier struc-
ture will be set at 0 %, 10 %, and 25 % (Lyakurwa 
et al. 2001:34). How the current intermediate bands 
will be merged to form the single intermediate rate 
of 10 % for Tanzania was not yet clear at the time of 
writing. 
Due to its escalatory nature this tariff structure leads 
to far  higher effective than nominal rates of protec-
tion for processing activities carried out domesti-
cally. In addition, a so-called “suspended tariff” of 
up to 50 % is collected on a number of sensitive 
import items that are also manufactured in Tanza-
nia. While officially in place as an instrument 
against unfair dumping practices, suspended tariffs 
in Tanzania tend to be used as a protective measure 
for uncompetitive domestic industries.  
Table 2: Import Duties by Major Commodity Groups 
Tariff Rate Items 
0 % 
Agriculture tractors and fertiliser 
Raw materials and machinery 
10 % (2 %)a Replacement parts and capital goods 
15 % (3 %)a Finished inputs, motor vehicle spare parts 
25 % (5 %)a Consumer goods 
a Preferential rate for EAC members 
Source: Tanzania Revenue Authority 
Box 2 : Export Processing Zones 
Tanzania’s national trade policy provides for the establishment of special export processing zones (EPZs), which are in-
tended to attract investments into export-oriented economic activities by means of tax incentives and the provision of 
appropriate infrastructure (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2003:42). Operations in an EPZ are exempt from all kinds of 
taxes and are allowed to sell up to 20 % of their output to the domestic market. Tanzanian policy makers put high hopes in 
EPZ, whereas most international observers are less enthusiastic. It is often argued that backward linkages of the kind ex-
pected from an EPZ do not automatically develop and that the opportunity cost of an EPZ caused by distortions may ex-
ceed the benefits.23 In the case of Tanzania it must even be feared that the EPZ will not attract substantial investment, as 
many investors might – despite tax exemptions – shy away from high costs for utilities like energy and water. 
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EAC members are granted preferential tariff rates, 
namely 0 %, 2 %, 3 %, and 5 %. However, export-
ers from Tanzania’s EAC partners Uganda and 
Kenya are also faced with suspended tariffs of up to 
25 %, and these often cancel out the preference 
margin accorded to them over other trading part-
ners. Since 2001, Tanzania has implemented its 
differentiated tariff phase-down vis-à-vis SADC 
members other than South Africa. Reflecting the 
asymmetrical nature of the SADC FTA, least devel-
oped countries like Tanzania liberalise more slowly 
than South Africa, and tariff phasing differs be-
tween South Africa and the other SADC member 
states. 
In principle, import duties refunded on inputs used 
in the production of export goods (Tanzania Reve-
nue Authority 2003), but so far the duty drawback 
system has not been working very well.  
In addition to tariffs, certain imported consumer 
goods are subject to excise duties. Excise duty is 
charged either on specific or ad valorem tax rates, 
the rates being 5 %, 10 %, and 30 %. Imports sub-
ject to specific excise rates include spirits, tobacco 
and petroleum products. VAT is collected at the 
standard rate of 20 % on all imported goods. Tariffs, 
excise duties, and VAT are all subject to an exten-
sive regime of exemptions, leading to great differ-
ences between nominal rates and effectively col-
lected revenue. For instance, total exemptions from 
VAT amounted to 31 % of all collectible VAT in 
1999 (ibid.). As exemptions usually benefit domes-
tic producers rather than external ones, extensive 
use of exemptions may well result in additional 
protection of domestic producers. In Tanzania, there 
are indications, for instance, that imported goods are 
subject to excise duties and VAT where the same 
domestically produced goods are exempt from these 
surcharges. There is evidence of substantial revenue 
leakage due to exemptions in Tanzania (Rajaram 
1999: 15). 
Imports moreover are bound up with other transac-
tion costs that may raise their price substantially. 
One of the more contentious ones is the pre-
shipment inspection carried out by an agency under 
contract to the Tanzanian Revenue Authority 
(TRA). Imports whose f.o.b. value exceeds US $ 
5,000 are required to undergo this inspection. The 
importer is charged a minimum cost of 1.2 % of the 
f.o.b. value, hence raising the price of the imported 
good and adding considerable red tape to import 
procedures. 
4.2 Fiscal Impact  
One of the most controversial issues of EPAs is 
their potential fiscal impact on ACP countries, i.e. 
the loss of revenue expected to follow tariff elimina-
tion towards the EU. While this is a real threat, it is 
by no means an automatism as often suggested by 
political rhetoric. Much depends on the evolution of 
actual trade flows. Moreover, we are convinced that 
the realms of trade policy and revenue collection 
should be kept apart whenever possible, in order to 
adopt and maintain a more transparent and efficient 
trade policy framework that is not subject to fiscal 
motives. However, it must be acknowledged that in 
most developing countries, including Tanzania, 
tariff collection plays a highly important role in 
public revenues, and consequently fiscal aspects of 
present and future trade regimes need to be taken 
into due account. In the case of Tanzania, taxes on 
imports amount to roughly one third of total public 
revenue. 
The aim of the following paragraphs is therefore to 
contribute to a rationalisation of the ongoing discus-
sion on the fiscal impact of EPAs. First, we provide 
a rough quantification of the expected revenue loss 
due to an FTA between the EAC and the EU. The 
reason why we decided in favour of this scenario is 
the EAC's current moves towards forming a cus-
toms union. The methodology applied can also be 
used for any other EPA constellation. In addition, 
because revenue leakage due to exemptions is still 
of substantial magnitude in Tanzania, as noted 
above, we adopt a methodology that takes these 
exemptions explicitly into account. In doing so, we 
find that the incurred revenue loss may be less se-
vere than is commonly suggested. 
Second, we will highlight an important caveat con-
cerning the discussion of possible ways to compen-
sate for the suggested revenue loss by further ra-
tionalising Tanzania’s exemption regime and im-
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proving revenue collection. To some extent, exemp-
tions from tariffs and other government taxes may 
make sense from an economic and trade policy 
point of view, and sometimes leakages may simply 
be caused by limited administrative capacity. The 
important issue is, however, that exemptions and 
leakages often reflect the interests of influential 
groups or individuals. Wherever or not the this is 
the case, any attempt to eliminate such leakage 
could meet with stiff political opposition. The as-
sumption is that, therefore, it may be much more 
difficult to make up for revenue loss through further 
rationalisation of revenue collection than is usually 
acknowledged. 
4.2.1 Background and Methodological 
Approach 
The fiscal implications of the trade liberalisation 
implied by an EPA are mainly due to two trade ef-
fects, commonly known as trade creation and trade 
diversion. In addition, certain dynamic effects play 
an important role, for example a move towards 
higher growth rates induced by an increased influx 
of foreign direct investment. While the latter are 
difficult to quantify in an ex ante analysis, the for-
mer two lend themselves quite readily to an analysis 
of the potential fiscal impact of trade liberalisation 
based on comparative statistics. 
Trade Creation: One of the main arguments in 
favour of regional economic integration, and even 
for trade liberalisation in general, is trade creation. 
Eliminating or lowering trade barriers between two 
or more countries potentially induces greater trade 
volumes between these countries, generating gains 
from differences in comparative advantages and 
factor endowments by means of division of labour. 
Generally, this should lead to greater welfare for all 
members to such an agreement. While, therefore, 
reduced tariffs provide considerable scope for in-
creased revenue due to a broader tax base, their 
complete elimination will – other things equal – 
inevitably lead to a loss of tariff revenue. However, 
compensation for thus reduced public revenue could 
in principle be levied via other taxes on imported 
goods or from alternative sources in the economy. 
Trade Diversion: At the same time, however, a 
move to free trade between two or more countries 
that at the same time maintain their external trade 
barriers towards the rest of the world, could have a 
welfare-decreasing effect on these countries. This is 
due to the fact that with tariffs between the member 
economies eliminated, consumers might switch 
from more efficient producers in non-member states 
to less efficient suppliers from within their particu-
lar FTA, diverting trade flows from non-members to 
members – hence the term “trade diversion.” The 
trouble with trade diversion is that even if it should 
leave consumers of the relevant products in the im-
porting country better off, it can still lower the over-
all welfare of the economy, as the treasury foregoes 
revenue from tariff collection. Obviously, this effect 
can have distributional consequences as well. 
Numerous studies exist on the potential revenue 
effects of regional integration initiatives, which 
adopt a methodology based on a trade diversion – 
the trade creation scenario. However, we know of 
only one explicitly concerned with an FTA between 
the EAC and the EU, namely McKay et al. (1998). 
They derive an upper limit for tariff revenue loss 
attributable to such an FTA of as much as 73 % of 
total tariff revenue, or 0.5 % of GDP for Tanzania, 
based on 1995 data. Other things equal, this would 
translate into a loss of 20 % of total tax revenue. 
Other authors have examined the potential revenue 
impact of the EAC Customs Union, which can be 
considered the first step in assessing the impact of 
an EPA between the EAC and the EU. However, to 
our knowledge most of these studies base their es-
timates on nominal tariff rates, and thus do not take 
into account the considerable extent of tax exemp-
tions granted in countries like Tanzania. In order to 
give the reader some impression of the magnitude of 
this feature of Tanzania’s tax regime, Table 3 shows 
the value of exemptions granted in 2000/01 in Tan-
zania. The draft Institutional Review on trade policy 
(Institutional Review 2002:54) reports that over 
40 % of potential tariff revenue might be lost due to 
tariff exemptions. 
These numbers indicate that any calculation of the 
revenue impact of EPAs that does not take into ac-
count exemptions from tariffs and other taxes will  
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inevitably overestimate the loss of revenue collec-
tion due to tariff elimination by a considerable fac-
tor. We therefore suggest a method that takes into 
account exemptions from all taxes collected on im-
ports in an explicit manner. 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Estimate Results 
Table 4 reports our estimate results. We calculate 
three scenarios: one following Gitu et al. (2003) in 
applying medium-range elasticities of demand and 
substitution and – following Rajaram et al. (1999) – 
two in which we assume a plausible upper and 
Table 3: Revenue Impact of Free Trade Agreements with the EAC and the EU  
 Revenue change - FTA with EAC Revenue change - FTA with EU Estimated Total Impact 
 mil TSh As % of Total 
Tax Revenue 
mil TSh As % of Total 
Tax Revenue 
mil TSh As % of Total 
Tax Revenue 
Scenario 1 
εd = 0.5 
εs = 2 
4,760 0.5 -37,000 -3.8 -32,300 -3.3 
Scenario 2 
εd = 0.25 
εs = 1 
-50.4 0.0 -26,400 -2.7 -26,400 -2.7 
Scenario 3 
εd = 1 
εs = 4 
14,400 1.5 -58,400 -6.0 -44,000 -4.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by TRA 
Table 4: Value of Exemptions by Category of Beneficiaries in Fiscal Year 2000/01 
Institution Value in mil TSh As % of total  
tax revenue 
Government institutions 33,943.9 3.5 
Para-statal institutions 2,768.8 0.3 
Religious and charitable organisations 13,517.7 1.4 
NGOs 25,812.1 2.6 
Private companies and individuals 55,387.4 5.7 
TIC 33,368.1 3.4 
Total 164,798.0 16.9 
Note: Values include exemptions on import duties, VAT and excise duty on imports 
Source: Lyakurwa et al. (2001) 
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lower limit for elasticities of demand and substitu-
tion. 24  
The estimated impact of an EAC FTA is positive in 
two of the three scenarios, but minimal in all three, 
ranging from roughly 0.0 percent (-50.4 mil TSh) to 
about 1.5 percent (4,760 mil TSh) of total tax reve-
nue, which amounted to 975,385.5 mil TSh in the 
fiscal year of 2001/02. By contrast, the ceteris pari-
bus revenue impact accruing to an FTA with the EU 
as reported in column 2 is negative and of a larger 
magnitude, resulting in a negative overall effect, 
which is reported in column 3. However, the reve-
nue loss we derive for an FTA with the EU follow-
ing the elimination of all import tariffs towards 
Kenya and Uganda is far lower than suggested in 
McKay et al. (1998), and ranges from 26,400 mil 
TSh to 44,000 mil TSh, or from 2.7 to 4.5 % of total 
tax revenue. While not dramatic, these numbers are 
                                                     
24  For a detailed description of the applied methodology see 
Annex D. 
not negligible either, and alternative sources of 
revenue ought to be found in order to compensate 
for the expected loss. The fact that our results are 
not overly sensitive to substantial variation of the 
underlying assumptions (i.e. the assumed elastic-
ities) suggests that our estimates should be of 
roughly the right magnitude. 
4.2.3 Conclusions on Fiscal Effects 
The revenue impact of tariff elimination we derive 
from our analysis of actually collected tariffs is less 
dramatic than has been argued in previous studies, 
which base their estimates on nominal tariffs. With 
regard to tariff elimination within the EAC we even 
find a positive revenue impact for Tanzania. 
                                                     
25  However, there is such a mechanism for redistributing 
revenue collected in the form of VAT on goods shipped 
from one part of the Union to the other. 
Box 3: Potential Revenue Implications for Zanzibar 
The United Republic of Tanzania is formed by the Mainland and Zanzibar, which comprises the two Islands Unguja and 
Pemba. Under the Union’s Constitution, Zanzibar has its own Constitution and enjoys far-reaching autonomy, which is 
reflected in the fact that it has a number of government institutions of its own, including  presidency, cabinet, legislature, 
and judiciary. Apart from this particular political status and its geographical separation, Zanzibar also differs from the 
Mainland in that its dependence on imports, both to meet the needs of its economy and for public revenue, is even more 
pronounced than on the Mainland. Imports from Kenya account for 20-25 % of local requirements, rendering the potential 
revenue impact of tariff elimination within the EAC potentially more severe than for Mainland Tanzania. 
While tariffs and taxes are widely harmonised between Zanzibar and the Mainland, the islands’ government does have 
some discretionary power regarding evaluation methods and the application of suspended duty: Suspended duty is not 
collected on imports entering Zanzibar, and often a higher minimum dutiable value (MDV) is applied. In general, Zanzibar 
pursues a somewhat less protectionist trade regime than the Mainland, reflecting the fact that there is not much industry to 
protect on the islands and as a result rates of protection differ between the Mainland and Zanzibar. Consequently, no im-
ports landed in Zanzibar are allowed onto the Mainland (though they are in the opposite direction). This has serious reve-
nue implications for Zanzibar, as there is no mechanism to distribute customs duties collected at the port of entry between 
the two members of the Union.25  
Moreover, in part due to deteriorating harbour facilities, direct imports have been declining and an important share of Zan-
zibar’s imports is landed in Dar es Salaam. This deprives the Zanzibar treasury of considerable amounts of revenue and the 
problem will only be exacerbated if the Mainland eliminates trade barriers on Kenyan exports in the course of implementa-
tion of the EAC customs union. The issue of finding a new formula for revenue sharing is on the agenda of a Joint Fiscal 
Committee, provided for in the Union’s Constitution, but an agreement is not yet in sight. For the time being, it must be 
feared that any revenue loss incurred by the Zanzibar treasury will be even more severe and substantial than for the 
Mainland. 
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While these results are rather reassuring in contrast 
to the often claimed dramatic negative fiscal impact 
of EPAs, the underlying reasons are on the contrary 
quite worrying with regard to possible compensa-
tory measures. It must be assumed that the extensive 
exemptions we observe only in part reflect adminis-
trative weaknesses or socially desirable exceptions 
from an otherwise efficient system. More probably, 
they are to some extent the result of strong eco-
nomic and political interests of single groups or 
individuals in society or abroad (Lyakurwa 2001: 
33). Such exemptions would have to be overcome 
against potentially strong political resistance if the 
occurring revenue loss is to be compensated for by 
rationalising the exemptions regime, as is com-
monly suggested (cf. Mduma and Msole 2001:38). 
We therefore propose that in discussions of counter-
vailing measures such interests should be taken duly 
into account and any proposed solutions should be 
scrutinised with regard to their political feasibility. 
By no means do we wish to suggest that vested in-
terests should not be challenged in the course of 
policy formulation. Rather, we wish to stress that 
they must not be overlooked during this process. 
4.3 Economic Impact – Risks and 
Opportunities for Tanzania 
Besides having fiscal implications, trade liberalisa-
tion is bound to have a direct impact on Tanzania’s 
private sector. The elimination of import tariffs 
renders foreign producers more competitive in the 
domestic market, hence raising competition for 
Tanzanian producers of both intermediate and final 
products. Again, this increase of competition is re-
flected by the estimated amount of trade creation. 
However, reciprocal trade liberalisation should also 
translate into increased competitiveness for Tanza-
nian exporters as well. Tanzanian producers who 
use imported intermediates in their production proc-
ess that currently still face tariffs should be able to 
benefit from further trade liberalisation under both 
the EAC FTA and the EU FTA, no matter whether 
they sell in domestic or international markets.  
Regarding trade relations with the EU, new export 
opportunities for Tanzanian producers in EU mar-
kets will in all likelihood only materialise if remain-
ing NTBs are eliminated, given the fact that most 
Tanzanian products already enjoy duty free market 
access under the EBA initiative. As far as the re-
gional integration process is concerned, realisation 
of economies of scale in an enlarged market will 
depend on a number of additional factors rather than 
mere tariff elimination, e.g. harmonisation of busi-
ness laws and tax regimes, reduction of transport 
and transaction costs, or adoption of a common 
investment code and competition law. 
Consequently, along with the static effects, the crea-
tion of larger markets through FTAs should generate 
certain dynamic effects for the member states’ 
economies. The single most important one is due to 
economies of scale: If the newly created markets are 
large enough to exploit economies of scale, invest-
ment in growth-generating industries may become 
worthwhile where fragmented markets were too 
small in the past. In addition, FTAs are assumed to 
lock-in their members’ commitment to trade liber-
alisation and other economic reforms, thus contrib-
uting to a more favourable investment environment 
altogether. 
While economies of scale are certainly an argument 
in favour of regional integration, it should be kept in 
mind that with regard to trade liberalisation towards 
the EU, Tanzania is about to open up its markets for 
producers who serve a very large home market and 
therefore already realise considerable economies of 
scale. These result in higher efficiency of produc-
tion and marketing processes. If these producers 
gain free access to the EAC, the scope for new in-
vestment to be attracted even into an enlarged East 
African market may be limited. 
In addition, the threat posed to East African manu-
facturers by EU suppliers might also have a detri-
mental effect on East African economic integration 
itself. If Tanzanian consumers substitute away from 
regional producers to EU suppliers, who – due to 
their larger home market – already benefit from 
larger economies of scale than, for example, Kenya, 
regional economic links within the region might 
come under stress. This would be inconsistent with 
the EU’s declared goal to use EPAs as a means to 
enhance regional integration of ACP economies. 
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Both the regional integration process and reciprocal 
trade liberalisation towards the EU bear opportuni-
ties as well as risks for Tanzania. However, since 
opportunities and risks accruing to each of these 
processes need not be the same, it seems appropriate 
to examine the potential economic impact of the 
regional integration process and of an EPA with the 
EU separately. To do so, we first provide a brief 
overview of Tanzania’s external sector, before we 
deal with each liberalisation process separately in 
section 4.3.2. 
4.3.1 Structure and Composition of 
External Trade 
Graph 1 shows the volume of Tanzania’s exports 
and imports for the past 5 years. Not surprisingly for 
an LDC, the trade balance is negative throughout 
the period observed. The worst year during this  
 
period was 1999, when the value of exports 
amounted to roughly one third of the value of total 
imports, resulting in a trade balance deficit of just 
over 1 billion US $. Exports have picked up over the 
last three years, after a continuous decline in previ-
ous years, but by far not enough to make up for 
what seems to be a steady positive trend in imports, 
leading to an increasingly negative trade balance. A 
further reduction of import tariffs is likely to exac-
erbate this already worrying situation, at least in the 
short run.  
Tanzania’s traditional exports are coffee, cotton, 
sisal, tea, tobacco and raw cashew nuts (see 
Graph 2). Its non-traditional exports include petro-
leum products, gold, other minerals and manufac-
tured goods (SADC 2001); (see Graph 3). The struc-
ture of exports has substantially changed in recent 
years as non-traditional exports play an increasingly 
important role in Tanzania’s external trade. As can  
Graph 1: Tanzania’s Trade Balance 1996–2001 
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be seen from Graph 4 by the end of 2002 the share 
of non-traditional exports had increased to 77.9 % 
of total exports, while traditional exports accounted 
for only 22.1 %, down from 60.0 % in 1998 (Bank 
of Tanzania 2002). This increase is mainly due to 
large-scale investment into the mining sector, which 
in spite of low prices in the world market recently 
has made gold the most important export commod-
ity, accounting for 38 % of total export value in 
fiscal year 2001/02. At the same time, traditional 
exports have declined both as a share of total ex-
ports and with regard to their total value, mainly 
because of low world market prices. 
Table 5 shows the aggregate composition of Tanza-
nia’s imports by major commodity groups with the 
respective nominal tariff rates. As depicted in 
Graph 5, Tanzania relies on a wide range of imports. 
Capital goods such as machinery, transportation 
equipment, and industrial raw materials, and con-
sumer goods constitute the major portion of
Graph 2: Structure of Traditional Exports (Nov–Oct 01/02) 
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Graph 3: Structure of non-Traditional Exports (Nov–Oct 01/02) 
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imported products. However, because of a decrease 
in domestic agricultural production attributable to 
climatic conditions, food and foodstuffs imports 
have increased sharply during the past few years.  
4.3.2 Implications of EPAs for Tanzanian 
Producers  
The elimination of trade barriers is in principle ex-
pected to result in efficiency gains for members of 
an FTA due to a more effective division of labour 
and resulting trade creation. However, for these 
gains to materialise, a minimum degree of differen-
tiation between the member states’ economies is 
indispensable. As far as regional trading partners in 
sub-Saharan Africa are concerned, there is only 
limited scope for such differentiation or comple-
mentarities. Most of these countries share similar 
economic structures resulting in patterns of trade 
flows largely biased towards advanced countries 
(Lyakurwa et al. 2001:6).  
Tanzania’s intra-regional trade with other EAC 
members (and SADC, for that matter) is low, as is 
the case for most sub-Saharan African countries 
(Lyakurwa et al. 2001:19; Ng and Yeats 2000).26 By 
contrast, trade with the EU offers in principle a  
                                                     
26  Kenya and Uganda together accounted for only 6.8 % of 
Tanzanian imports in 2001/02, and trade with SADC 
amounted to less than 5 % between 2000 and 2002. 
Table 5: Imports by Main Product Categories in 2000 
Product Category Millions of TSh Share in % Non-EAC Tariff Rate 
Capital Goods 237,668 40 0 % / 5 % / 10 % 
Intermediate Goods 119,302 20 10 % / 15 % 
Consumer Goods 243,395 40 25 % 
Total 600,365 100 – 
Source: Bank of Tanzania 2002 
Graph 4: Structure of Total Exports (Nov–Oct 01/02) 
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larger scope of complementarity and diversification 
in the case of further trade liberalisation. However, 
trade openness towards the EU also bears a much 
larger risk of trade diversion, i.e. goods that are 
currently imported from third countries might be 
replaced by goods from the EU due to tariff elimina-
tion – and not necessarily because of higher effi-
ciency of European producers. At the same time, the 
benefits for consumers of EU imports as well as for 
producers, who use imported intermediates in their 
production, might be considerable. 
Views on whether trade creation will be beneficial, 
threatening or of no relevance at all for Tanzanian 
producers differ widely among Tanzanian stake-
holders. In order to assess the potential risks of re-
gional integration for Tanzania, our approach is as 
follows. Recurring once more to our estimates on 
trade diversion and creation discussed above, we 
identify industries for which the expected trade 
creation from partner countries is largest due to 
tariff elimination in Tanzania, and suggest that this 
reflects a threat due to increased competition for 
Tanzanian producers.  
Opportunities for Tanzanian exporters, by contrast, 
are identified by means of revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA) indices calculated for current 
trade flows between Tanzania and the regional trad-
ing partners as well as for trade with the EU. In each 
section we then examine in more detail a selection 
of agricultural products that are particularly relevant 
to Tanzania, either economically or for domestic 
food security reasons. Calculation of RCA indices 
also gives an indication of the probability that indi-
vidual industries will relocate from one country 
(with a lower comparative advantage in that indus-
try) to the other once an FTA is implemented 
(World Bank 2000:53). 
Risks of Enhanced Regional Integration? 
Even where there is some degree of differentiation, 
as in the case of Kenya, with its relatively well de-
veloped industrial sector on the one side and the 
agriculturally dominated economies of Tanzania and 
Uganda on the other, there appears to be very lim-
ited complementarity between the member states’ 
patterns of specialisation and trade. The overall 
Graph 5: Structure of Imports 
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volume of regional trade creation is relatively small, 
according to our estimates, with total imports from 
the region increasing by roughly 2.2 %. This result 
is in line with what one would expect in a region as 
little diversified as East Africa and suggests that the 
economic risks – but also the opportunities – of East 
African regional integration are rather minor for 
Tanzania. 
A more detailed look at various relevant product 
groups reveals that within the manufacturing sector 
the industry in which regional trade creation is most 
significant appears to be the textiles and clothing 
industry. Out of 49 products experiencing an in-
crease in imports from regional partners by 10 or 
more percentage points, four are basic textile prod-
ucts such as printed or coloured woven fabrics. 
These compete directly with products from domes-
tic textile mills. 
In agriculture, the sub-sector most adversely af-
fected seems to be animal husbandry. Again, four 
out of 49 products with trade creation of more than 
10 % are either live sheep or mutton  or bovine ani-
mals. As food security is a major concern in LDCs 
like Tanzania, we take a closer look at a selection of 
starch staples commonly traded in the region, such 
as wheat, maize, and rice. We find trade creation to 
be of a significant magnitude (10 %) only for durum 
wheat, which, however, constitutes no more than a 
negligible share of total imports of starch staples. 
For all other products in the selected groups of 
products, regional trade creation amounts to less 
than 3 %. Our conclusion is, therefore, that regional 
integration does not pose a major risk for Tanza-
nia’s food security based on domestic production. 
Risks of Introducing Reciprocity with the 
EU 
As for reciprocal trade liberalisation vis-à-vis the 
EU, here trade creation is more significant than in 
the case of regional integration. This is the expected 
result and it is presumably due to two reasons: First, 
internal tariffs within the EAC are already lower 
than towards the rest of the world, including the EU; 
the elimination of import tariffs on EU products will 
therefore imply a much larger price change than in 
the case of regional trade liberalisation. Second, 
there is a much stronger complementarity between 
the European and the Tanzanian production struc-
ture, with European producers being in a position to 
raise trade volumes more easily in a number of 
commodities in the case of tariff elimination.  
From the estimated trade creation accruing to the 
establishment of an EU-EAC EPA, we conclude 
that, once more, the textiles industry may suffer 
most from increased competition through cheaper 
imports. Of 22 items experiencing an increase of 
trade volumes with the EU of more than 10 %, 11 
are textile products. This, again, is also due to the 
fact that current tariff protection is among the high-
est in these industries.  
In the agricultural sector, we did not find any sig-
nificant effect in any sub-sector, and estimated trade 
creation was found to be surprisingly low. As far as 
food security is concerned, we also find no evidence 
for an immanent threat in form of substantially in-
creased import competition in staple food products.  
In view of these results, however, it seems appropri-
ate to highlight some of the weaknesses of the ap-
proach taken. The fact that low or no trade creation 
is estimated in particularly sensitive sectors, such as 
for instance staple foods, may be due to one or more 
of the following reasons. Either tariffs are already 
low or zero, and thus tariff elimination will not have 
a major impact on import prices and consequently 
do not lead to any further effect in our calculation. 
However, prices and production structures as re-
vealed by actual trade flows may already be dis-
torted to an extent that cannot be calculated in the 
framework of the methodology used here. Second, 
some products may simply not be imported prior to 
trade liberalisation, and thus no trade creation is 
calculated. The latter could be the case for products 
for which an import ban is in effect. In this case, the 
method of identifying risks and opportunities by 
examining the relevant trade creation cannot pro-
duce satisfactory results. 
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Opportunities of Regional Integration 
In order to identify whether Tanzania may benefit 
from regional integration through improved export 
opportunities in particular product groups, we calcu-
late indices of revealed comparative advantage 
(RCAs) for both regional trade and trade with the 
EU in product groups at the 4-digit level of the HS 
code.27 The underlying assumption of this approach 
is that once trade barriers are dismantled from a 
competitiveness point of view, Tanzania will be in a 
                                                     
27  RCAs were calculated for the present study using the 
formula (Xj-Mj)/(Xj+Mj), where Xj denotes exports of 
products within group j to the region, and Mj denotes im-
ports of products within group j from the region. RCA cal-
culation of this type results in indices ranging between 1 
and – 1. RCAs in the vicinity of 1 show a comparative ad-
vantage, whereas RCAs in the vicinity of –1 show a com-
parative disadvantage for products produced in Tanzania. 
The calculation was done at the 4-digit HS-level and for 
those headings for which we derive Tanzania’s RCAs to-
wards the EAC and EU partners of 0.5 or higher. It must 
be noted that any specific value of this measure is consis-
tent with any volume of trade (Greenaway and Milner 
1993:186). For matters of convenience we have not in-
cluded the tables in this report but they are available on re-
quest from the authors 
position to expand its trade vis-à-vis its main trading 
partners in those sectors and commodity groups 
where a comparative advantage is already revealed 
by the current pattern of trade flows. Actual trade 
potential, however, depends on a number of factors 
other than just a high RCA. One limiting factors of 
this approach then lies in the implicit assumption 
that there are no capacity constraints impeding ex-
port expansion.  
A ranking of all RCAs of Tanzanian products ex-
ported to the region shows that only one fifth have a 
positive RCA, predominantly originating from agri-
cultural production. As there is a small overlap of 
current export and import structures vis-à-vis 
Kenya, a small trade potential may be inferred from 
this estimate. No significant comparative advantage 
can be observed, however, for most of Tanzania's 
manufactured products. Tanzania’s textiles sector in 
particular has low or even negative RCAs, implying 
a low potential for trade expansion in the region 
resulting from further trade liberalisation. The main 
reason for this finding may be attributed to Tanza-
nia’s relatively high cost of production, specifically 
relating to energy, telecommunication and transport 
costs.  
Box 4: Risks and Opportunities from the Perspective of Tanzanian Manufacturers 
Tanzanian businesspeople are surprisingly self-confident with regard to the competitiveness of their companies in a re-
gional framework. Most expect the EAC customs union to be beneficial to the Tanzanian industry. This perception is 
mainly due to the fact that the negotiations – besides the elimination of internal tariffs and the establishment of a common 
external tariff – also cover NTBs, which most Tanzanian producers see as the main obstacle to exports to Kenya. How-
ever, the same producers expect protection in the form of suspended tariffs on selected items (like the traditional textile 
products Kanga and Kitenge) to be maintained, claiming that without them they would not be able to compete with Ken-
yan suppliers. Similar views are expressed in the tea packing industry with respect to the ban on tea imports. Other indus-
trialists believe they will benefit from the elimination of internal tariffs in the EAC, because cheaper inputs will then be 
available. For example, one food-processing and canning operation in Arusha which receives its tin cans via Mombasa, 
and for the time being has to pay Kenyan as well as Tanzanian import duty on these, hopes it will become more competi-
tive in the regional market once internal tariffs are abandoned.  
Views on liberalisation towards the EU are more sceptical but also diverse in nature. One large supplier of car parts 
owned by a multinational company expects that the European mother would most probably close down its Tanzanian 
production facilities once it could supply the East African market duty-free from Europe. By contrast, there are producers 
from other industries that hope to benefit from cheaper inputs, claiming that European producers are no threat to their 
business, because they do not offer products tailored for the specific needs of the African market. Finally, there are com-
panies that hope to be able to benefit from improved market access to and, in particular, better information on market 
requirements in Europe. These include processors and packers of fruit, juice and cashew nuts as well as textile mills. Par-
ticularly interesting export opportunities for Tanzanian producers are seen in increasing European demand for organic 
products. 
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As regards export opportunities created by the re-
gional integration process, NTBs in the form of 
“informal movement fees,” administration of sani-
tary and phytosanitary certification and onerous 
customs procedures in general seem to be much 
more a hindrance to agricultural regional trade than 
tariffs (EAC 2002). This view has been confirmed 
by personal communication with producers as well 
as by experts of the respective institutions such as 
the Board of External Trade and the Tanzanian Bu-
reau of Standards (see Box 4). 
Opportunities of Trade Liberalisation with 
the EU 
Since Tanzania already enjoys tariff-free market 
access to the EU, opportunities from an EPA will 
mainly derive from the elimination of NTBs and 
increased investment in Tanzania’s export sector. 
Once more, we calculate RCAs to identify those 
sectors that might benefit most from such steps. 
Most of Tanzania’s main traditional export com-
modities such as cashews, coffee, cotton, tobacco, 
sisal, and tea display the expected high RCA values 
with respect to the EU. This result is, however, 
mainly explained by the methodology applied: 
RCAs are naturally high if one of two trading part-
ners is the sole exporter of the respective product. 
The EU does not produce coffee and Tanzania has 
an import ban on coffee; thus trade flows only occur 
in one direction, resulting in a high RCA value even 
though turnover of coffee production and export 
volume continuously decrease.28 Moreover, the 
indices can be high irrespective of the volume of 
trade actually taking place. Hence, very small trade 
flows irrelevant to total trade can produce high 
RCAs.  
However, a number of important products show 
promising results, such as calculations for the tex-
                                                     
28  Consequently, even though coffee has experienced severe 
price drops on international markets, a RCA of 1 is derived 
for Tanzania, a country with one of the most suitable cof-
fee production environments in the world, because it has 
undertaken substantial efforts  to diversify away from cof-
fee and to food crop production,. 
tiles sector and its raw materials (cotton, hemp, 
sisal), a number of horticultural products, cut flow-
ers, and various fish products. They result in RCAs 
of 0.9 and above, indicating that additional trade 
potential could be realised if remaining trade barri-
ers were eliminated, and supply-side constraints 
were overcome that currently impede expansion of 
production and exports. 
Whether additional opportunities for Tanzanian 
producers will result from an EPA will therefore 
depend to some extent on whether any measures to 
improve access to the EU’s markets are included in 
the agreement. Since under the EBA initiative Tan-
zanian products already have duty- and quota-free 
market access to the EU, the issue to be addressed in 
this context is mainly NTBs. The rules of origin and 
sanitary and the phytosanitary standards that the EU 
applies to some of these industries pose particular 
problems.  
The rules of origin currently applied by the EU are a 
particular problem for producers in the textiles and 
clothing industries. For instance, the EU requires for 
cotton clothing that the manufacturing process must 
‘manufacture from yarn,’ implying that the yarn 
must be sourced locally and that imported cotton 
fabric cannot be used (Brenton 2003:3). Even 
though Tanzania is in the comfortable position to 
grow cotton, for a number of processes this is not 
the most efficient and appropriate input source. The 
production of yarn and fabric are bottlenecks. How-
ever, if cotton, yarn or fabric are imported from 
other countries external to the ACP, Tanzania will 
lose its preferential market access and have to ex-
port under MFN conditions to the EU market. 
As for the manufacturing sector as a whole, a num-
ber of observers and private sector representatives 
consider measures to attract European investors, 
secure improved access to export finance as well as 
to provide better information on market require-
ments in Europe equally important to further im-
proving market access in terms of tariffs and NTBs 
(see Box 4). Also, the extent to which the economy 
could benefit from larger markets appears rather 
limited, since many of the domestic manufacturers 
even lack the capacity to serve their local, let alone 
national and international, markets.  
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Tanzanian producers and exporters of agricultural 
products still have considerable difficulties in ful-
filling European market requirements in terms of 
quality standards, sanitary and phytosanitary  
standards (SPS), and health and consumer protec-
tion standards and their respective certification. 
Putting into place adequate mechanisms and incen-
tives to ensure compliance with international stan-
dards should be a major concern of stakeholders in 
the agricultural sector. Our findings moreover con-
firm the view that the sector still faces serious pro-
duction constraints that limit efficiency, output and 
quality of production, and consequently its ability to 
seize new export opportunities.  
4.4 Social Implications 
The social implications of trade liberalisation may 
be manifold, depending on the various transmission 
channels, the policies and institutional structures in 
place and the time allowed for the adjustment pro- 
cess. In the following the most pertinent issues in 
the case of Tanzania are identified, i.e. the social 
implications of a potential revenue loss and adjust-
ment costs to be faced by the main economic sec-
tors. The findings in this section draw both on the 
quantitative analysis presented above and interviews 
with Tanzanian stakeholders, particularly with pri-
vate sector representatives.  
Social Implications of Revenue Loss 
As far as social implications of the fiscal impact of 
an EPA are concerned – in addition to the overall 
revenue loss discussed above – both potential meas-
ures to compensate for this and changes on the ex-
penditure side need to be taken into consideration.  
On the revenue side, the attempt to compensate for a 
loss of revenue through alternative sources inevita-
bly has distributional consequences. Their nature 
depends on which sources are chosen. The remedy 
commonly proposed whenever revenue losses due 
to trade liberalisation are addressed is to broaden the 
tax base, preferably by introducing a generally ap-
plicable VAT. The main appeal of the VAT is that it 
causes relatively small distortions in the economy. 
However, at a rate of 20 %, the existing VAT in 
Tanzania is already comparatively high; indeed is 
even the highest in the region. Consequently, this is 
not an instrument likely to offer much more room to 
improve the treasury’s accounts.29  
Most other fiscal instruments are more problematic 
and quite often lead to an inefficient allocation of 
resources in the economy and (sometimes unwar-
ranted) re-distributional effects on incomes between 
different segments of the economy. In the case of 
Tanzania, special caution should be used to avoid 
the possibility that additional taxes are imposed 
exclusively on potentially less organised groups 
such as agricultural smallholders or informal micro-
businesses in the larger towns. As in most LDCs 
with an orientation towards economic development 
driven by import substitution and/or export promo-
tion, the Tanzanian tax system is currently already 
heavily biased in favour of the urban population.  
The same argument applies if alternative sources of 
revenue are not found or do not suffice to make up 
for the revenue loss incurred. In this case, the only 
fiscally sustainable way out would be to resort to 
cuts on the expenditure side. Substantial cuts in 
public expenditure would be highly disputable from 
a social point of view in the case of Tanzania. The 
country has endorsed serious steps towards poverty 
reduction and increased social sector spending as a 
share of total expenditure by a considerable amount 
in the past (OECD/AfDB 2003:206). Budget con-
straints already put these achievements at risk. Con-
sequently, there is little room for manoeuvre on the 
expenditure side without running the risk of nega-
tively affecting social sector expenditure.  
Social Implications of Economic Adjust-
ment 
The economic costs and benefits that may arise 
from establishing an FTA with the EU will more-
                                                     
29  Although it is true that Tanzania has an extensive exemp-
tion regime which provides for many exemptions from 
payment of the VAT as well, our argumentation above 
suggests that challenging these exemptions might not be an 
easy task. 
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over have direct social implications. Again, it must 
be ensured that the most vulnerable groups do not 
have to bear the costs of economic adjustment fol-
lowing an elimination of import tariffs towards the 
EU, and that they are able to fully participate in the 
benefits. New export opportunities may also benefit 
the poor. Trade policy affects the poor in various 
ways: 
— In their capacity as producers, they are affected 
by price changes for the inputs they use as well 
as for the products they sell. Consequently, 
trade liberalisation resulting in cheaper imports 
as well as in potentially increased demand op-
portunities might at the same time destroy and 
generate employment, possibly creating entirely 
new forms of jobs. 
— As consumers, the poor may benefit from lower 
prices for the goods they buy, be they imported 
or domestically produced.  
80 % of Tanzania’s population are employed in the 
agricultural sector. Accordingly, most of Tanzania’s 
poor are farmers or live in rural areas. Conse-
quently, even though we have found no evidence 
that increased competition in the wake of regional 
integration and trade liberalisation toward the EU 
would be insurmountable for Tanzania’s agricultural 
sector, it seems indispensable that special attention 
be paid to identifying necessary safeguards in this 
particular sector of the economy – even more so as 
food insecurity must still be regarded as the major 
concern of the rural poor in Tanzania (OECD/AfDB 
2002:288).  
For instance, domestically produced crops might be 
substituted with cheaper imports of staple foods 
over the medium to long term. and this could result 
in changes in consumption patterns, as is already the 
case in large parts of West Africa. This will affect 
the incomes of producers of local crops. Moreover, 
increasing dependence on food imports renders poor 
consumers more vulnerable to price or exchange-
rate shocks. Analyses of the social implications of 
EPAs therefore must take into account not only the 
direct effects of tariff elimination but also poten-
tially medium- to long-term changes of production 
and consumption patterns. 
As far as the manufacturing sector is concerned, 
different concerns arise. While on the one hand we 
found that the threat from regional and European 
competitors is more immanent in the manufacturing 
sector (especially in textiles) than it is in agriculture, 
there were on the other hand also indications that 
the manufacturing sector may be better prepared to 
seize increased opportunities. In addition, this sector 
is much better represented at the political level than 
the agricultural sector. Given the relatively high 
level of protection currently enjoyed by manufactur-
ing industries, adjustment costs to raise productivity 
and competitiveness to the necessary levels will, 
however, be substantial.  
Negative social implications can be mitigated by 
longer – yet firmly determined – transition periods 
that could be envisaged under EPAs, as well as by 
the lower costs of imported inputs. While efficiency 
gains should in principle benefit all consumers in 
Tanzania, further research is needed to assess the 
distributional consequences of shifts in the produc-
tion structure. Furthermore, in addition to firm-level 
adjustment, competitiveness of the manufacturing 
sector could be raised substantially by lowering the 
high costs of utilities in Tanzania, including elec-
tricity, water, transport and telecommunications.  
4.5 Recommendations 
Our findings indicate that the opportunities and risks 
arising from the conclusion of an EPA for Tanzania 
are manifold. None of the proposed opportunities 
identified will materialise automatically; they will 
instead have to be actively seized by Tanzania’s 
stakeholders. Similarly, measures need to be taken 
to mitigate the identified risks. Hence, Tanzania 
needs to formulate an effective and coherent nego-
tiation strategy, including measures to be under-
taken domestically that will enable the country to 
make optimal use of the new trading arrangements. 
With regard to the economic implications of EPAs, 
we therefore recommend the following: 
1. The Tanzanian government should as soon as 
possible commission an impact study in accord-
ance with the terms of reference provided by the 
ACP secretariat. This study should examine the 
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fiscal, economic, and social impact of an EPA 
on Tanzania in a thorough and comprehensive 
manner. In addition, this study should also take 
the fiscal and economic implications of the re-
gional dimension of EPAs explicitly into ac-
count.  
2. Any conclusions drawn and recommendations 
made in this study should be based on economic 
and political realities in Tanzania. In particular, 
estimates of the fiscal impact of an EPA should 
take tax exemptions into explicit account. Re-
commendations based on these estimates must 
not overlook the political economy underlying 
the exemption regime in place. 
3. Based on the results of the study, Tanzania 
should prepare for a loss of public revenue due 
to tariff elimination. Feasible measures to com-
pensate for this revenue loss need to be identi-
fied, i.e. systematic efforts must be made to find 
alternative sources of revenue. 
4. Particular attention should be paid to potential 
risks and opportunities in the agricultural sector, 
and their social implications. In addition to 
short term effects of tariff elimination vis-à-vis 
the EU, medium- to long-term implications for 
trade and consumption patterns need to be taken 
into account. Defining safeguard measures will 
be of particular concern with a view to Euro-
pean subsidies still in place. 
5. For the agricultural sector, it will moreover be 
of special importance that national policies are 
adapted to the actual needs of producers in the 
various sub-sectors, and implemented accord-
ingly. No trade strategy can substitute for the 
institutional and policy deficits currently bur-
dening the country. 
6. The same applies for Tanzania’s incipient in-
dustrial sector. There is still a need to create an 
appropriate business environment which allows 
the manufacturing sector to become competitive 
in a global economy. However, the sector 
should not receive excessive protection at the 
cost of domestic consumers; it needs instead to 
be able to adjust to efficiency and quality re-
quirements during a defined period of time. 
5 Preparation of EPA Negotiations: The 
Multilateral and National Level 
The beginning of formal negotiations at an all-ACP 
level in September 2002 immediately revealed un-
equal bargaining powers between the EU and the 
ACP group. It became apparent that there is a lack 
of co-ordination among the ACP states, mainly due 
to weaknesses in their organisational structure and 
because of the heterogeneity of interests. In addi-
tion, many ACP states, like Tanzania, lack experi-
ence and the capacity to formulate their national 
interests in trade issues. However, one condition 
required to be in a position to seize the opportunities 
associated with the negotiations of the envisaged 
trade agreements is for the countries of the ACP 
group to formulate their key interests with regard to 
the national and regional level and defend them in 
multilateral negotiations.  
The present chapter first outlines the current state of 
negotiations of EPAs at the multilateral level and 
the organisational structure of both contracting par-
ties, highlighting organisational deficiencies at the 
EU-ACP level of negotiations. Second, the chapter 
describes the current state of preparations at the 
national level in Tanzania. It analyses ministerial 
responsibilities and identifies shortcomings in Tan-
zania’s formulation of trade policy. Special attention 
is given to the involvement of non-state actors, as 
stipulated in the Cotonou Agreement. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of how to strengthen 
Tanzania’s trade capacity and makes recommenda-
tions on how to prepare EPA negotiations more 
effectively at the national level.  
5.1 Preparations for EPA Negotiations at 
the Multilateral Level  
The negotiations between the EU and the ACP 
countries started at an all-ACP level in September 
2002. According to the European Commission’s 
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rationale, EPAs should be negotiated on a regional 
level. The contracting parties therefore have agreed 
to divide the negotiation into two phases. During 
phase I, discussions of a more general nature will 
take place at an all-ACP level. In phase II, envis-
aged to start in September 2003, the EU will enter 
into negotiations with regional integration initia-
tives. This is, in view of the situation in East Africa, 
an ambitious goal. But the European Commission 
has already signalled, that – if justified – phase I 
could be extended.  
The following timetable is currently envisaged by 
the contracting parties:  
From Sept. 2003:  Launch of negotiations of EPAs 
with regional groupings (phase II) 
2005: Exploration of alternative 
 possibilities for non-LDCs 
2006: Formal and comprehensive 
 review of progress in negotia-
 tions 
31st December 2007: Phase-out of waiver allowing 
 non-reciprocal trade prefer-
 ences 
1st January 2008: Entry into force of any EPA 
 which may have been con-
 cluded 
2008-2018/2020: Implementation of EPAs and 
 transition to fully fledged 
 FTAs 
2018/2020: Entry into force of WTO- 
 compatible FTAs 
5.1.1 The EU’s Negotiation Structure 
At all levels, the EPA negotiations will be con-
ducted by the European Commission, which was 
given the mandate to negotiate by the Member 
States of the EU, 30 i.e. at the ministerial, the ambas-
sadorial and the technical level.31 It was moreover 
decided that the negotiation of EPAs falls within the 
responsibility of DG Trade (and not DG Develop-
ment), a fact which shows that for the Commission 
EPAs are first of all trade agreements, although with 
a development component. 
The EU is a strong and experienced negotiation 
partner. It is a supranational organisation that speaks 
with one voice during negotiations, thereby repre-
senting the currently fifteen and the later 25 member 
states. Thus, the position of the European Commis-
sion is always the outcome of a co-ordination and/or 
voting process between the European Commission 
and its member states and within the European 
Commission. This has a twofold effect: On the one 
hand, it limits the scope of negotiation options; on 
the other hand, it clearly adds to the European 
Commission’s bargaining power. 
It should be noted that the EU’s enlargement in 
2004 will have an impact on the negotiations with 
the ACP states, as the acceding countries are coun-
tries with a high dependence on agriculture. Thus, 
the EU might become even more reluctant to liber-
alise the agricultural sector, a sector where the ACP 
countries are supposed to have comparative advan-
tage. Furthermore, the co-ordination process within 
the EU is very likely to become more complex and 
difficult as a result of the need to establish new de-
cision-making procedures, to adapt to structural 
problems and to review major policies, especially 
the CAP. 
                                                     
30  The mandate was necessary because according to the treaty 
establishing the European Community, the EC has been 
given an exclusive power only in the area of common 
commercial policy; Article 133 of the Treaty of Amster-
dam. The envisaged EPAs will to exceed this competence 
in that they will not be pure trade agreements but will also 
– amongst other things – regulate development and in-
vestment matters. 
31  At the ministerial level, the EU delegation will be headed 
by Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy, who will be accom-
panied by other commissioners as necessary. At the am-
bassadorial level, the Director of DG Trade will head the 
EU delegation, accompanied by senior officers from vari-
ous Directorates General. 
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5.1.2 The ACP’s Negotiation Structure 
The ACP side also foresees a ministerial, ambassa-
dorial and technical level. But its organisation is 
more complex, mainly because of the large number 
of states – currently 78 – that have to be represented 
at the different levels. At the ministerial and ambas-
sadorial level, negotiating groups headed by so-
called troikas had to be established to ensure that all 
ACP regions are adequately represented.32 As a 
result of this complexity, the beginning of negotia-
tions had to be delayed until the ACP side had set 
up its structure. 
At the ministerial level, the ACP Council of Minis-
ters will be the decision-making organ. It is respon-
sible for adopting  negotiating positions and approv-
ing all outcomes of the negotiations. 
At the ambassadorial level, the Committee of Am-
bassadors (COA) will prepare the negotiations for 
decisions at the ministerial level. At the technical 
level, it is foreseen that the negotiating groups will 
prepare technical briefs and submit them to the 
COA for review, discussion and final approval be-
fore these groups meet with the EU side.33 Out-
comes of negotiations at this level are again subject 
to COA endorsement. At the next stage, joint ACP-
EU ambassadorial level negotiations will be con-
vened to approve the work done by the negotiating 
groups, discuss cross-cutting issues and finalise 
preparations for the ministerial level meetings. 
Compared to the EU, the ACP side is a weak nego-
tiation partner, and decision-making processes are 
bound to be slow due to the complex negotiation 
structure. One reason for the creation of such a 
complex structure with working groups on three 
                                                     
32  These ‘troikas’ consist of one spokesperson and two alter-
nate spokespersons representing each of the ACP regions. 
33  Technical preparations are led by the ACP Secretariat with 
the assistance of an Advisory Group of High Level Trade 
Experts, consisting of experts representing the regional 
economic integration organisations and officials of col-
laborating institutions. The Advisory Group of High Level 
Trade Experts has not yet started its work due to differ-
ences between the ACP Council of Ministers and the ACP 
Secretariat concerning responsibilities and tasks. 
levels is the absence of a common foreign trade 
policy on the ACP side and the apparent wish of the 
national governments to keep tight control over the 
negotiations. So far, the regional organisations have 
not received a mandate, since none of the EPA 
groupings that are likely to form the EPA configura-
tion are currently a customs union, let alone have a 
common trade policy. This makes it crucial for the 
national governments to strengthen their trade ca-
pacity in order to be represented in an effective 
manner at all levels of the negotiation process and to 
manage, in addition, the necessary coordination 
among themselves. 
5.2 Preparations of the Negotiations at 
the National Level 
Conducting multilateral trade negotiations presup-
poses that key interests with regard to trade policy 
have been formulated at the national level. The next 
section therefore examines the process of trade pol-
icy formulation in Tanzania. The definition of trade 
interests requires: 
— structures and procedures to support the defini-
tion of interests; 
— a clear distribution of roles and responsibilities 
between ministries; 
— mechanisms to involve all relevant stake-
holders, including non-state actors;  
— allocation of the resources needed to implement 
policies; and  
— analytical capacity. 
— As trade policy touches upon a variety of issues 
other key ministries typically involved in trade 
policy formulation – in addition to the Ministry 
of Trade – are (Solignac Lecomte 2001:13); 
— the Ministry of Finance because of the fiscal 
implications of tariff policies; 
Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements with the EU 35 
— the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of its 
responsibility for political relations with trading 
partners; 
— the Ministry of Agriculture and other line min-
istries because of sectoral implications of trade. 
The following section first outlines the current state 
of preparations of EPA negotiations and, second, 
analyses how trade policy formulation is carried out 
by giving a short overview of the responsibilities of 
the ministries involved in trade policy formulation 
in Tanzania. 
5.2.1 The Current State of Preparations 
of the Negotiations in Tanzania 
Concrete preparations for the negotiations in Tanza-
nia started only in January 2003. EPAs are not a 
priority on the policy agenda. One reason for this is 
that at the moment Tanzania’s primary concern 
regarding trade is the establishment of the East Af-
rican Customs Union, which is supposed to enter 
into force in November 2003. Also, the Tanzanian 
government needed to reorganise responsibilities 
within the government with regard to the EPA nego-
tiations, since the former structure of co-operation 
with the EU did not reflect trade policy issues. The 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) initiated a first meeting 
on EPAs at the technical level in January 2003. The 
outcome of the meeting was to recommend (Minis-
try of Finance 2003): 
— that the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) 
be made the lead ministry to co-ordinate EPAs. 
Considering the limited capacity of MIT, it was 
recommended that the MOF should work in 
close consultation with the MIT and provide 
secretarial services;  
— that the MOF should take the initiative to im-
mediately form a task force to provide technical 
back-up on EPA negotiations;  
— that an impact study be commissioned to estab-
lish baselines and modalities for negotiations. 
The follow-up process to this meeting was, how-
ever, sluggish. The envisaged task force had not 
been appointed by the time of writing, nor have the 
terms of reference for the impact study been final-
ised or the respective request for funding processed. 
The regional dimension of EPAs was not taken into 
consideration, according to the draft terms of refer-
ence, which means that the implications of the cur-
rent overlap between SADC and EAC for Tanza-
nia’s EPA position will not be taken into considera-
tion. This would be a serious shortcoming of any 
such impact study. 
5.2.2 Structure for the Preparation of the 
Negotiations in Tanzania: Roles and 
Responsibilities 
Difficulties encountered in the preparations for EPA 
negotiations result from a fragmentation and lack of 
clarity of responsibilities in the formulation of trade 
policy in general. Trade policy issues have not been 
given a high priority in the past years, a fact re-
flected by the rather weak position of the Ministry 
of Industry and Trade within the government.  
In addition, there is no permanent intra-
governmental committee to consult on trade policy 
issues and to act as a facilitator for co-ordination of 
interdependent issues. This leads to an ad hoc ap-
proach to inter-ministerial consultation, which 
moreover undermines the effectiveness of participa-
tion of the line ministries, particularly in reporting 
on the sectoral implications of policy proposals and 
negotiation strategies. The same goes for NSAs, as 
there are no mechanisms established to involve 
them: There is neither a regular reporting system 
nor a consultation forum.  
Ministry of Finance (MOF): MOF holds the posi-
tion of EDF Authorising Ministry, because the allo-
cation of EDF funds was formerly seen as the major 
element in ACP – EU relations. As a budgetary 
issue it fell within the responsibility of the MOF. 
With EPAs on the agenda, the major focus has 
shifted to trade issues and this calls for the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry to play a greater role. MOF is 
mainly concerned with revenue collection.  
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Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT): MIT has 
formally been declared the lead Ministry of trade 
policy formulation, exemplified by the National 
Trade Strategy. But while carrying lead responsibil-
ity on the WTO, it does not lead on regional trade 
agreements and only now is supposed to be given 
the role of co-ordinating EPA negotiations in col-
laboration with the MOF. Assigning lead responsi-
bility on WTO issues and EPA issues to one single 
Ministry, i.e. MIT, would facilitate the requisite co-
ordination in multilateral trade matters in the future.  
However, the capacity of MIT to fulfil its mandate 
is currently very limited. Work practices and techni-
cal skills are still constrained by MIT’s former role 
of managing and administrating government-
monopolised trade under a socialist economic sys-
tem. Although MIT was appointed to be the lead 
authority for trade policy formulation, the division 
of labour between MIT and the Office of the Presi-
dent, Planning and Privatisation on trade policy 
issues is not clear-cut, as the latter is responsible for 
trade policy at the macro level. In addition, although 
the first meeting to prepare EPA negotiations rec-
ommended that MIT take the lead for co-ordination 
of EPA issues, it also recommended that MOF 
should appoint the task force for EPA negotiations.  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Co-operation (MFAIC): The MFAIC is responsi-
ble for regional integration initiatives, namely the 
EAC and SADC. At present, EAC and SADC do 
not fall within the responsibility of one single de-
partment: EAC trade issues are addressed in the 
Department for East Africa and the Department for 
Multilateral Co-operation deals with SADC and 
WTO issues. According to an internal communica-
tion, the departments are set to become one depart-
ment with responsibility for “Regional co-
operation.” Notwithstanding MFAIC’s lead respon-
sibility on economic and political aspects of the 
regional integration processes (EAC and SADC), 
the EAC Secretariat concurs with MOF on tariff 
matters, leading to a bias towards revenue consid-
erations in developing national positions. 
Ministry for Agriculture and Food Security 
(MAFS): Considering that the agricultural sector 
contributes the largest share of foreign exchange 
earnings in Tanzania, we were surprised to find out 
that the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
only plays a minor role regarding trade policy. Cur-
rently, this Ministry deals with WTO, AGOA, EBA 
and SADC issues, but there is no particular structure 
for Cotonou or EPAs. EPAs will probably concern 
agricultural marketing policies, which fall within the 
responsibility of the newly created Ministry of Co-
operatives and Marketing. To our knowledge, this 
Ministry does not at present contribute to interna-
tional trade policy formulation.  
5.2.3 The Way Forward: A Task Force 
for EPA Negotiations 
As was discussed above, responsibilities between 
Ministries in the formulation and negotiation of 
trade policies are fragmented and there is no perma-
nent intra-governmental committee to consult on 
trade policy issues. With regard to the preparations 
of EPA negotiations, it is therefore essential to es-
tablish mechanisms to involve all line ministries, to 
inform all relevant stakeholders, including non-state 
actors, and to establish a forum for consultation. We 
therefore support the recommendation made by the 
Draft Institutional Review of the Tanzania Trade 
and Poverty Programme (TTPP) to establish a Min-
isterial Committee on Trade Policy.34  
We furthermore propose: 
— To establish a task force consisting of represen-
tatives from the MIT, MOF, MFAIC, MAFS 
and POPP under the chairmanship of MIT. The 
task force should be small to make it work ef-
fectively. Each institution should be represented 
by two members: the Permanent Secretary and a 
                                                     
34 The standing Ministerial Committee on Trade Policy is 
supposed to co-ordinate action on all international trade is-
sues. It was recommended that it should consist of minis-
ters from MFAIC, MOF, Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security, a representative of the Tanzania Revenue Author-
ity, and other ministries and agencies as required. The task 
force that we are proposing could be seen as a Sub-
Committee of this Ministerial Committee. Other Sub-
Committees on other trade negotiation settings like the 
WTO could be created. 
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senior staff person to minimise the risk of staff 
turnover and to ensure continuity in the prepara-
tion process.  
— To give a clear mandate to the task force to co-
ordinate the preparations for negotiations and to 
develop a negotiation strategy. The task force 
should be in a position to establish working 
groups dealing with specific issues. These work-
ing groups should consist of senior officials 
from the Ministries, Government Agencies and 
NSAs concerned. Such multi-agency working 
groups would ensure that the interests of various 
stakeholders are taken into due account.35  
— To establish a reporting mechanism between the 
task force and all line ministries and NSAs to 
inform them about the work of the task force 
(also see 5.3 below).  
— To nominate within each ministry staff posi-
tions as contact points for EPA issues to assign 
clear responsibilities for EPAs within each min-
istry. The contact point would be responsible for 
the dissemination of information within its min-
istry. In the case of the five ministries repre-
sented in the task force, the contact point should 
be a member of the task force. 
— To give all line ministries and non-state actors a 
possibility to discuss and comment on the pro-
posals made by the task force by establishing a 
monthly consultation forum to be organised by 
the chair of the task force. 
5.3 Involvement of Non-State Actors in 
the Preparation of Negotiations 
Involvement of NSAs within the Cotonou frame-
work and especially in EPA negotiations is an ambi-
tious goal. As discussed above, the new trade re-
                                                     
35  Selection of the NSAs to be part of the working group 
should be at the discretion of the NSAs themselves. For 
this purpose, we support the idea of establishing a Trade 
and Poverty Advisory Council, as recommended in the In-
stitutional and Organization Review (Tanzania Trade and 
Poverty Programme 2003). 
gime will affect the income and thereby the welfare 
of wide parts of society and there should be more 
transparency and more active involvement of NSAs 
in these processes. The Cotonou Agreement and 
EPA negotiations touch upon topics with which the 
various parts of NSAs are concerned to different 
extents. Not every civil society organisation is 
working on aspects relevant for development co-
operation in general or trade issues in particular. 
Few NGOs have the expertise to engage in these 
topics. Consequently, it makes sense to focus on 
those parts of NSAs which are in the position to 
contribute to the process and which speak for 
groups likely to be directly affected by the results of 
the process. In the case of EPAs, it is expected that 
these groups would, as a minimum comprise, in-
clude private sector organisations, trade unions and 
civil society organisations engaged in economic and 
trade matters such as small enterprise promotion and 
the like.  
In the following we discuss our main findings for 
Tanzania and analyse the reasons for the low level 
of current NSA engagement, distinguishing between 
internal constraints arising within the NSA commu-
nity and external constraints.  
5.3.1 Internal Constraints for NSA 
Involvement 
In Tanzania NSAs do not play the prominent role in 
EPA negotiations that is foreseen by the Cotonou 
Agreement. According to our findings, they are 
currently not aware of the extent to which they will 
be affected by EPAs. Thus far there has been almost 
no NSA involvement in the discussion of trade mat-
ters. Some reasons for the low level of NSA in-
volvement lie within the NSAs’ own organisational 
structures and have their roots in internal con-
straints. These internal constraints can be catego-
rised and summed up as a lack of awareness, of 
capacity, of co-ordination, of funds, and, more gen-
erally speaking, a lack of experience with involve-
ment in policy-making processes.  
Lack of awareness: Almost all interviewees were 
not informed of the Cotonou Agreement, and of 
EPAs in particular. Most of the people informed 
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about the Cotonou Agreement received their infor-
mation from the media. None stated that they had 
been informed through any kind of promotion by 
the government or by the EU delegation in Tanza-
nia. This goes hand in hand with a general lack of 
interest in trade topics among NSAs and especially 
among NGOs. Generally, there are very few NGOs 
engaged in trade matters. When asked about the 
issue, they state that they do not see the influence 
trade policy has on their work and vice versa. Sur-
prisingly, many interviewees from private sector 
companies were not aware of Cotonou or EPAs 
either. 
Lack of capacity: If NSAs want to identify their 
specific interest in EPAs, they require analytical 
skills to assess risks and opportunities. This is im-
peded by a lack of capacity in terms of missing ex-
pertise and know-how as well as in terms of lack of 
personnel to spare for trade topics. Most organisa-
tions, including private sector ones, have no staff 
knowledgeable in the sphere of international trade 
relations. This is also related to the fact that interna-
tional trade relations and trade liberalisation are per 
se very complex issues. Their linkages to poverty 
eradication and other topics in which most NGOs 
are engaged is difficult to trace but nevertheless 
crucial for reaching the goals of development co-
operation and the Cotonou Agreement in particular.  
Lack of co-ordination and organisation: NSAs 
are a very heterogeneous group, which makes it 
difficult if not impossible for them to speak with 
one voice. The NSA community does not co-
ordinate its efforts with a view to better considera-
tion of their interests in the policy formulation pro-
cess. This refers to the co-ordination between the 
various groups of NSAs and their umbrella organi-
sations as well as to co-ordination within the differ-
ent groups (see Box 5). 
There are several umbrella organisations in Tanza-
nia that seek to bundle the common interests of their 
members: 
— the Tanzania Association of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (TANGO); 
— the Trade Unions’ Congress of Tanzania 
(TUCTA); 
— the Private Sector Foundation, the apex private 
sector organisation; 
— Viwanda na Biashara Ndogondogo (VIBINDO), 
representing the informal business sector.36  
However, there is no formal forum which compre-
hensively backs the “non-state actor concept” pro-
posed by the Cotonou Agreement. At present, lobby 
groups and their umbrella organisations seem to 
have difficulties in collecting, analysing, and dis-
seminating relevant information to raise their mem-
bers’ awareness of the EPA process. Besides, the 
diversity of interests they have is often too broad to 
allow consensus to be reached. There also seem to 
be some constraints concerning the dissemination of 
information within the member organisations.  
Lack of experience with policy formulation pro-
cesses: We assumed that lack of experience with 
policy formulation processes would be another con-
straint for NSA involvement. This is only partly the 
case, as the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) pro-
cess has already introduced NSA participation in 
strategic policy issues to Tanzania. Even though this 
process is far from perfect and the stakeholders 
involved claim they have not been given the chance 
to respond to the papers presented to them, some 
parts of NSAs are familiar with the concept now. 
Some of them (like the private sector and TGNP and 
the civil society TEDET) have even taken an active 
part, pushed to be included in the process, and pre-
pared statements and papers in advance. These ac-
tivities are completely missing from the Cotonou 
and EPA processes at present.  
                                                     
36  VIBINDO so far only represents the informal sector in the 
region of Dar es Salaam, but it is currently trying to estab-
lish a nation-wide body.  
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Box 5: Different Levels of Co-ordination among NSAs 
To illustrate the situation, we will take a closer look at the levels of co-ordination within the different parts of NSAs. We 
will focus here on civil society organisations, the private sector, and within the private sector on agriculture.  
Civil society organisations: So far there has been little or no involvement of civil society in the Cotonou process. Only a 
limited number of civil society organisations, like the Tanzania Gender Network Programme (TGNP) and the Tanzania 
Eco-Developm18 
ent Trust (TEDET), are aware of EPAs and have staff knowledgeable on the Cotonou and EPA process. None of them 
have yet taken any active steps towards participation. Other civil society organisations are waiting for the government to 
invite them to participate, and finally there are NGOs not at all informed about the negotiations and their risks and oppor-
tunities. This to some extent contrasts with the experience of the PRS process, where some NGOs actively pushed for 
involvement, and it may be explained by the fact that trade is not usually perceived as an issue relevant to civil society. 
Private sector: Within the private sector the situation is different. Large parts of the private sector, like the informal sec-
tor and the agricultural sector, have not yet undertaken any activities and mostly lack information and awareness. The 
Confederation of Tanzanian Industry (CTI) stands out as very well organised and prepared. This association efficiently 
keeps track of new developments, promotes its interests vis-à-vis the government and has a high pressure potential. CTI, 
however, mainly fosters protective trade policies, thereby delaying Tanzania’s integration into the world and regional 
markets. As CTI represents only a minority of large manufacturing companies within the private sector, and an even 
smaller share of the NSA spectrum, there is the risk that this well-organised body may become too dominant compared to 
other NSAs that have not become part of the process yet. Still, with the private sector the one most directly affected by 
EPAs, all parts of it should be engaged in the preparation process. This is not the case at present, as also shown by the 
examples from the agricultural and manufacturing sectors.  
Agricultural sector: One particularly relevant but difficult case is representation and co-ordination of the agricultural 
sector in trade policy formulation. On the one hand, the institutional framework for lobbying and promotion of policy 
interests is still very much the same as it was prior to Tanzania’s structural adjustment and market liberalisation. There is a 
widespread perception that the government mostly confronts associations, commodity boards, and chambers with deci-
sions already taken rather than involving them in the policy formulation process. On the other hand, most institutions are 
themselves still engaged in the transformation process towards a market economy. Stakeholders have not yet defined the 
role they may play for the benefit of their constituencies. Commercial farmers close to markets and small scale producers 
scattered in rural areas across the country obviously have very different needs and interests. The founding of the Tanza-
nian Chamber for Agriculture and Livestock (TCAL) indicates that farmers are aware of this bias of interests. While there 
is hope that the implementation of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme will provide incentives and support 
for increased participation of rural small scale farmers in policy formulation, under-representation of this sector’s specific 
interests in national policy formulation processes will persist over the short and medium term. 
Manufacturing sector: Tanzanian manufacturers were surprisingly uninformed about the Cotonou Agreement, upcoming 
EPA negotiations, and in particular the type of trade liberalisation envisaged in the EPA concept. Even members of CTI, 
arguably the most active business association in Tanzania, described themselves as at best  “vaguely informed” about 
these issues at the time of the interviews. Consequently, the private sector is rather unprepared for the potential risks but 
also for the opportunities arising from an EPA as analysed above. One striking feature is that many businesspeople simply 
cannot imagine being left without protection from global competition. Various managers stated that their businesses would 
be seriously threatened by European imports if tariffs were eliminated, but were confident that the government would take 
the necessary steps to protect them from “unfair” competition.  
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5.3.2 External Constraints to NSA 
Involvement  
The above finding is in line with the fact that the 
government has not established any systematic 
mechanism to facilitate NSA involvement in the 
Cotonou and EPA preparations. Regular meetings, 
round tables or any other form of exchange of ideas 
would not only facilitate participation but also serve 
as a legitimisation of involvement. Additionally, it 
would of course motivate and support NSAs to or-
ganise in a way that allows them to participate.  
Lack of government support: Participation also 
depends on the government and its commitment to 
get NSAs involved. This commitment is largely 
absent so far. The government has until now not 
engaged in any activity aimed at raising awareness 
among NSAs, to support or encour- 
age them to participate in the preparation process of 
EPAs. This may be due to the government itself 
struggling to find an organisational structure for 
EPAs, and it may change once such a national nego-
tiation structure has been established. The PRS ex-
perience shows that this is possible.  
Lack of EU support: What is provided for in the 
Cotonou Agreement led us to expect that the EU 
delegation would be actively involved in guiding the 
process of EPA preparations in Tanzania, including 
fostering NSA participation. However, the delega-
tion’s activities have been restricted to occasional 
publications on the general concept in the media. 
These include newspaper articles and the EU news-
letter, which is, however, published only in English. 
Information is rarely published in Swahili, though 
such information would reach a much broader audi-
ence. The perception was confirmed that the discus-
sions on EPAs have so far been Brussels-centred 
both on the side of both the EU and the ACP.  
One noteworthy fact in this context is the engage-
ment of one of the German political foundations, the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which at the time of 
writing was the only organisation actively involved 
in building awareness and capacity in the area of 
Cotonou, EPAs and NSA participation in the related 
discussions and decision making processes.  
5.3.3 Fostering the Involvement of NSAs: 
Some Recommendations 
The analysis of the stage of NSA involvement 
showed shortcomings in the spheres of awareness, 
capacity, co-ordination and experience with policy 
formulation processes. The following recommenda-
tions suggest how to overcome these weaknesses 
and refer not only to the NSAs themselves but also 
to the other players involved, namely the govern-
ment and the EU delegation.  
Raising awareness: Increased dissemination of 
information about EPAs through the media will 
support awareness raising. Information should focus 
on the need for participation and point to explicit 
fields of interest to NSAs. The government needs to 
show its interest in NSA participation, raise the 
acceptance of their involvement and thereby legiti-
mise it. It should show its willingness to support 
participation and use it as a tool to generate infor-
mation about society’s interests. The EU delegation 
should increase dissemination of information both 
in English and in Swahili. Additionally, it should 
promote the existing capacity building facilities and, 
if possible, engage in capacity building itself;  
Building trade capacity: Training on trade issues 
(for example, on possible impacts of trade liberali-
sation in general and EPAs in particular) should 
address participants from the NSAs and the gov-
ernment in order to bridge the existing gap between 
these actors. The government and especially the EU 
delegation should better promote the funds available 
to NSAs for capacity building (for example, the 20 
million euro capacity fund or the share of EDF 
money dedicated to NSA capacity building). The 
government should broaden NSA involvement by 
integrating them at an early stage and giving them 
the chance to respond to papers and proposals. 
NSAs should prepare to become involved in ad-
vance and insist on becoming part of the process. 
Those who feel responsible for the topic should 
submit papers on the relevant issues in advance to 
show their interest and competence on the issue. To 
push the process of involvement of NSAs on the 
side of the government, the EU delegation should 
repeatedly insist on NSA participation and demand 
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results from this process, as the World Bank did 
during the PRS process.  
Strengthening co-ordination and organisation: 
The government should establish a mechanism to 
facilitate the involvement of NSAs. This mechanism 
could have the form of the advisory council sug-
gested by the TTPP (Draft Institutional Review 
2002). The council would consist of stakeholders 
from the NSAs who would be consulted on topics 
concerning NSAs (the imbalance of participation 
within the private sector needs to be overcome by 
strengthening TCCIA, VIBINDO, TCAL and other 
umbrella organisations on the basis of capacity 
building measures and by giving them equal rights 
in the process of involvement (for example equal 
access to relevant meetings). Civil society organisa-
tions affected by the topic of trade liberalisation 
should no longer merely react to government activi-
ties and become actively involved and push for par-
ticipation. 
5.4 Trade Capacity Building and further 
Recommendations 
All of the above-mentioned ministries that deal with 
trade issues, in particular MIT, the ministry respon-
sible for trade, lack capacity for trade policy analy-
sis, negotiation and implementation, as has recently 
been noted by the Institutional Review of the TTPP. 
This seems to be associated with the rather low pri-
ority that the government has traditionally given to 
trade policy. Yet training of analytical skills is es-
sential as a prerequisite for developing negotiation 
positions. It is therefore  important not only to es-
tablish structures and mechanisms for the prepara-
tions of EPA negotiations but also to strengthen the 
trade capacity of the various stakeholders involved 
in trade policy formulation (see Box 6). 
The ACP Secretariat and the European Commission 
established a Project Management Unit (PMU) to 
administer a 20 million programme for capacity 
building in the ACP countries and the regional eco-
nomic groupings. It became operational in July 
2002. Unfortunately, the PMU faced severe imple-
mentation problems. Currently, however, the main 
problem is a lack of project proposals from the ACP 
side. This indicates that capacity building has to 
start at an even earlier stage, i.e. to put countries in a 
position to make use of capacity building offers. 
Box 6: What Does Trade Capacity Building Mean? 
Despite the growing recognition of the importance and necessity of trade capacity building, there is no clear understanding 
among donors or the beneficiaries of technical assistance about its scope or its precise objectives. The aims of donor sup-
port can be split into two broad categories: support at the political level on the one side, and enhancing competitiveness of 
exporters on the other. The following definition confines itself to the political level, however, and includes both state and 
non-state actors as beneficiaries. 
At the policy-making level, capacity building measures can in principle be carried out in the following areas:  
Analysis: Analytical capacity to monitor trade issues is needed, as analytical work constitutes the foundation for the for-
mulation of policies and the adoption of negotiating positions. Apart from the government, target groups should also be 
private sector organisations, trade unions, etc. Moreover, it would be important to build independent capacity for analysis 
and research on international trade.  
Formulation of trade policies, i.e. subsequent to the identification of trade interests, formulation of objectives and strate-
gies for their attainment. This includes managing information and networking with stakeholders. 
Negotiation skills: Training is required to acquire negotiation skills revolving around strategic ability, skilful diplomacy 
based on greater interpersonal skills and improved teamwork. 
Implementation: Capacity building to ensure that policies are actually implemented through training of standards agen-
cies, trade facilitation bodies, etc. 
Source: Solignac Lecomte (2001:13) 
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In Tanzania, there are currently two programmes in 
place working on trade capacity building: The Joint 
Integrated Technical Assistance Programme 
(JITAP) which is conducted by ITC, UNCTAD and 
WTO, and the Tanzania Trade and Poverty Pro-
gramme (TTPP), which is designed and funded by 
DFID. 
JITAP aims at assisting African countries to partici-
pate more effectively in the multilateral trading 
system. The programme has been in operation in 
eight countries since 1998. JITAP particularly fo-
cuses on capacity building with regard to the WTO 
system. Its main objectives are to build capacity for 
understanding the multilateral trading system and its 
implications for Tanzania; to help gear Tanzania's 
policy to seek maximum advantages from the multi-
lateral trading system; and to enhance Tanzania's 
export readiness in selected key areas (Pallangyo 
2003). Although the programme has faced financial 
constraints and management problems in the past, it 
has contributed to raising awareness and deepening 
understanding of the WTO Agreements. 
TTPP is broader in scope and designed to develop 
capacity both inside and outside the government. Its 
aim is to build capacity among stakeholders to en-
able them to formulate and negotiate trade policies 
and strategies that are pro-poor, taking into account 
that Tanzania is involved in WTO, EU, EAC and 
SADC negotiations. Recognising that trade reform 
can boost the country’s economic growth prospects 
and contribute to poverty eradication, the intention 
is to build capacity to ensure that trade reform 
serves poverty reduction and environmental sustain-
ability objectives. According to the Project Memo-
randum, TTPP will also enable NSAs to understand 
and analyse the impact of trade reform, and to enter 
into a meaningful dialogue with government offi-
cials in order to influence trade policies and to 
monitor these policies. 
TTPP is a relatively young programme that started 
in 2002. It consists of eight core components37, the 
                                                     
37  Components: 1. consultancy to identify linkages between 
trade policy and poverty reduction; 2. institutional and or-
ganisational review; 3. raising awareness of trade policy is-
sues and improving dialogue between public and private 
first of which was completed through submission of 
an Institutional Review. DFID will provide a total of 
£ 927,685 on grant terms over a three year period. 
Given the scope and objectives of JITAP and TTPP, 
capacity building with regard to EPAs does not 
require setting up another special programme struc-
ture. Instead, EPA capacity building measures could 
become part of these programmes and make exten-
sive use of local and regional expertise based at the 
university or in research institutes. Whereas TTPP 
focuses on institutional capacity development, EPA 
capacity building could be complementary and con-
centrate on individual capacity development and 
training of trade negotiators. Short-term expertise 
and trainings could be used to complement this, 
utilizing more specific and tailored training meas-
ures whenever needs are identified during day-to-
day work concerned with the preparations for nego-
tiations.  
With respect to EPA capacity building, we therefore 
suggest that:  
— Training should be made available urgently for 
the members of the proposed task force or the 
working groups on a short-term basis, as sug-
gested above.  
— As a means of internal capacity building, at 
least two consultants from within Tanzania 
should be recruited for the impact study on 
EPAs. The same goes for further studies and 
trainings to be carried out with regard to spe-
cific aspects of EPAs.  
— With a view to the potential length of the nego-
tiation process, and in order to strengthen capac-
ity to interrelate with the Tanzanian delegation 
in Brussels, joint trainings should be arranged 
for participants from the capital and from Brus-
sels. 
                                                                                  
sectors and civil society; 4. integration of trade issues in 
the national budgetary and economic reform process; 5. a 
fund for trade policy studies; 6. formal and informal capac-
ity building in WTO and other trade issues; 7. provision of 
IT equipment; 8. a fund for essential participation in trade 
negotiating fora. 
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— Over the short to medium term, more systematic 
training should be envisaged for a broader group 
of stakeholders; this should be based at or coor-
dinated with the available facilities at the Uni-
versity of Dar es Salaam and local research in-
stitutes. 
6 The Regional Dimension of EPAs 
6.1 The Role of Existing Regional 
Integration Initiatives in the EPA 
Negotiations 
EPAs are seen as a means to consolidate and deepen 
processes of regional integration within the ACP by 
fostering trade reforms, promoting common rules 
and enhancing openness and transparency of mar-
kets.38 The EU prefers therefore to negotiate EPAs 
with regional groupings rather than with individual 
countries. It is, however, up to the ACP countries 
themselves to decide whether they want to negotiate 
a regional or an individual EPA.39 
If the members of an existing regional initiative (RI) 
decide to negotiate an EPA as a group, they have to 
agree on common positions to speak with one voice 
in the forthcoming second phase of the negotiations. 
Consequently, it is important for regional initiatives 
to identify rules and mechanisms concerning how 
best to work out and adopt common positions on 
relevant issues. Within this process the regional 
secretariats can play an important role as facilitators 
and co-ordinators of the preparations for EPA nego-
tiations.  
                                                     
38  The European Commission first argued that EPAs should 
replace the existing arrangements under the Lomé Conven-
tion to establish a WTO-compatible trade agreement. Only 
later did the European Commission promote EPAs a means 
for regional integration.  
39  The Cotonou Agreement, article 37.5, states: “Negotiations 
of the economic partnership agreements will be undertaken 
with ACP countries which consider themselves in a posi-
tion to do so, at the level they consider appropriate and in 
accordance with the procedures agreed by the ACP Group, 
taking into account regional integration process within the 
ACP.” 
In the present study we have assessed the state of 
regional integration and examined the preparedness 
for EPA negotiations in the East African Commu-
nity (EAC), which is one regional option for Tanza-
nia. The heads of state of the three members of EAC 
(Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) in addition declared, 
in April 2002, that they intend to negotiate trade 
issues “as a bloc.” First, we outline which ACP 
regions are eligible for EPA negotiations from the 
EU’s point of view and briefly delineate the oppor-
tunities and risks of an EPA for RIs. Second, we 
analyse the current state of EPA preparations at the 
regional level. The chapter concludes with recom-
mendations on what has to be done to facilitate and 
accelerate the EPA preparation process at the re-
gional level.  
6.1.1 Required Qualifications for ACP 
Regions 
Even though it is the ACP's prerogative to decide on 
the actual geographical configuration of future 
EPAs, the European Commission has formulated 
guidelines to provide orientation on the eligibility of 
regional groupings for EPA negotiations (European 
Commission 2001). According to these guidelines, 
regional groupings that have implemented a cus-
toms union or have legally binding agreements to do 
so, are seen as offering the best conditions for the 
attainment of the provisions of the Cotonou Agree-
ment. Additionally, the Commission has stated its 
view that ACP countries that are members of an 
eligible regional integration initiative should not be 
eligible for EPA negotiations on an individual basis 
(European Commission 2001:12).  
The paper also addresses the case of overlapping 
memberships between two or more regional group-
ings. According to the European Commission, nego-
tiations of two or more EPAs with the same country 
are not conceivable. Countries that are members of 
different regional groupings are therefore asked to 
decide within which grouping they intend to negoti-
ate an EPA. This does, however, not imply that they 
are required to step out of the RI with which they do 
not negotiate an EPA. Furthermore, it is also a re-
gional EPA cannot include broader regional con-
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figurations which go beyond the current regional 
economic integration frameworks. 
In summary, the Commission’s position on regional 
EPAs comprises five basic components (Bilal 
2002:21): 
— EPA negotiations should take place within a 
regional framework; 
— each ACP country can only negotiate once, 
regardless of multiple memberships; 
— each EPA should be self-contained and hence 
does not allow for overlapping or competing ini-
tiatives; 
— all members of a regional grouping negotiating 
an EPA must speak with one voice; 
— within the process of negotiating an EPA, a 
multi-speed approach may be envisaged. 
6.1.2 Opportunities and Risks for 
Regional Initiatives in the EPA 
Process  
Whether EPA negotiations at the regional level act 
in favour or against deepened integration in the 
ACP regions depends on the region’s preparedness 
for common trade negotiations. The process of ne-
gotiating a regional EPA entails both opportunities 
and risks for internal integration processes. 
Opportunity for deeper integration: EPA negotia-
tions can have a positive effect by assisting the re-
gional organisations to harmonise their trade re-
gimes, thus strengthening the regional integration 
process (Trades Centre 2002b:60). As the estab-
lishment of an FTA or a customs union is a precon-
dition for negotiating an EPA, EPA preparations can 
act as an incentive for regional initiatives to set up 
such trade agreements in a shorter period of time 
than initially foreseen.  
Opportunity for wider integration: EPA negotia-
tions at the regional level call for a solution for 
overlapping memberships between different re-
gional initiatives, a situation that is widespread in 
Southern and Eastern Africa. One solution could be 
for different regional groupings to form alliances, 
harmonise their negotiation position and agree on 
the same trade arrangements with the EU. If this is 
the case, EPAs can act as an incentive to deal with 
overlapping memberships as well as a driving force 
for wider regional integration. Irrespective of the 
technical issues to be addressed to make such an 
arrangement feasible, it may be expected that one 
broad regional integration initiative as a replace-
ment for the existing proliferation of regional initia-
tives will enhance bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
EU and have positive effects on the economic per-
formance of the member states.40  
Risk of overstretching the regional initiatives: 
EPA negotiations could also have negative effects 
on regional integration processes in Africa, for ex-
ample by imposing over-ambitious timetables on the 
RIs (cf. Qualmann/ Rojahn 2002). Many RIs are 
currently working on major integration projects 
themselves.41 These projects absorb most of the 
manpower and negotiating capacity available in the 
often understaffed regional secretariats. The pres-
sure to start trade negotiations with the EU in a 
phase of internal restructuring and change bears the 
risk of overstretching capacity and demanding too 
much of the RIs, whose institutional structure is not 
yet consolidated. Furthermore, EPAs focus mainly 
on trade and economic issues, while existing RIs 
also have political and development objectives 
which may not be taken sufficiently into account 
during the EPA negotiations.  
Risk of conflicts among member states and 
among regional initiatives: To negotiate a regional 
                                                     
40  Sharer (2001:16f.) states: "The complexity of Africa's trade 
arrangements reduces the potential trading gains from re-
gionalism and undermines improvement in the investment 
climate that arises from larger markets, added certainty 
and stability of policies, and improved transparency (...). 
Finally, it may weaken reform momentum by dissipating 
the political capital needed to pursue reforms and foster-
ing the very favouritism and special interests that trade 
liberalisation is supposed to overcome." 
41  COMESA and EAC plan to establish a customs union by 
2004, and the SADC members have agreed on implement-
ing an FTA by 2008. 
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EPA, the member states of the RI in question have 
to agree on common positions towards the EU. This 
can be a difficult, possibly conflictive task, as the 
RIs often consist of heterogeneous countries with 
rather different trade interests. One major distinction 
lies between LDCs and DCs, because LDCs cur-
rently benefit from preferential market access to the 
EU market under the EBA initiative and therefore 
have relatively more to lose in an EPA than their 
DCs partners (see Chapter 3). More industrialised 
countries have a higher interest in protecting their 
manufacturing sectors than LDCs, which prefer to 
protect the agricultural sector instead. This raises 
the question as to which sectors are to be included 
and how fast liberalisation as a group will be eco-
nomically and politically feasible. To decide on 
these issues for the EPA negotiations is a challeng-
ing new task for RIs, as most of their member states 
still have divergent trade and economic policies in 
place.  
Conflicts may also emerge between different RIs. 
To prepare EPAs, RIs are forced to co-operate more 
closely in order to agree on the geographical con-
figuration of future EPAs. This can lead to the har-
monisation of the different integration processes in 
the region as well as to wider regional integration, 
as described above. However, the need to co-operate 
can also cause conflict. This could e.g. be the case if 
different RIs in Eastern and Southern Africa are 
required to establish an FTA as a precondition for 
an all Eastern and Southern Africa-EPA in order to 
solve the problem of overlapping membership. The 
existing RIs have various interests, objectives and 
internal timeframes and it is doubtful whether these 
can be harmonised to the satisfaction of all the 
countries in question.  
EPAs can serve as a means to foster regional inte-
gration. Whether the RIs can seize this opportunity 
depends, however, on how successfully they can 
defend their interests and needs in the negotiations 
with the European Commission. It is therefore nec-
essary for them to define strategies on how the op-
portunities of an EPA can be best used and risks be 
avoided. In the following section we examine how 
the EAC is dealing with this challenge of preparing 
EPA negotiations.  
6.2 The Case of the East African 
Community (EAC) 
The EAC is a positive example for regional integra-
tion efforts in Africa. Established only in 2000, its 
three member states, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, 
are following a straight path towards economic and 
political integration. From this perspective EAC is a 
likely geographical option of an EPA for Tanzania, 
and we have therefore integrated the EAC’s state of 
preparation in our study. The following section first 
gives an overview on the EAC’s integration efforts, 
and, second, outlines the current state of EPA prepa-
ration by analysing the opportunities and risks of an 
EPA for the special case of the EAC. Finally, we 
recommend a way forward for EPA preparations at 
the regional level.  
6.2.1 Internal Structure and Integration 
Efforts 
The current EAC is a re-launch of the first East 
African Community, which lasted from 1967 to 
1977. These considerable integration efforts were 
discontinued mainly because of the partners’ diver-
gent political regimes and development strategies. 
When the general political and economic conditions 
changed in favour of closer co-operation in the 
1990s, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda agreed to re-
launch regional integration in East Africa. This 
process led to the signing of the "Treaty for the Es-
tablishment of the East African Community" in 
1999 and its ratification in 2000. The Treaty pro-
vides for a unification process following four steps: 
a customs union, a common market, a monetary 
union and, finally, a political federation. 
The main strengths of the EAC are: the common 
cultural ground, especially the languages Swahili 
and English, the political stability in the region and 
the basically compatible legal and political systems, 
which go back to the countries' shared past under 
British colonial rule. Another factor working in 
favour of the Community is the presence of co-
operation pressure, due e.g. to the common use of 
Lake Victoria or cross-border wildlife migratory 
routes. Beneath these common interests and shared 
goals, tensions and divergences of opinion exist 
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among the partners. There is political disagreement 
as well as there are economic constraints, such as 
Tanzania's fear of the Kenyan economic dominance 
in the EAC (cf. Mair 2001:165). 
The EAC does not yet have a strong regional institu-
tional structure. Decisions are taken unanimously by 
national representatives of the three member states. 
The existing regional bodies, like the EAC Secre-
tariat and the East African Legislative Assembly 
(EALA), are understaffed in view of the tasks that 
lie ahead of them and only deal with administrative 
and technical tasks, because they lack the mandate 
to take binding decisions.  
At the time of writing, member states and the EAC 
Secretariat were working on the completion of the 
EAC Customs Union Protocol, which was planned 
to be approved by Ministers in November 2003. The 
establishment of the customs union is an important 
step for EAC to enter into an FTA with the EU and 
therefore beneficial for EPA negotiations. Further-
more, it is likely that the customs union will go 
along with a qualitative and quantitative enhance-
ment of the EAC Secretariat.42 
6.2.2 State of EPA Preparations 
The EAC member states have undertaken first steps 
to prepare for common trade negotiations. The 
process is, however, still in its beginning and it is 
not clear whether the above-mentioned opportuni-
ties or risks of an EPA will prevail in the case of the 
EAC. The following section outlines the state of 
EPA preparations in the EAC and its shortcomings.  
Opportunity for deeper integration: In view of 
the forthcoming EPA negotiations and the new 
WTO round, the heads of state of the EAC member 
countries declared in April 2002 that the three coun-
                                                     
42  The "Study to Develop a Legal, Institutional and Adminis-
trative Structure for the Customs Union", commissioned by 
the EAC Secretariat, provides detailed information on this 
topic. The consultants propose, for example, to set up a 
Customs, Fiscal and Trade Group in the Secretariat, con-
sisting of seventeen divisions with a total staff of 129 (cf. 
imani development 2003:7). 
tries should negotiate as a bloc in future trade nego-
tiations. This is an important step towards deeper 
integration, since previously there was no co-
operation on trade issues. To put the heads of states' 
decision into practice, the member states, in collabo-
ration with the EAC Secretariat, organised a work-
shop in October 2002 (“East African Community 
Negotiating as a Bloc”) with participants composed 
of the EAC ambassadors in Brussels and Geneva, 
trade experts, staff from the EAC Secretariat and 
representatives of all ministries involved. The par-
ticipants recommended that the EAC member states 
should agree on common positions which should 
become "official EAC positions" for EPA negotia-
tions. The EAC Secretariat was to play a more im-
portant role as a co-ordinator and facilitator for the 
preparation of negotiations. Through these initia-
tives, the EAC has already taken the EPA prepara-
tions as an opportunity to plan closer regional co-
operation on trade issues (cf. EAC Secretariat 
2002). 
Opportunity for wider integration: The EPA 
preparation process has already led to some activi-
ties among the RI to tackle the questions arising 
from EPA negotiations. First consultations have 
taken place between EAC, SADC and COMESA, 
with COMESA playing the most active role in the 
process. For COMESA the most favourable option 
is one single EPA covering the whole Eastern and 
Southern African region (COMESA 2002a: 14). An 
impact study commissioned by SADC on “Impact 
Assessment of Economic Partnerships Agreements 
on the SADC and Preliminary Adjustment Scenar-
ios” draws the same conclusion and recommends 
"that SADC form […] alliances among regional 
partners for the negotiations of the EPAs" (Trades 
Centre 2002a:XV). 
A general framework to ensure coherence among 
regional initiatives in Eastern and Southern Africa 
has been formulated in the common Regional Strat-
egy Paper of IOC, COMESA, EAC and IGAD, 
which includes a Regional Indicative Programme 
(RIP) to be financed under the 9th European Devel-
opment Fund. The RIP foresees the establishment of 
an Inter-Regional Co-ordination Committee (IRCC) 
between the four regional initiatives and representa-
tives from SADC. The IRCC does not have the 
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mandate to deal with the EPA preparations, but it 
should nevertheless serve as a forum for dialogue on 
crucial issues, like overlapping memberships be-
tween the regional initiatives and technical prob-
lems resulting from different sets of common exter-
nal tariffs or rules of origin. 
Risk of overstretching the regional initiatives: All 
key stakeholders dealing with EAC matters at the 
national and regional level are working on comple-
tion of the Customs Union Protocol. The establish-
ment of the customs union is favourable with regard 
to EPAs; it is, however, also a considerable chal-
lenge for the EAC. The customs union not only 
demands intensive negotiations on the content of the 
Protocol, it also has to be accompanied by creation 
of the respective legal, institutional and administra-
tive framework. According to a study on these is-
sues commissioned by the EAC Secretariat, substan-
tial structural reforms at the national as well as at 
the regional level are needed (cf. Imani develop-
ment 2003). The challenge involved in completing 
the customs union as foreseen may be the main rea-
son why EPA negotiations are not at the top of the 
agenda of most of the relevant stakeholders. There 
is obviously some interference between the internal 
EAC timeframe and the projected start of EPA ne-
gotiations in September 2003.  
The EPA concept provides for negotiations between 
the European Commission and regional initiatives. 
The concept does not take into account the state of 
integration of most of the RIs in Africa. In the EAC, 
the internal integration process is not advanced and 
the common policies not convergent enough to enter 
into common trade negotiations. On the EU side, the 
Commissioner of Trade represents all EU member 
states in the EPA negotiations. On the EAC side, in 
comparison, there is neither a supranational body 
with the mandate to negotiate for the member states 
nor are there mechanisms in place to reach agree-
ment on common EAC positions for negotiations 
with third countries. It is, for example, not clear 
how responsibilities for trade issues are shared be-
tween the EAC Secretariat and the national officials 
dealing with EAC matters. One main problem in 
this context is the limited capacity of the EAC Se-
cretariat: Only two staff members are responsible 
for all macroeconomic issues, including fiscal and 
monetary aspects, and EPAs are only one of the 
many topics relating to trade issues that have to be 
dealt with.  
In face of the difficulties that parallel negotiations 
on the customs union and EPAs cause for the EAC 
and its member states, the question is whether the 
EAC member states should consequently plead for a 
postponement of the start of EPA negotiations at the 
regional level until they have finalised the Customs 
Union Protocol, or whether they should decide to 
start negotiations in parallel, as provided for, in 
September. In either case, substantial efforts need to 
be made to strengthen negotiation capacity on trade 
issues at the regional level.  
Risk of conflicts among member states and 
among regional initiatives: The analysis of the 
preparation process at the EAC level has revealed 
that even though  some first steps have been taken 
towards common trade negotiations, there is still a 
lack of the concrete action needed to put the neces-
sary mechanisms in place. It seems as though the 
decision of the heads of state to negotiate as a bloc 
is only a political statement, one at present without 
any binding character. This situation is reflected in 
the fact that opinions about the potential geographi-
cal configuration of an EPA for Tanzania still differ 
among the stakeholders. According to some, Tanza-
nia will certainly negotiate within an EAC frame-
work. For others, this decision still depends on the 
conclusion of an EPA impact study for Tanzania 
and is rooted in both political and economic ration-
ales. The uncertainty over whether or not the EAC 
will start EPA negotiations may also be the reason 
why the above-mentioned recommendations on the 
potential structure and mechanisms of the prepara-
tions for EPA negotiations have not yet been put 
into place.  
The situation is especially difficult in case of the 
three EAC member states, as they all have two re-
gional options for EPA negotiations: Kenya and 
Uganda could also negotiate with COMESA, Tan-
zania could negotiate with SADC (see Box 7). For 
none of the countries it is clear what the potential 
gains and losses of each arrangement may be. Tan-
zania may be reluctant to decide in favour of the 
SADC option as long as it is not clear how it will be 
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possible to give due consideration to the country's 
status as an LDC during the negotiations at the re-
gional level; i.e. how special and differential treat-
ment can be guaranteed for LDCs negotiating in a 
regional grouping with non-LDCs. Another problem 
for Tanzania is its vital interest in remaining a 
member of two regional initiatives: SADC and 
EAC.  
The issue of the problematic geographical configu-
ration of EPAs could be mitigated through closer 
co-operation among the different RIs. Unfortu-
nately, even if the stakeholders are aware of the 
difficulties arising from overlapping memberships, 
there is at present neither an institutionalised consul-
tation structure among the regional initiatives nor 
are there any systematic attempts to discuss these 
very critical but politically sensitive issues. The 
planned regional forum, IRCC, has not yet been 
established. The question is whether this lack of 
action with regard to EPA negotiations is only due 
to capacity constraints at the national and regional 
level or whether it is as well a sign of a lack of po-
litical will to deal with EPAs. EPAs are seen among 
some stakeholders in Tanzania as a concept that 
comes from outside and that is not appropriate for 
the specific situation in Eastern and Southern Af-
rica. 
6.2.3 The Way Forward: Challenges and 
Recommendations 
The analysis of the preparation process in the EAC 
has revealed that the Community and its member 
states are not in the position to formulate key inter-
ests and common positions. They are for this reason 
unable to enter into EPA negotiations with a strat-
egy which would enable them to seize the opportu-
nities of an EPA and to avoid potential risks. We 
have identified three obstacles which are hindering 
more effective preparations at the regional level: 
— lack of binding decisions with regard to EPA 
negotiations; 
— lack of a clear assignment of responsibilities 
among the decision-makers;  
— lack of pro-active engagement to deal with 
EPAs both at the EAC and the national levels. 
One reason for the lack of initiative among the key 
stakeholders is that they are neither sufficiently 
aware of the potential economic benefits and losses 
of an EPA nor do they know what kind of institu-
tional reforms are needed to conduct negotiations 
with the EU at a regional level. The necessary po-
litical decisions with respect to EPA negotiations 
Box 7: The Geographical Configuration of an EPA: Options for EAC Member States 
Option 1: All three countries withdraw from any regional initiative except EAC and negotiate an EAC-EPA. As the coun-
tries have economic and political interests in remaining member of different RIs, is it doubtful whether this option is fea-
sible.  
Option 2: Tanzania resigns from SADC, Kenya and Uganda resign from COMESA, but they retain a special, “associated” 
membership, which allows them to negotiate an EAC-EPA without losing touch with other integration processes in the 
region. The associated membership status should grant the right to attend meetings, but not to vote, and should be free of 
tariff obligations and involve lower membership fees (Imani development 2003:24). It has to be examined whether an 
associated membership would still enable the countries to defend their interests in each RI.  
Option 3: Tanzania resigns from SADC, rejoins COMESA, and EAC forms a “fast track group” within COMESA. The  
twenty members of COMESA could negotiate a common EPA with a more ambitious timeframe for EAC members, as the 
latter have already established a customs union and COMESA members have not. It is questionable whether this option is 
in any aspect attractive for Tanzania. For political and economic reasons, Tanzania wants to remain a member of SADC 
and to keep up a strong relationship with South Africa. 
Option 4: COMESA, EAC and SADC agree on a common EPA and therefore harmonise their trade policies with the aim 
of establishing one broad FTA in the region. Further research is needed to analyse whether it is realistic that the twenty 
five, rather heterogeneous, members of the three RIs could agree on rules and mechanisms to establish one single FTA in 
Southern and Eastern Africa.  
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can only be taken if both the economic effects of an 
EPA for the region and the necessary institutional 
reforms have been assessed. Only on the basis of 
clear decision criteria it is possible to define the 
region’s key interests and outline a common nego-
tiation strategy.  
Assessment of the potential economic benefits 
and losses for the EAC region: If they are to iden-
tify reasonable and promising negotiation issues, it 
is crucial that the member states be aware of the 
effects that an FTA with the EU might have on their 
economies. Thus it is essential that an impact study 
on the economic and social effects of an EPA on the 
EAC region be conducted as means of preparing 
and defining negotiation positions. Once they are in 
possession of the results of such an impact study, it 
will also be easier for the three member states to 
agree on common positions. The study could be 
based on the terms of reference for a “Study on 
Impact Assessment of Economic Partnership 
Agreements and Preliminary Adjustment Scenarios" 
at a regional level formulated by the ACP Secre-
tariat. Funding can be provided by the EU through 
the capacity building fund for EPA negotiations.43 
Such a study should be based on the findings of 
former impact studies like and the present report. 
However, it is necessary for the study to go beyond 
the scope of these studies by paying more attention 
to the fiscal implications of an EPA, including the 
dynamic effects, and by assessing in a more detailed 
manner the economic impact on different sectors, 
including the social implications.  
Proposals on institutional and administrative 
reforms: The decision makers lack information not 
only on the economic impact of an EPA but also on 
the institutional and administrative reforms that an 
EPA would entail for the regional initiatives and 
their member states. It is certain that a qualitative 
                                                     
43  SADC has already completed the above-mentioned impact 
study. The study, “Impact Assessment of Economic Part-
nerships Agreements on the SADC and Preliminary Ad-
justment Scenarios,” recommends that all SADC countries 
should negotiate a common EPA with the EU. As to geo-
graphical configuration, the study recommends that SADC 
countries could negotiate jointly with COMESA and EAC 
(cf. Trades Centre 2002a). 
and quantitative step towards deeper regional inte-
gration has to be taken to enable the EAC Secre-
tariat to conduct EPA negotiations at the regional 
level. We suggest that a study be commissioned to 
examine how common trade negotiations at an EAC 
level could be administered, and in particular on 
how the EAC Secretariat’s mandate could be trans-
formed or extended in order to enhance its status.  
Within this context of institutional change, one main 
challenge is to find a solution for overlapping mem-
berships. As stated above, a single country cannot 
negotiate an EPA with two different RIs. This prob-
lem is not only a result of EPA negotiations, it also 
emerges as soon as two RIs implement a customs 
union: Members of one customs union are not al-
lowed to be members of another customs union, 
since they are required to implement the CET and 
cannot grant preferential rates of duty to other states 
on their own.44  
Lack of information on what is in an EPA for RIs is 
only one reason for the rather modest state of prepa-
rations so far. The other reasons may include, as 
stated above, capacity constraints as well as a lack 
of political will. Even if the decision makers are not 
convinced of the merits of an EPA concept, and are 
thus not eager to push for this issue, the second 
phase of negotiations will nevertheless start in Sep-
tember of this year. The RIs and their member states 
have to prepare themselves to defend their interests 
towards the EU as successfully as possible and to be 
able to seize the opportunities presented by an EPA. 
We therefore suggest the following next steps to 
invigorate the preparation process. 
Recommendations: If the member states are will-
ing to conduct EPA negotiations as a bloc on the 
basis of common positions, and with the EAC Se-
cretariat playing a co-ordinating role, there is a 
chance that EPA negotiations may make a contribu-
tion towards deeper integration among the EAC 
countries. Given the EAC Secretariat's mandate to 
facilitate and co-ordinate the EPA preparation pro-
cess, we recommend that the Secretariat be given a 
                                                     
44  This problem will not occur if the two customs unions 
agree on an identical CET.  
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more active role in the process. As a means of ena-
bling the EAC Secretariat to assume this role, we 
suggest:  
— that the responsible Ministries in the member 
states take a binding decision to negotiate an 
EPA within the EAC; 
— handing over responsibilities to the regional 
level by giving the EAC Secretariat the official 
mandate to co-ordinate the preparation process; 
— agreeing on a division of labour between the 
EAC Secretariat and the national level;  
— establishing a regional negotiation team consist-
ing of representatives from the member states 
and the EAC Secretariat; 
— strengthening capacity in the EAC Secretariat 
by hiring there, as a minimum, one additional 
trade economist.  
Preparation for trade negotiations is a complex 
process involving the identification of vital interests, 
the promotion of dialogue between all key stake-
holders and the creation of mechanisms to prepare a 
common negotiation strategy. To support the re-
sponsible stakeholders in dealing with these tasks, 
we suggest:  
— commissioning an impact study on the effects 
of an EPA on the EAC economies as a group, 
including not only the economic impact but also 
the necessary institutional reforms; 
— identifying crucial issues for the negotiations 
and establishing working groups to deal with 
these issues; 
— intensifying the dialogue with other RIs to co-
ordinate the preparation process and to find so-
lutions for technical questions bound up with 
the EPA negotiations. 
7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The aim of the present study was to shed light on 
the preparations and potential impact of EPAs in 
ACP countries. We have taken Tanzania as a case 
study to identify, on the one hand, the potential op-
portunities and risks of an EPA and to analyse, on 
the other hand, the mechanisms of strategic policy 
formulation for the negotiations. Whereas many of 
the details on the institutional set-up and economic 
implications are country-specific, we do believe that 
some of our findings are not only valid for the case 
of Tanzania but can also be applied to the situation 
in other ACP countries, especially LDCs. The coun-
try-specific conclusions and recommendations are 
reported in the chapters above. In this final chapter 
we focus on findings that can be generalised for 
other ACP countries. The chapter concludes with 
recommendations generally applicable for ACP 
countries, including a number of areas where the 
European Commission and the broader donor com-
munity should become active and support partner 
countries in preparing for EPA negotiations. This 
final step is based on our analysis on the extent to 
which EPAs can potentially contribute to develop-
ment and poverty reduction in ACP countries, and 
how negotiations can be used to shape the EPA 
concept in this respect.  
The objectives of EPAs were inferred from Article 1 
of the Cotonou Agreement, which stipulates that co-
operation between the EU and the ACP states will 
“be centred on the objective of reducing and even-
tually eradicating poverty consistent with the objec-
tives of sustainable development and the gradual 
integration of the ACP countries into the world 
economy.“ The main means to achieve these objec-
tives is establishment of reciprocal free trade be-
tween the EU and ACP countries, or preferably 
ACP regions. The underlying rationale is that trade 
liberalisation will lead to trade creation, and as such 
increase welfare. But trade liberalisation does not 
translate automatically into benefits – especially not 
in least developed countries, let alone for the poor in 
these countries – if this is not actively supported by 
and embedded in a whole range of other policy 
measures. How trade liberalisation can be made pro-
poor is not outlined in the “EPA concept”. This 
demands a thorough analysis of the impact of spe-
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cific policies on vulnerable groups, and an appropri-
ate sequencing and timing of trade liberalisation.  
The state of preparedness for EPA negotiations was 
found to be alarmingly low at both the national and 
regional level. The process of deep regional integra-
tion is only now beginning in most of the ACP re-
gions, a fact which implies that regional authorities, 
such as the secretariats, do not have the capacity or 
the mandate to actually formulate and negotiate 
external trade policy for a designated region. The 
question is whether the countries are willing to 
transfer responsibility to the regional level and 
whether the regional secretariats will be put in a 
position to play a leading role in the preparations for 
joint trade negotiations. The issue of overlapping 
memberships will make these decisions even more 
difficult in Eastern and Southern Africa. Decisions 
by individual countries on the regional framework 
under which they wish to negotiate have potentially 
far-reaching implications. The initial timeframe set 
by the Commission for EPA negotiations did not 
take into account the reality of regional integration 
and the negotiation capacity of most RIs in ACP 
countries.  
The possibility to negotiate EPAs, however, is an 
opportunity in itself, since it gives the ACP coun-
tries the chance to influence the eventual shape of 
an agreement, and thereby to maximise the benefits 
and reduce the risks. This, however, presupposes 
that ACP countries are actually in a position to do 
so, i.e. to analyse, formulate and pro-actively nego-
tiate their position. This in turn requires analytical 
and institutional capacity, which is scarce in most of 
the countries concerned. Considering their limited 
capacity, it is necessary for ACP countries to set 
clear priorities for trade policy formulation and ne-
gotiation, and to implement the measures needed for 
institutional re-structuring and capacity building. 
Establishing reciprocal free trade between the ACP 
and the EU will result in revenue loss and at the 
same time increase import competition. Govern-
ments may have fewer resources to provide com-
plementary measures, and may even cut back ex-
penditure in the social sectors, as has been experi-
enced in many countries during structural adjust-
ment programmes. Although our study revealed that 
in the case of Tanzania total revenue loss may not 
be as severe as often feared, the loss incurred is 
likely to make it necessary for ACP countries to find 
alternative sources of revenue to compensate for 
tariff revenue losses and to restructure their revenue 
collection schemes. These in turn also need to be 
pro-poor if the poor are not to be worse off than 
without EPAs. 
One serious shortcoming of the EPA concept lies in 
the fact that it is silent on the question of how dif-
ferent levels of development of the member coun-
tries in the existing regional integration initiatives 
are to be treated in an EPA. This creates uncertain-
ties mainly among LDCs, which fear to lose the 
preferential status they enjoy under the EBA initia-
tive.  
If EPAs are to open up opportunities - including for 
LDCs - and if adjustment costs are to be limited, we 
therefore recommend that ACP countries need to 
negotiate for:  
— an outcome as close as possible to the EBA 
scheme in terms of a total abolition of all tariffs 
and quotas on all ACP exports; 
— elimination of NTBs and extended supply side 
assistance to reduce export and production con-
straints;  
— special and differential treatment for LDCs, 
especially if they negotiate a joint EPA with 
non-LDCs.  
Reform of the EU's CAP would be essential for any 
further opening of the EU agricultural markets for 
ACP products; but it is acknowledged that other 
forums are better suited to put pressure behind this 
issue. 
Based on our findings, we furthermore conclude 
that there is an urgent need for ACP countries to 
recognize the significance of trade issues for devel-
opment and poverty reduction, and subsequently to 
put themselves in the position to outline a negotia-
tion strategy which enables them to put their key 
interests on the agenda.  
52 Regine Qualmann et al. 
To achieve this task, we recommend: 
— ensuring that relevant national policies, such as 
agricultural policy, include poverty reduction 
programmes, as this is a precondition for mak-
ing efficient use of trade programmes and pav-
ing the way for pro-poor growth; 
— commissioning impact studies to reduce uncer-
tainty concerning the potential benefits and 
losses of an EPA; 
— deciding on the geographical configuration of 
EPAs and, if possible, commissioning an impact 
study on how to solve technical problems aris-
ing from overlapping memberships; 
— setting up a national task force to co-ordinate 
EPA negotiations with a view to overcoming the 
fragmentation of responsibilities in the field of 
trade policy formulation and establishing a focal 
point for all relevant stakeholders, such as the 
private sector and civil society. 
Assistance from the donor community in building 
trade capacity will be necessary to enable the ACP 
countries to be equal partners. Although there  ap-
pears to be a contradiction in the fact that that for all 
ACP countries the EU and its member states are 
both development and trading partners, the Euro-
pean Commission and bilateral donors do offer a 
number of support activities with respect to trade 
capacity building. Naturally, as the negotiating part-
ner, the EU cannot assist the ACP countries in de-
termining their negotiating positions. But the EU, in 
particular the EU delegations in the field, can help 
to raise awareness by disseminating information, 
especially about available funds and programmes 
for capacity building. It is then up to the ACP gov-
ernments and stakeholders to make effective use of 
them. 
To make EPAs an effective instrument for the inte-
gration of the ACP states into the world economy in 
a way consistent with the overarching objectives of 
poverty reduction and sustainable development, we 
recommend that the EU  
— provide flexibility regarding timeframes to give 
regional groupings enough time to further inte-
grate; 
— clarify whether and how the EPA concept takes 
into account special and differential treatment 
for LDCs; 
— ensure that applications for funding and trade 
capacity building are processed in an efficient 
and timely way; 
— make the EU delegations in the field responsi-
ble for the dissemination of information about 
EPAs as well as for awareness raising among 
the various stakeholders about potential implica-
tions of EPAs; 
Foster and insist on the involvement of NSAs in 
trade policy formulation, since this was seen as one 
of the fundamental principles when the Cotonou 
Agreement was signed. 
Further, we suggest that the donor community, es-
pecially the EU member states, should 
— assist in trade capacity building, wherever trade 
capacity building is not yet on the agenda; 
— co-ordinate trade capacity building efforts to 
avoid any fragmentation of various projects and 
programmes by different donors and to increase 
effectiveness;  
— make EPA capacity building an element of al-
ready existing trade capacity building pro-
grammes; 
— ensure that trade capacity building programmes 
take into due account national strategies and 
sectoral policies touching upon trade issues and 
poverty reduction and build on them. 
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Annex A: Lists of Interviews Conducted 
 
Table A 1: Interviews Conducted during the Desk Study, November 2002–January 2003 
Institution Name 
ACP Secretariat, Brussels Mr Ahmed Ndyeshobola 
Association of World Council of Churches related Development Or-
ganisations in Europe, Brussels 
Dr. Karin Ulmer 
East African Community (GTZ Advisor) , Arusha Dr. Heinz-Michael Stahl 
Economic and Social Research Foundation, Dar es Salaam Dr. Josephat Kweka 
Embassy of Tanzania, Brussels Dr. Prosper Mbena 
European Commission, Brussels Dr. Ingo Feustel 
German Federal Ministry of Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Bonn 
Mr Reinhard Palm 
Dr. Eefje Schmid 
President’s Office, Planning and Privatisation, Dar es Salaam Ms Diana Makule 
World Economy, Ecology and Development, Bonn Mr Klaus Schilder 
 
Table A 2: Interviews Conducted during the Field Study in Tanzania, February–April 2003 
Institution Name 
Business Associations and Private Sector Promotion Agencies  
Board of External Trade Mr Yusufu Kashangwa 
Board of External Trade Mr K.S. Mwasha 
Confederation of Tanzanian Industries, Arusha Office Mr Daniel E. Mghwira 
Confederation of Tanzanian Industries, Dar es Salaam Mr Hussein Kamote  
Mr Geoffrey Mackanja 
East African Business Council Mr Elly Manjale 
Small Industries Development Organisation, Arusha Mr Abdallah S. Kiluvia 
Small Industries Development Organisation, Dar es Salaam Mr Mike Laiser 
Tanzania Bureau of Standards 
 
Mr Charles M. Ekelege 
Mr Bethuel Matemba 
Ms Beatrice M. Mutabazi 
Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture,  
Dar es Salaam 
Mr Matiko 
Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, Arusha Mr Edwin W. Shetto 
Tanzania Coffee Board Mr Frederick S. Mpangile 
Tanzanian Board for Agriculture and Livestock Mr E.R.K. Mshiu 
58 Regine Qualmann et al. 
 
(A2 continued) 
Tanzanian Board for Agriculture and Livestock Mr Salem Shamte 
Tanzanian Coffee Producers Association Mr Mtei 
Trade Union's Congress of Tanzania  Mr N.K. Ngulla 
Donor Community   
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany Dr. Enno Barker 
Mr Hady Riad 
Mr Peter Zinngraf 
Centre for Development of Enterprise Mr Francis P. Mwimanzi 
Department for International Development Mr Iain Jones 
Embassy of Sweden (SIDA) Mr Bertil Odén 
European Commission Mr Axel de Lamaisonneuve 
Ms Helen Tilly 
Mr Joachim Zeller 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) Mr Peter Häussler 
Ms Angela Ishengoma 
Ms Silvia Riad 
German Technical Co-operation  Mr Detlef Mey 
Royal Netherlands Embassy Dr. Bernard Berendsen 
Mr Willem L. Bronkhorst  
Mr Steven Collet 
World Bank Mr Philip I. Mpango 
East African Community  
East African Community Secretariat Mr Nyamajeje C. Weggoro 
East African Community Secretariat Mr Peter Kiguta 
East African Community Secretariat Ms Mary N. Makoffu 
East African Community Secretariat Ms Isabele Waffubwa 
East African Community Secretariat Mr M.D.Sajjabi 
East African Community Secretariat (GTZ Advisor) Dr. Heinz-Michael Stahl 
East African Legislative Assembly Ms Kate Kamba 
Ms Sheila Kawamara-Mishambi 
Ms Irene Ovonji-Odida 
Government  
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security Ms Margaret Ndaba 
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(A2 continued) 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security Ms J. F. Bitegeko 
Mr Munisi 
Ministry of Finance Mr D. M. Msangi 
Mr Eliud T. Nyauhenga 
Ministry of Finance Mr Pius Mponzi 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation  Mr Moses T. Kibwana 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation  Mr Mboyi 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation  
(SADC Desk) 
Mr Pastor Ngaiza 
Ministry of Industry and Trade Ms Bulondo 
Ministry of Industry and Trade Mr Bede Lyimo 
Ministry of Industry and Trade (JITAP) Mr A. T. Pallangyo 
Ministry of Industry and Trade Mr Mussa Uledi 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (Zanzibar) Mr Joseph Abdalla Meza 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (Zanzibar) Mr Rashid Kibao 
Mr Idriss Shamte 
President's Office, Planning and Privatisation Mr Mrango  
Ms Diana Makule 
Tanzania Investment Centre  Mr Emmanuel Naiko 
Tanzania Revenue Authority  Mr Tonedeus Muganyizi 
Tanzania Revenue Authority  Mr S.S. Yusufu 
Tanzania Revenue Authority Mr Kangoye 
Zanzibar Investment Promotion Agency Ms Alice Kipogo 
NGOs  
Centre for International Business Development Services Mr Remmy Temba 
Jobs for Africa Mr Damas Dandi 
PRIDE Tanzania Mr James J. M.Obama 
Tanzania Eco-Development Trust Dr. Mushagwe  
Tanzania Gender Network Programme  Ms Rebecca Muna 
Private Companies  
A to Z Textile Mills Ltd. Mr Binesh Haria 
Arusha Aggregates Ltd. Mr Kanti V. Patel 
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(A2 continued) 
Banana Investments Ltd.  Mr A.R. Olomi 
Chemi and Cotex Industries Ltd. Mr Anup L. Modha 
Darsh Industries Ltd. Mr H.C. Lal 
General Tyre East Africa Ltd. Mr Deven Lohani 
Kibo Match Group Ltd. Mr S.B. Nag 
Kwanza Collection  Mr Lawrence Muze 
MAC Group Mr Y.M. Manek 
Metal Crown Ltd.  Mr Shaukat Dalal 
Premier Cashew Industries Ltd. Mr Mushtak Fazal 
Shah Industries Ltd. Mr Himatlal D. Shah 
Sunflag Ltd. Mr Prosper V. Jincen  
Tanzania Tea Packers Group Mr G.C. Theobald 
Tchibo Estates Ltd.  Mr Ralph Medoch 
Research Community  
Research on Poverty Alleviation Dr. Cyril Chami  
Economic and Social Research Foundation Dr. Suma Kaare  
Economic and Social Research Foundation Dr. Josaphat Kweka  
Economic and Social Research Foundation Dr. Beatrice Mkenda 
Economic and Social Research Foundation Dr. Flora Musonda 
Economic and Social Research Foundation Ms Ummy Mwalimu 
Economic and Social Research Foundation Dr. Stergomena Tax 
Tanzania Trade and Poverty Programme Dr. Haji Semboja 
University of Dar es Salaam Prof. Francis Matambalya 
University of Dar es Salaam, Economic Research Bureau Dr. Gordon Mjema 
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Annex B: Interview Questionnaire 
 
B–1: Questionnaire for Government Officials, Researchers, Associations, NGOs, Donors45 
1 General Questions concerning EPAs 
— Are you familiar with the EPA concept? 
— In what way is your institution involved in EPA preparations? 
— Will / should the extent of involvement of your institution change in the future? 
— In what way are you personally involved in EPA preparations? 
— Will / should your personal involvement change in the future? 
— Have you or other staff in your institution participated in capacity building in this respect? 
— Are you currently undertaking any activities regarding EPAs? 
2 Economic and Social Impact of EPAs on Tanzania 
— How have the economic sectors responded to trade liberalisation so far? 
— What has been the impact of past trade liberalisation? 
— What economic impact will an EPA have on Tanzania? 
— Which sectors will be affected most by an EPA? 
— In what way will these sectors be affected (positive / negative effects)? 
— Will they be able to respond adequately? 
— How could phasing and coverage of trade liberalisation accommodate the needs  
of Tanzanian economic actors?  
— Are there currently any problems with market access (EU / region / general)? 
— Has the EBA initiative improved market access to the EU? 
— If preferences are not exploited, why not? 
— What will be the fiscal impact of EPAs on Tanzania? 
                                                     
45  Not all questions apply to all interviewees. 
62 Regine Qualmann et al. 
— Can Tanzania compensate for potential revenue loss? 
— Is the potential impact of EPAs being discussed under the current fiscal reform? 
 
— What will be the social (poverty-related) impact of EPAs on Tanzania? 
— Which social groups will be affected most? 
— In what way will these groups be affected (positive / negative)? 
— How can the most vulnerable groups be protected from a negative impact? 
3 National Co-ordination and Preparations of EPA Negotiations 
— Which institutions are involved in the preparations of EPA negotiations? 
— How do these institutions work together? Is there a co-ordination mechanism between the ministries? 
— What should a co-ordination mechanism look like? 
 
— Where do you see major deficits in preparations and co-ordination? 
— Is trade capacity effectively utilized?  
— Does Tanzania make use of funding provided for capacity building?  
 
— Which of the national authorities are responsible for regional integration initiatives? 
— How do these national authorities work together with the regional integration initiatives EAC and SADC? 
— Has Tanzania defined interests at the regional level and how are these enforced? 
— Is Tanzania willing to give a greater role to the regional integration initiatives in the negotiation process? 
 
— How is Tanzania participating in the ongoing EU-all ACP negotiations?  
— How are the national authorities working together with their representatives in Brussels  
and Geneva (WTO)? 
— Whom do the representatives in Brussels and Geneva report to? 
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— Does Tanzania make use of the ACP Secretariat’s expertise? How? 
 
— How are the negotiations prepared for? 
— Who are the actors involved in the preparations for the negotiations? 
— How does Tanzania determine its national and regional interests? 
— Has Tanzania defined its national and regional interests? 
— How could Tanzania strengthen its negotiation capacity? 
4 Involvement of New Actors 
— Who are the actors involved in the preparations for the negotiations? 
— How does Tanzania define its national and regional interests? 
— Has Tanzania defined its national and regional interests? 
— Which ministries are responsible for the preparations for EPA negotiations? 
— How do these ministries work together? Is there a co-ordination mechanism between the ministries? 
— If not, how could you image such a mechanism? 
— Does Tanzania make use of the funding provided by the PMU for capacity building? 
— How could Tanzania strengthen its negotiation capacity? 
 
— How do the national authorities work together with the regional integration initiatives EAC and SADC?  
— How does Tanzania represent its interests on the national and regional level in the EAC and SADC? 
— Is Tanzania willing to give a greater role to the regional integration initiatives in the negotiation process? 
 
— How is Tanzania participating in the ongoing negotiations?  
— How are the national authorities working together with their representatives in Brussels? 
— Does Tanzania make use of the ACP Secretariat’s expertise? How? 
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B–2: Questionnaire for Private Enterprises 
— What products do you produce? 
— Are you currently exporting to any foreign country? 
— To which countries do you export? 
— How much of your output do you export? 
— What share to which country? 
 
If you do not export, why not? 
Do you face any obstacles to potential / current exports? 
— Which obstacles are you currently faced with ? (RoO, SPS, tariff escalation,  
red tape, packaging, local authorities, other) 
— How could these obstacles be overcome? 
— Do you think that other enterprises are faced with the same problems? 
 
— Are any inputs for your enterprises imported? 
— Where do these inputs come from? 
— What percentage of your inputs is imported? 
— What percentage is imported from which country? 
— Are your imported inputs subject to tariffs or any levies? 
— If you export, do you make use of duty drawback? 
— If not, why not? 
 
— Do you face competition from foreign producers? (foreign or domestic?) 
— Who are these competitors and where do they produce? 
— Do they produce the same products as you or do they produce substitutes? 
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— Do you think further trade liberalisation would increase competition from foreign producers? 
 
— Were you affected by past trade liberalisation?  
— In what ways? 
— How have you responded? 
 
— What do you expect of the customs union with Uganda and Kenya? 
— Are you taking any measures to deal with the new trade regime? 
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— What would be your policy interests in the establishment of the customs union? 
 
— Have you ever heard of the EPA concept? 
— Have you ever been invited to any information workshop on the new EU ACP trade agreement / Cotonou? 
— What are your interests in the trade negotiations with the EU? 
— How are you participating in policy formulation currently? 
— What organisation represents your interests towards the relevant government  
institutions and has it informed you about the new EU ACP trade agreement? 
 
— Are you familiar with the EPA concept? 
— In what way is your institution involved in EPA preparations? 
— Will / should the extent of involvement of your institution change in the future? 
— In what way are you personally involved in EPA preparations? 
— Will / should your personal involvement change in the future? 
— Have you or other staff in your institution participated in capacity building in this respect? 
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Annex D: Methodology of Comparative Static Analysis for Fiscal Impact Estimation 
 
For our estimate of the revenue impact of an EAC-EU EPA we make use of comprehensive data collected by the 
Tanzania Revenue Authority, which provides import data at the 8-digit level of the Harmonised System (HS) by 
country of origin. This high level of disaggregation enables us to calculate the average revenue collected for each 
product and trading partner in a specific fiscal year. The latest available data is for fiscal year 2001/2002, which 
we use as the base year for our calculations. 
In order to assess the revenue impact of an FTA between the EAC and the EU, we proceed in two steps. First, we 
estimate the trade creation and diversion anticipated in connection with an East African FTA, and then, in a sec-
ond step, we use the resulting trade flows to estimate the trade creation and diversion generated by an FTA be-
tween the EAC and the EU, following the methodology of Gitu et al. (2003).48 However, our approach differs 
from previous attempts to assess the revenue impact of such FTAs, which mostly focus on nominal tariffs pre-
sumably applied to imports into Tanzania. For our estimate of the accruing revenue loss we use not nominal tariff 
rates but the amount of import duty actually collected on each product. In addition, we calculate the average tax 
effect accruing to VAT, excise duties, and sales tax49 on the respective imports. We in this way seek to take into 
account the substantial revenue loss due to official as well as unofficial tax exemptions in Tanzania (cf. Rajaram 
1999:15). 
To estimate the respective volumes of trade creation for Kenya and Uganda caused by an EAC FTA, we first 
compute the average tariff ti,j collected on product i from each trading partner j. This average tariff reflects the 
effective price change τi,j for imports from each of the two preferred trading partners for the case that tariffs on 
imports of good i are eliminated. Trade creation TC for good i imported from country j is then computed using 
the formula  
 TCi,j= Mi,j*εd,i*τi,j/(1+ti,j), 
where Mi,j denotes current imports of product i from country j, and εd,i the elasticity of demand for good i.  
In order to quantify the amount of trade diversion away from non-preferential partners k towards EAC partners, 
we calculate the combined average tariff ξi on imports of i from Uganda and Kenya (weighted with the cif value 
of current imports from each country). This average tariff reflects the average price change on imports of i that 
accrues to tariff elimination towards the preferential trading partners. The corresponding diversion of imports of 
good i away from supplying country k towards preferential trading partners is then given by  
 TDi,k= Mi,k*εs,i*ξi/(1+ti,k), 
where Mi,k denotes current imports of product i from country k, and εs denotes the elasticity of substitution be-
tween different suppliers of good i. Imports thus diverted from each non-preferential partner k are then split up 
between preferential partners j according to their share of current imports of the respective product (cf. DeRosa 
2002:13). In case the product is currently not imported from any of the preferred partners, we assume that this 
                                                     
48  This two-step approach is adopted in order to make our results comparable with previous studies examining the fiscal impact of tariff 
elimination within the EAC. 
49  Although the sales tax was presumably replaced by a 20 % VAT in July 1998, the data show collected sales tax for HS codes 
27100031 (aviation kerosene), and 87112000 (motorcycles with reciprocating engines of capacity 50-250cc) imported from Saudi 
Arabia. 
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specific product cannot be supplied by them in the short run, and consequently that no trade diversion can take 
place.50 In this case ξi cannot be derived and TDi is set to zero. 
Since no reliable estimates for either of the respective elasticities can be obtained, we follow Gitu et al. (2003) in 
assuming constant values of 0.5 for εd and 2 for εs for all goods. However, since these values are rather arbitrary, 
we run the same computation, doubling and halving εd and εs, in order to test the sensitivity of our results with 
regard to this important assumption.  
The change in public revenue corresponding to the changes thus derived in effective tariffs and trade flows is 
then computed by applying not only the new tariff regime to the estimated imports but also the average tax effort 
(i.e. excise, VAT, sales tax, and any other surcharges recorded in the data) corresponding to each product and 
country of origin, thereby taking into account the differential treatment accorded to different products from dif-
ferent trading partners by central government taxes, as revealed by the data.  
To obtain estimates of the revenue impact of an FTA with the EU in the second step, we proceed in exactly the 
same manner, allowing for trade diversion away from both EAC countries and other non-EU partners based on 
the estimated trade flows under an EAC FTA. 
It must be stressed that in our estimate we resort to some elementary simplifications. First, we do not take into 
account the changes in import tariffs following the establishment of a common external tariff (CET) in the EAC, 
with rates that will presumably differ from the ones currently prevalent in Tanzania. The reason we adopt this 
simplification is that because we use the average tariff rates actually collected instead of nominal ones, we would 
have to know what this average would be in the case of the CET. Calculating the effect of the CET with its 
nominal rates would in this case inevitably underestimate the true revenue effect, because this would be tanta-
mount to the  assumption that all exemptions were eliminated at the same time.51 The second major simplification 
we resort to is that we do not take dynamic effects into account, and assume that when an FTA is established, all 
tariffs are eliminated immediately. This does not reflect the fact that the Cotonou Agreement envisages a transi-
tional period of up to twelve years for implementation of full reciprocity between ACP economies and the EU. 
Any such gradual adjustment of tariffs may, however, lead to quite different results and remains to be examined 
in future research. Finally, basing the calculations on trade flows of a single year is not unproblematic, as these 
can be expected to evolve quite dynamically over the coming years. However, despite these major simplifica-
tions, we believe that in employing this method we should be able to get some realistic idea of the magnitude of 
the revenue impact to be expected from an EPA between the EAC and the EU. 
 
 
                                                     
50  It should be noted that this – among others – is an important simplification we resort to in our calculations.  
51  One solution to this problem would have been to assume that the same average share of nominal tariff rates collected will be collected 
under a CET. However, for this purpose we would have needed the actual tariff rates as well as those envisaged under the CET for 
each HS code. Unfortunately, these data were not available at the time of writing. 
  
